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SOME
REFLEXIONS

UPON THE

Seventh, Eighth and Ninth VERSES

OF THE

Second Chapter of GENESIS;

Wherein the OPINIONS of the late ingenious

Dr. MIDDLETON,

(As far as that Passage is concerned)

And of the LEARNED AUTHOR of the Originals, &c.

(In respect to a particular Part of it)

ARE OCCASIONALLY CONSIDERED.

Si quid novisti rectius istis,
Candidus imperti: HOR.



LONDON;

Printed by W. STRAHAN;

And Sold by Messrs. RIVINGTON, in LONDON; J.
FLETCHER, in OXFORD; and W. THURLBOURN,
in CAMBRIDGE. MDCCCLII.



T H E
P R E F A C E.

THE Multiplicity of Writings, that in the present Age are offered to the Public Inspection, may justly seem to call for some Apology from the Generality of those who presume to add to their number. The World is at all times an awful Tribunal, but more especially when so many various compositions, and each of these frequently excellent in their kind, have at once exercised and improved its Judgment, and made a more refined Taste become, in some degree, general: from hence every future addition to the present Stock of Observations may appear less necessary,

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sary, whilst its reception must be more difficult, even supposing there was a necessity for it.

*A Writer possessed with these high, and at the same time well-grounded notions of the abilities and delicacy of his Judges, must, in proportion, find it more incumbent upon him to apologize for himself; and yet perhaps from that very circumstance will be more at a loss how to do so. It therefore, I hope, need not be matter of surprize, if under these impressions I should feel some hesitation, and be ready to draw back when at the very entrance, as being conscious of defect of art sufficient to give a favourable Bias to those who may possibly condescend to be my Readers. But here a common Observation comes in to my aid, viz. that artless Distress generally speaks more strongly for itself, than when adorned with all the studied Parade of Eloquence. I believe, therefore, my very best Apology will be, to lay the plain naked Truth before the Reader, without
any*

P R E F A C E.

any Art or Covering whatever, and so trust myself entirely to his Candour.

All then, that, upon this method of proceeding I can have to say, will be comprehended in a small compass. In reading that passage of Sacred Writ in the Original, which is the Subject of the following Essays, it appeared to me in a view extremely simple and obvious, and which at the same time gave full, clear, and distinct Ideas to each Term made use of through the whole; and moreover caused the seventh and ninth verses to correspond to each other with an uncommon exactness. This naturally led me into such a train of thought and method of enquiry, as appeared necessary to guard and support what I apprehended to be the truth of the point; a Detail of which here would only be an anticipation of what is to come hereafter, and therefore I must refer the Reader to the particulars, as they shall arise before him.

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Only it may be proper to observe, that I consulted various Lexicographers and Commentators besides those that in the course of my Subject I had occasion to mention; and altho' one or other of them may give, I believe, the Sanction of his opinion for that sense of the terms in the present case, which, I apprehend, Usage, Etymology, and the Context requires them to bear, yet I do not perceive that any one of them has view'd, or gone through the whole in the method I have pursu'd. Whether this may be look'd upon as a recommendation, or the contrary, I know not, yet the Reflexion arising from hence, that I have not been entirely actum agens, doing what is already done to my hand, and merely retailing the opinions of others, will be a sufficient Inducement for me to proceed.

But as the Light, in which I viewed the passage, led me to adhere to the literal Historical Narrative of the Jewish Legislator, and

P R E F A C E. vii

a Person whose general Character was that of an elegant, spirited and popular Writer, has given entirely into an Allegorical Scheme upon this part of the Mosaic History, I was call'd upon, towards the conclusion, to say something, in order to obviate whatever impressions He might possibly have made in opposition to what I apprehended to be the true account; with this therefore I have ventured to conclude the first Essay. And as some time after I had done so, another learned Writer fell into my hands, who gave an Interpretation to one of the Terms that I had occasion to treat of, which tended to overthrow, what I look'd upon to be the true meaning of the Passage; this required me to examine what He offer'd in support of his notion, the result of which is the Subject of the second Essay.

Thus then a sincere Enquiry after, and Endeavour to vindicate, what I take to be the Truth, and that of a Sacred kind too, is the shortest and best Apology that I can make for
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sending abroad at all what may be found in the following Pages.

As to the committing of them to the Public View in the original form which they were first drawn up in, of a sort of familiar Letters to a Friend, I have endeavoured to apologize for that in the Letters themselves, and therefore there is less occasion to repeat it here, especially when thro' my anxiety to gain the Reader's favour, (for which I am afraid there will be but too much occasion) I have, in some measure, been guilty of repetition in what I have already said. I will therefore desist from any further enlargement of this Preface, lest my Apology should itself stand in need of one.

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ESSAY

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ESSAY I.

S I R,

I Am going to provoke your Censure ;—you will say, perhaps, that it is quite unnecessary to do so, since Censure is what the generality of people are but too apt to complain they can have more than sufficient of, without giving (as they think) any Provocation at all. It may be proper, therefore, for me to explain myself a little, and to tell you, that by Censure, I mean Criticism; and yet, after I have even thus soft'ned the Term, I am afraid (such is your great Candor and good Nature !) that I shall not prevail upon your good Sense to overcome these Obstacles so far, (which yet is setting my Fears very high too) so far, I say, as to exert itself effectually for me upon the Occasion, unless I have recourse to some little kind of Artifice likewise. I shall, therefore, throw what I have to say (for the most part) into a Sort of Queries ; as being the best Excitement to the Reluctance of your Humanity, as most expressive of my Deference to a superior Judgment, and as being one of the

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properest Methods too of vindicating my own Prudence in giving you what I have just above call'd a Provocation ; and if I shou'd any where neglect to put this Design in Execution, I beg that you will look upon the Omission as a Compliance with the turn of the Sentence, or a Slip of the Memory, and wherever almost it is not express'd, that you wou'd suppose it to be some way imply'd ; and moreover, that I don't send this to you, so much to give my own Opinion, as to solicit yours.—In this View then, those Qualifications, that I was afraid of, may appear to have a fair opportunity of exercising themselves ; but still, to give a yet further Incitement to you, I must let you know, that it is highly probable, your Answer may bring me to an immediate Resolution in any Point, which may appear, perhaps, of a more than ordinary doubtful Nature, and which I should not be able to come to for some time, if I waited 'till I thought myself fully qualified to sit in Judgment, and pass Sentence upon all my own Queries.

There has then of late Years, a strong Spirit of enquiry gone forth into the learned World, and may it ever continue ! But are we not frequently apt to approach human Authors with rather too much reverence, and those, that are confessedly divine, with rather too little ? or at least, do we always sufficiently keep up and maintain

maintain that distance between them, which Truth and Sense require?

Is our Business, in respect of these latter, any more than to assure ourselves that we have the *true Reading* before us, and then to enquire into the *true Meaning* of it, according to the known and established Rules of Interpretation in such cases, and if (after we are satisfied as to these points) any Difficulty remains, is it not more becoming us to resolve it into our Ignorance of the *Depth of the Riches*, both of the *Wisdom and Knowledge of God*, (Rom. xi. 33.) than to cavil and find fault with his Dispensations?

And altho' I have said we are to enquire into the *true Meaning* of these Writers, yet is there not more Methods than one of arriving at it? Is not an Attention to what precedes, follows, or is immediately connected with any passage, i. e. to the Context, an approved Method? Is not comparing parallel Places in the same Author, or different Authors in the same Code, or even in two Testaments of the same divine Stamp, another way that is often successful? And here let me add, for fear of Misapprehension, (altho' it seems, in a good measure, implied as a Qualification previous to the two Methods just mentioned) is not Etymology, or a tracing up Words to their original Root or Roots, and a deducing their various Significations from thence, as far as they can be obtain'd by these means, a Me-

thod very deserving of regard, especially in the dead Languages, and more especially in this of the Sacred, as being more simple and analogical than the Tongues of inferior Date; and therefore, from this Circumstance, capable of rather more certainty, when thus treated, than the others are? Or lastly, is not a recourse to the antient Translations, a Proceeding approv'd by many as of use in these cases? But is it not dangerous to presume to alter, or conclude the Originals corrupted upon their Authority? or even to give new or unusual Senses to words upon the same Authority, unless there shou'd be Places, where the Context renders such a Conduct absolutely necessary, or parallel Texts to support it; (and then the Sense will not be properly new or unusual) I say, is it not dangerous, because the Translators are not infallible; and supposing they were so, yet their Translations are as capable of being corrupted, as the Originals? Is their use then frequently, any more than just to shew the Sense of those Translators, even where their Translations are allow'd to be genuine and uncorrupted?

Cannot you readily discern, that in my present Judgment, I prefer the former Methods; and moreover, that I shou'd be glad of your Approbation for doing so? (A)

But hitherto, I have kept you in Suspense; you may collect that I have some Topic of Divinity,

vinity, or some Passage of the S. S. in my Eye, but what it is in particular, you cannot, from any thing I have yet said, conjecture: I ask pardon for keeping you so long, as it were, upon the Threshold, beyond what good Manners can strictly justify; and shall now, without further Delay, introduce you to the Subject.

The Point that I want to enquire into, is, the true Import of the 7, 8, and 9 Verses of the second Chapter of the Book of Genesis.---7. And the Lord God formed Man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and Man became a living Soul.---8. And the Lord God planted a garden eastward in Eden, and there He put the Man whom he had formed.---9. And out of the ground made the Lord God to grow ev'ry tree that is pleasant to the sight, and good for food: the tree of life also in the midst of the garden, and the tree of knowledge of good and evil.

May I not ask, is not the first of these three Verses a sort of recapitulation of the 26 and 27 Verses of the first Chapter, or rather a more distinct unfolding of one Part of them, viz. the Creation of Man only? If so, are not we to look for what is called the Image of God there, in this place likewise? Certainly---if the first question be resolv'd in the affirmative (and that it must be so, I shall endeavour to shew hereafter). But where is this to be found? the first sentence

is, the Lord God (I do not offer at the critical Sense of this expression but take it the Deity) form'd the *Man* or *Adam*,---Dust of the ground or *Admeh*, i. e. of dust taken from the ground to signify either the finest part of the Earth, or that which was the loosest, and therefore of itself and naturally the most unfit for such a purpose; Is not either of these Senses good and proper to be admitted here? The last clause is,---*and Man became a living Soul*; not *became*, but *was* a living Soul: the words likewise here rendered by our Translators, *living Soul*, are exactly the same with those that, in the 24th Verse of the first Chapter, are rendered *living Creature*; and with Submission, do not you think this latter is the better Translation of the two, and more fit for even this place, than the present? For does not *Soul* generally imply in it the Idea of Life, and therefore, is not *a living Soul* a palpable and useless Tautology? (B) But such an one, I apprehend, cannot be laid to the charge of the sacred Writer, or the Spirit by which Moses wrote; and therefore, that the original word (*Napesh*) translated *Soul*, did not, in its primary and leading Signification, include the Idea of *Life*, but only meant an *organical Frame*, in general endow'd, or not endow'd, with a capacity of animal or sensitive Life, i. e. of Sensation and Self-motion; and when it had this *capacity*, and had this *Life actually* conferr'd upon it, then it was (*Napesh chi*) i. e. *a living organical Frame*,
or

or a *living Creature*, I acknowledge, our English word *Creature* does not express so neatly and precisely, as I could wish, the exact meaning that I wou'd have convey'd here, yet a better does not occur to me at present: Hitherto then, have we not found a Body for Man, have we not found that Body organical, and capable of sensitive and animal Life, and actually endow'd with it? But still, is this Adam, this Lord of the Creation, this Image of the Almighty, advanc'd any farther by all we have yet said, than up to a level with the Beasts that perish?

There is but one clause more in the verse. Shall we try then, if what we are in quest of, may be found there? I shall repeat the former part of the Period with it, that we may take the Sense of the whole in a fuller manner. *And the Lord God formed Man of the Dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of Life.* Here then, perhaps, it may be observ'd, that all the Images are material in this last clause, a Prospect (it may be thought) of ill omen to the point that we are in search of: but do not the Adepts in the sacred Language tell us, that all its words in their primary Signification are of that kind? Nay! will not, even our own Language, in a good measure, tell us the same of itself? since the very word, by which we express an Idea the most diametrically opposite to *Matter*, is itself of material extraction, if I may so speak;—I

mean *Spirit*, which is well known to come from the Latin Term, *spirare, to breathe*; the very word (in the Substantive) that our Translators have here made use of, to render (Nusmeh) by, and which might as well be rend'ed the *Spirit* of life.

Of Life did I say? But will not the original word, here likewise, furnish us with an Observation? is it not in the plural number? and pray how comes it to be so?---Marius de Calasio says, because---*Vita plures complectitur annos*; but, suppose a Child died before it was a year old, might not this word, in the plural number, still be apply'd to it, as well as to Adam, who had it given to him before he was a year old? is not the reckoning of our lives by years, a mere arbitrary thing, and might they not as well be computed by Months, Days, or Hours? nay! as ev'ry Inspiration or Expiration that we make, is the free Gift of God, and our Life is but an Aggregate of these, might it not have this plural Term apply'd to it from this consideration? But still, this will not account for its being apply'd to Man in particular, in the History of his Formation, whilst the other Creatures have it not given to them in the Narrative of their Origin, since they are as capable of Life (or Lives) in this Sense of the word, as he is. Ainsworth, I think, says, that by the *Spirit of Lives*, is intimated one Spirit or Soul to be in Man, which
hath

hath sundry Faculties and Operations; but still, this is not at all a distinct Characteristic, that gives the Soul of Man a peculiar Title to the Appellation of Lives, since the Animal Nature of Beasts is capable of sundry Faculties and Operations; and therefore, in this view, they might, at their formation, be said to have a *Spirit of Lives*, given to them, as well as their Lord and Master—Man.—The word here translated Life, may be plural in the Original; because, altho' Life, subsisting in a single *Individual*, is but one, yet, as join'd, or capable of being join'd, to *many* Individuals; it may be considered as manifold, and therefore be stiled Lives: but still, this observation is liable to the same objection with the former. There is another Reason given for the plural Use of this word, which may be seen in a Note upon it, in Leigh's *Critica Sacra*; but it halts in the same place with all the foregoing.

Is not the Sense then, that is wanted for this plural word, a Sense in which it may be in a peculiar Manner, apply'd to Man? since that alone will account for its being bestow'd upon him at the Creation, whilst the other Animals have it not given to them upon the same Occasion: (C) But if Man was originally design'd to live for ever, in the strict sense of the expression, if such a Life upon this Earth would be greatly inconvenient in several respects, if not impossible

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(provided the Propagation of the Species continued in the same proportion from the beginning, which it observes at present, since then, the World must have been long ago furcharg'd with inhabitants,) upon these suppositions, I say, it were reasonable to expect, that after a certain Term, Man wou'd have been transferr'd from his present habitation to some other Mansions, altho' he had never sinned, and from thence incurred a temporal death. In this case, indeed, the thread of Life wou'd never have been broken by a mortal dissolution, and consequently, in that view, it wou'd have been but *one*; yet, if we consider how totally different the future life must have been from the present temporal one, even in this case, we may notwithstanding, I think, look upon them as two Lives, or widely different States of Existence.

If it shou'd be ask'd, how I know that they wou'd have been so different? Don't you think this might be a proper answer? Experience shews us, that the Bodies of Men, in their present condition, are not capable of being supported for ever, by the method of earthly and carnal nourishment; since, supposing no Diseases to intervene, Old Age itself, by a very natural Process, will render the Body absolutely incapable of performing the functions of Life by that means. But will it be said, that it was not thus from the beginning? that there is a manifest and great

difference introduc'd between the present State of
 man's life, and that of the Ante-Diluvians; and
 therefore this shews, that God (if it had so pleas-
 ed him) might have increas'd this difference to
 an infinite degree, in case our great Fore-father
 had never transgress'd, i. e. might have made
 his Body, and those of all his Posterity, to be
 supported for ever, just in the same way, that
 they are now maintain'd during the Span of the
 present Existence: and this conjecture may re-
 ceive some strength from the promise made of
glorified Bodies, to those that are Christ's at his
 coming, under the present Dispensation of the
 Gospel. For if God will bestow glorified Bo-
 dies upon his faithful christian followers in the
 world to come, certainly it were easy to conceive
 and reasonable to expect, that Adam might, and
 wou'd have had his Body preserv'd, such as it
 was when first created, by the same means that
 it was at all supported; and this *for ever*, without
 any difficulty, if He had not been guilty of
 a breach of duty, and God had in his good
 pleasure so ordain'd it. What God may do of
 his good pleasure, becomes not me or any Man
 to search too narrowly into; — but has He in-
 deed promised *glorified Bodies* to Christians?
 most assuredly. — St. Paul asserts it positively,
 (1. Cor. ch. xv. v. 43.) He says it (i. e. our Body)
 is down in Dishonour, it is rais'd in Glory. But,
 what is it to be rais'd in Glory? the following

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Characteristics of our raised Bodies, viz. of Power, and their being spiritual, seem to be but amplifications upon the former; their Glory will be, that they shall have their Powers very much enlarged, and become likewise spiritual, not in the strict intellectual sense of the word, but only as having something analogous to Spirit, as not being liable to any Decays, consequently not standing in need of any Repairs, and by that means, the necessity for food and all the other Accommodations of this life will be superseded. Our Saviour hath likewise told us, that in the next world Men neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are as the Angels of God; but these last Beings want not the assistance of earthly accommodations, and therefore good Christians will not want them. Is this then the State assigned to the Bodies of faithful Christians? But what are faithful Christians? Are they not pardoned Criminals at the best? and is it reasonable to think, that these should be put into a better condition, in respect of their bodies, than an unoffending Adam? if they gain what He forfeited by his transgression, is not that as much as can be expected for them? if they are then Inheritors of eternal Life, and are to be endow'd with glorified Bodies, certainly it may be strongly concluded, that Adam, if He had not offended, wou'd, after a time, have been removed into another eternal State, and have been likewise endow'd

dow'd with a glorified Body, not subject to the decays, nor standing in need of the repairs of an earthly Tabernacle. Does not then this circumstance of the glorified Bodies of Christians, that came in by way of objection, serve strongly to confirm our reasoning, in respect to the translation of Adam into another State, altho' He had not subjected himself to Death by transgression; and consequently, might not He, in a very proper and true sense, be said to have had the *Spirit of Lives*, or a capacity of a double Existence given unto him, altho' he had never offended, and by consequence never died? Thus much then for this point.

There remains but one particular more, and then we shall have done with this verse; it is—and (the Lord God) *breathed into his nostrils*, &c. Now this Expression, as well as the other, conveys *material* Ideas to us, since to breathe, blow gently, or inspire into the nostrils of an animal Body is a material Action; but certainly, there is no necessity for understanding it in the strict *literal* Sense; nay! I must insist upon it, there is a sort of necessity for understanding it otherwise. May not this be illustrated by what our blessed Saviour is said, by St. John (Ch. xx. v. 22.) to have done to his disciples, when he conferr'd upon them the Holy Spirit? He breathed or inspired upon them,—He breathed in or upon (*ἐνεπνεύμασε*) (the very word the Seventy have made

made use of to translate the above expression from the original Hebrew) and said, *Receive ye the Holy Ghost*. But can we suppose there was any natural Efficacy in this breathing to confer the Holy Ghost? was not this visible action rather perform'd in condescension to the weakness and infirmity of his Disciples, whilst the real cause that gave the Excellence was a secret and invisible operation, such as was to discover itself only by its fruits and effects: And so in like manner, when the inspir'd Writer Moses tells us, that God breathed into the nostrils of the Adam the breath or *spirit of lives*; are not we to understand it spoken or written as in condescension to the capacity of his Hearers or Readers, and in some measure from necessity, because the Language will not, in its primary and most obvious Sense, convey any thing but sensible Ideas, and that He did not intend hereby to describe the exact and particular manner, by which this was effected, since that was secret and (it is probable) really incomprehensible to us in our present state, but only to shew in general that it was really conferr'd; or if we may advance a step farther, and reason analogically from things sensible to things immaterial, then the sense may be, that the operation of the Almighty, by which this Spirit of lives was join'd to the earthly Body or the Adam, was as gentle and as little injurious to the nice and delicate Texture of

of that Part of the Body where it keeps its chief residence, as the ordinary breath of Man is to those things upon which it commonly falls.

Shall we now try, if we have not either directly or incidentally laid in a sufficient quantity of materials to bring us up to the point that we are aiming at? Is it not clear, that if Man had never transgress'd He wou'd never have died? Is it not clear likewise, from what hath been said, that He, notwithstanding, had a capacity of a two-fold Existence conferr'd in a peculiar manner upon him, distinct from the inferior creatures? May it not be strongly argued, from what St. Paul hath declar'd concerning the future life of faithful christians, that his second state was to be (in respect of his corporeal part) almost entirely different from the first, and that moreover, it was to be a glorified and immortal one? But let us ask, what cou'd there be to give the Adam the least pretensions to so a high a Privilege above his *fellow creatures*, the inferior Animals? Can we possibly conceive any thing, except it were a rational and intellectual Soul? Was it not then intended to be signified by this Sentence, that the Lord God joined to the Adam or earthly Body, a Soul capable of a rational life, above the Brute Creatures here, and likewise of a glorious and immortal one, infinitely beyond them in a World to come? I hope it will not be look'd upon as troublesome, if I now give

give you a Paraphrastic Translation or Rendering of the whole verse: may it not be some way thus?

The Lord God formed an Adam (D) or earthly Body out of the finest and loofest part, i. e. the Dust of the Admah or Earth, and inspired into, or united with it, an intellectual and rational Soul, capable of a life of Reason here in this present world, and of a glorious and eternal life in a world to come hereafter; but as the intellectual Soul and earthly Body seem'd too different in their natures for an entire coalition or happy union, the Lord God *moreover* made the Adam an organical Frame capable of, and actually endow'd with, a sensitive or animal life, (such as subsists in the inferior Creatures) as a mean or connecting Term between the earthly Body and intellectual Soul, and to render the *whole Man* a more fit and proper Inhabitant for this temporal World.

I have now given you what I apprehend may be the full meaning of this verse: but wou'd it not be disingenuous not to acknowledge, that I, even I myself, can see some objections to it? But, will it not be too fatiguing to recount them to you? I shall presume upon your good nature, that you will answer in the negative, and altho' it is trespassing rather too much upon that Quality, yet I shall venture to do it; because, by bringing forth these objections, I may possibly
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throw some new light upon, and add a little fresh Strength to what I have already said.

1. Then, it may be observed, that the Word (Napeſh) is not only translated Soul in the Place now before us, but likewise in almost innumerable other Texts, wherein it will not, with any tolerable Propriety, admit of any other Sense. As the Texts are almost innumerable, it would be in vain to attempt a critical examination of them all; I shall, therefore, in part, give that point up, and allow, that it frequently is so; altho' I must, at the same time, beg leave to take Notice, that I fancy it may be often found, that the Sense might, with equal, if not more Propriety, be kept up if it were rendered by *Bodily Frame*, or some such equivalent expression: but the chief difficulty will be to shew, how it can at all signify the Soul consistently with the above explication of it, for if that can *once* be done, it will be a Solution applicable to all cases of the same kind. Shall I attempt it? In order to this end, we may observe, that the Synecdoche (or putting a part for the whole) is a Figure common, I believe, in all languages; thus, when any Thing is compounded of a Variety of parts, it is usual to single out one or two of those that are predominant in its composition, and make that or these stand for the whole indifferently, or for some large Portion of it. Not to trouble ourselves in various Researches upon

a plain case, let us use an Instance from the verse at present before us: the word Adam, in its primary signification, means only the *gross body*, (as its Etymology plainly shews) yet it frequently stands for the whole Man; thus *Body*, likewise in our English language, when joined with an universal affirmative or negative, always, in ordinary conversation, signifies the whole Man or Person, as *no Body* and *every Body*: and this so universally, that it would be reckoned great impropriety to use the Word *Body*, with these Epithets, in its proper Sense, except upon Philosophical Subjects.

And might not then the word, (Napeśh or organical Frame) after having been applied with the Epithet (chi) to signify a *living Creature* or *Animal*, or more fully, a *living organical Frame*; might it not, I say, for conciseness sake, be used singly, or alone, to signify an Animal? But when, by the transgression of our great Forefather, the Animal broke in, as it were, upon the rational part of the Man, and destroyed, in a great measure, the original Subordination established between them, so that all the Abilities of the latter were frequently employed for the gratification of the former, i. e. the whole Soul was either engaged in the Search after, or the actual enjoyment of animal Pleasures; then might not (by an easy transition) the word (Napeśh) rise in its Pretensions too, and lay claim

claim to stand for the whole Soul? And if it not only took advantage (if I may so speak) of the commotions raised in the Microcosm-Man, but really *gained ground* by means of them likewise, then must not the *sacred*, as being *popular* Writers also, submit, in some measure, to it, and let it engross and stand for the whole Soul, if they intended to be of general or common use to the People? But did it not become them likewise to reserve a right of sometimes recalling it back to its original signification, and to let it know, that it had been guilty of encroachments? Certainly.—Now this right, I apprehend, they have *actually* put in execution; which I shall endeavour, in as few words as I can, to lay before you.

I have already observed, that if *Napefb* corresponded exactly to our English word Soul, then the Epithet (*chi*) would have been a superfluous addition to it. I must here add, that the Epithet (*mot*) or dead subjoined to it, would likewise be contrary to truth; because the Soul never dies. But if the original signification of *Napefb* be an organical Frame, indifferent either to *Life* or *Death*, then the Book of the God of Wisdom and Truth may easily, (which, after all our frail reasonings, it necessarily must be) may easily, I say, be acquitted of the Charge of either Superfluity or Falshood. I imagine that I have nothing more to do here but to shew, that

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the Epithet (*mot*) or dead is applied to this word *Napesh*, that our Translators have rendered *Soul*. Now it is to be found so applied in *Levit.* Ch. xxi. v. 11. and there, indeed, they have rendered it *dead Body*, as thro' constraint, since immediately to connect together the two words *dead Soul*, was rather too palpable; and besides, the Sense of the Law, there given, would not admit it. Now a very little reflection may (by the way) shew us, that the Epithet living (as I before observed) is really as *absurd*, tho' not so *flagrant*, when it is given to the Soul, because we have such an expression in our common language as a *living Soul*; but we only employ it, I apprehend, when there is occasion for a Pathos or strong Emphasis to be given; as for instance, I can assure you not a *living Soul* was there, or not a *living Soul* escaped, or such like: But in a calm and easy Narrative of Matters of fact, (as is the case before us) we do not, I think, even at this Day, commonly (if we can at all with Propriety) use it.

But still further to enforce the Point, (from which I have a little digressed) I shall observe, that *Napesh* is not only joined to the Epithet *mot*, but likewise stands alone for what we mean by *dead Carcase*, as in *Levit.* ch. xxi. v. 1. *The Lord said unto Moses speak to the Priests, &c. there shall none be defiled for the DEAD (Napesh) among his People.*—I shall mention but one

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Text more (*Num.* ch. v. v. 2.) Command the Children of Israel that they put out of the Camp, — Whosoever is defiled for the *Dead* (*Nafesh*.) Leigh ascribes this signification of word to a Catachresis; but that is a Figure, I apprehend, that is had recourse to, only when Commentators cannot find any thing better to which they may ascribe a difficulty; In plain terms, it is no more (as you very well know) than an abuse of a word, or a too violent straining it beyond its ordinary meaning, and therefore ought hardly ever to be admitted, when a softer and easier Solution may be given; now the Question is, whether fixing the primary or leading Signification of the word *Nafesh*, as is done above, (and for the reasons there given,) viz. making it a sort of middle Term between Life and Death, and in itself indifferent to both, be not that very solution?

I shall beg leave to offer one observation more (in the way of objection) upon this point, and then shall have done with it. May it not be said, that as we are for determining the primary Sense of *Nafesh*, not to include the Idea of Life in it, because, upon the first Application of it to Animals, the Epithet *living* is added, which, in that case, would be superfluous; may it not be alledged, I say, that the Epithet (not) *dead* is liable to the same objection for just the contrary reason; since to call that *dead*,

which does not include the Idea of Life, may be looked upon as much a Tautology as the other?—No.—To give, indeed, the Epithet of *dead* to that which does not include the Idea of Life in it, and, moreover, never had Life given or superadded to it, would be highly improper, but yet not a Tautology; because Death is a negation of Life, and necessarily presupposes it; and, therefore, to say a thing is dead, is, in effect, to say it once was living; but it does not hold convertibly, and to say a thing is *living* does not imply it *once* was dead; consequently, when we give the Epithet of dead to that which has no Life, we are not guilty of a Tautology; because we inform the Hearer of something more, than we do by barely saying it has no Life: We tell it *once had Life*.——But I ask pardon,—this really looks almost like *Chicane*, tho' I was seriously drawn into it by the course of my Subject: Is not this often the consequence of endeavouring to make very plain things plainer?

I hasten, therefore, to put the conclusive Question to you upon this head; and that is, whether what hath been said to the objection may not be looked upon as a sufficient reason, why the signification here given to the word (*Napesh*) should maintain its place, and, likewise, how the Translation of it by the word *Saul*, in other Places of the sacred Writings, where

where the Context may fitly require doing so, is, notwithstanding, very reconcileable to this rendering? And, moreover, whether giving this, as the primary and leading Sense, does not bid as fair, if not fairer than any other, to reconcile all the different significations that hath been given to it by Translators?—I apprehend it does; but still it is an apprehension, that I should entertain with much greater complacency, if I found it had your concurrence. (D)

But, 2dly, I come now to a seemingly more material objection upon this particular, and that is, that St. Paul appears in (1 Cor. xv. v. 45.) his famous first Epistle to the Corinthians, to render the part of this very passage, that we are now considering, by the expression a *living Soul*:—He says, so it is written, the first Man, Adam was made a *living Soul*. But does not St. Paul quote the Septuagint here? The expression is exactly the same, and, I think, it is a fact pretty generally allowed, that the sacred Writers of the new Testament frequently do so, as being obliged to it, from the circumstances of the Generality of their Converts. The Greek Tongue, was, at that time, I believe, the prevailing Language, and the Septuagint was, for the most part, their Bible, whilst they were ignorant of the original Hebrew; and, therefore, when a quotation was necessary, to this recourse was taken, as being what was understood by

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them ; so that the Septuagint, and not St. Paul, is properly answerable for the Phraseology here. But is it not very possible, that whatever blame is incurred in this Place may be chiefly laid to the Charge of our own Translation ?

I fancy it will be readily allowed, that the Septuagint Writers, and likewise the sacred ones of the new Testament, are frequently obliged to speak of things, of which the Greeks and Heathens, in general, had no notion, 'till they were thus revealed to them ; and, therefore, they must either invent new words upon the occasion, or else apply those that the Greek Tongue furnished them with, in a sense somewhat peculiar to themselves. And may it not admit of a Question, whether the word $\Psiυχ\eta$ (the term here used) is not one of this last kind ? However, be that as it will, thus much is certain, that this same word is employed by the seventy, both to describe something in the inferior Animals and in Man,— $\Psiυχ\eta\ \zeta\omega\sigma\alpha$ is the expression used in common to them both ; and, therefore, were it not reasonable to think, that it was used to describe something that they both had in common ? And farther, the expression, in the original, is exactly the same likewise : (as I have before observed p. 6.) What then, I say, can be inferred from hence, but that it was intended to convey the same Ideas in both cases ? But the highest qualities that the
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Brute enjoys in common with Man is, that it is a *living Creature*, or *Nature*, or more fully, that it is an organical Frame endowed with animal, or rather sensitive life; was not this, therefore, intended to be described by them in both cases, as well as by the Original? But if this was their intention, might it not be St. Paul's too to describe the same thing, in what He hath quoted from them?—Certainly, that it *might* be so, *must* be allowed me. But, perhaps, you'll say, a bare possibility will not, at present, serve my turn; but it must be shewn to be really, and in fact, the case.

What must be done then? Is not here a strong invitation given to us to examine a little into St. Paul's reasoning upon the point? And if, upon doing so, it should appear, that, according to this Sense of the expression, it is clear, regular, and strong; but that, by our present Translation, there is a kind of little confusion thrown over it; would not this be looked upon as sufficient satisfaction to a reasonable Enquirer for the truth of the point, that we are endeavouring to establish? I shall presume for your Answer in the affirmative, upon this supposition; and, therefore, shall make some little essay towards the experiment.

Not to go too far back in the case, it may be sufficient to observe, that the Chain of reasoning in St. Paul (of which the expression, under
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our present consideration, makes a Part) takes its rise from a question put by the Apostle himself, in the way of objection, at the 35th verse. — *But some Man will say, says He, — How are the dead raised up, and with what Body do they come ?* So that the point before him is the resurrection of the body. It was a great difficulty, how a body, mouldered into Dust, could be again restored at all, and then, how it could be made fit for a glorious and eternal life. He argues, by illustration, upon both these points, He shews how the dead body may be raised, by the example of a seed of corn thrown into the earth, and the possibility of its being improved in condition, and fitted for an eternal and heavenly state, from the great variety of bodies subsisting in this visible Universe, that differ from each other greatly in Beauty and Splendor, i. e. in degrees of Glory. — *So also, says He, is the resurrection of the Dead ;* then, in the remainder of this 42d verse, and the whole following, He amplifies upon the great change that will be made between the present and future Bodies of Men ; and, at the 44th verse, He says, *It is sown a natural Body, it is* (i. e. I apprehend, by a common Idiom, *it is to be*) *raised a spiritual Body. There is a natural Body, and there is a spiritual Body.* And so it is (or rather hath been) written in effect ; — what hath been in effect written ? Why, 1st. that there is

a natural Body, because it is said (Gen. ii. v. 7.) *the first Adam was made a living Creature or Nature*, (for the word, rendered *Soul*, is the same with that above rendered *natural*, only the one is a Substantive, the other an Adjective) or more fully, an organical Frame endowed with sensitive life; and this, all Men have derived from him; and, therefore, there is subsisting a *natural body*, and, moreover, endowed with animal or sensitive life (the $\Psiυχὴ ζῳα$.)—But as there are various methods by which this *Life* may be taken from it, and it may be resolved into the dust from whence it originally came, I say farther, that there is to be a *spiritual body* hereafter, because it is, in effect, written, (since it may readily be inferred from the Gospels) that the great Author of our Religion (whom I shall here call the last Adam) was made, and now is, a life-making or a quickening Spirit, and, therefore, He can restore the *Body* and that *Life* that hath been separated from it; and, moreover, make it, in some Sense, spiritual, so as to be a fit inhabitant for the heavenly Mansions.—But as the natural or earthly body of Adam was first, and then the spiritual and glorified body of Christ our Saviour after, so likewise must it be with us; we must submit to carry about an earthly organical Body, to have it moulder in the dust, and then hereafter raised again into that which is *spiritual*.—As

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we have borne the Image of the earthly,—we shall also bear the Image of the heavenly *Adam*, and so forth. Here then, I apprehend, the process of reasoning is clear, regular, and strong; but if the $\Psiυχὴ ζῶσα$ is to be translated a *living Soul*, and Soul is to be understood, in the full sense of the word, for the intellectual and rational part of Man, then, I apprehend, the Chain will be, in some measure, broke, and a little confusion introduced. For how can Adam's being made a living Soul tend any way to illustrate or prove that there is a natural Body, (the point that He was upon) or to prove the resurrection of it: Nay! something of a Proof for the contrary may be drawn from that consideration, since, to set the Soul entirely free from the prison of this earthly Tabernacle, should seem more desirable and more conducive to its happiness, than to re-unite it again after a releasement, and would not only *seem*, but *really* be so, upon any other footing than that of the Christian Doctrine of a spiritualized body. However, nothing could be inferred from it towards the point, because multitudes would allow of the Soul's existence after separation, that would strenuously deny the Credibility, or even Possibility of the Resurrection of the Body; and, therefore, this expression, as in our Translation, seems to stand off from the Subject in hand, to be introduced with little or no propriety,

priety, and to cause a disturbance to the Sentence that follows ; for the sense seems to require some opposition between them, and our Translation makes them very near the same, for certainly, to a common understanding, there is no very great difference between a *living Soul* and a *quickenig Spirit*. But it is not St. Paul's method to introduce things unavailing, or foreign to his Subject ; altho' He frequently uses a copious variety, yet it is a variety that is connected and dependant ; and, therefore, if, by sinking the Term $\Psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ a little, beneath what it bears in our Translation, we give that opposition, that connection and dependance, likewise, that the context requires ; is not this a strong presumption, that we have laid hold upon the Idea that St. Paul had, when He wrote, and, by consequence, given the right rendering to the original Hebrew also, in the Place under our present consideration ? And may not then, from what hath been said upon this objection likewise, some more materials be collected to throw into that Scale, into which we have put the truth of the case ?

There is but one thing more that I can think of, at present, upon this Head, and that is, it were to be wished we had some classical Authorities for this use of the word $\Psi\upsilon\chi\eta$, altho' I have, at the entrance upon this point, put in a sort of Bar to any objection that may arise from
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the want of them ; yet I should not despair, if I had leisure to make a little search after them. (F)—— I come now to my 3rd and last objection. May it not then possibly be said by some one, that He will join issue with me, in respect to the expression, in the last clause of the verse, and agree to render it a living Creature ; but then, for an entirely different Reason from what I do, viz. because it is a summing up of, or a conclusion from, the two preceding clauses, and then it must not be as I say, and the Adam (*likewise*) was, but the Adam became (as our Translation has it) *a living Creature*, in consequence of what was just before said ? And, therefore, nothing more is really intended to be described here, than barely that Adam was a *living Creature*, or *organical Frame* endowed with *sensitive life*.

A Person that takes upon him to maintain a critical point in literature, is somewhat like (if we may compare small things with great) a General defending a besieged Town. He must look not only on the right, but also on the left and all around ; for the assailants may possibly attempt upon every side, at least, it cannot be known certainly at which particular part they will exert their strength ; and, therefore, none (if that is practicable) is to be neglected : And altho' I pretend to neither Quick sightedness nor Abilities sufficient for an undertaking in that way,

way, nor, supposing I had them, would my Temper and Inclination permit me readily to enter the lists of controversy: yet I profess myself an humble Votary to Truth, and I am so sensible of your *good dispositions* towards it, that, I believe, you will lend a favourable ear to whatever professes any thing like them, however defective it may be in other respects. But, —enough of this—lest I should offend you.

(To be ingenuous then,—this objection, (as I have put it) at first view, seemingly gives an air of correctness to the whole verse, (when taken separate) which it must otherwise want; for 1st. there is the Adam from the dust of the Admah; then 2dly. the Life was infused into it; and then 3dly. the consequence, that the Adam became a *living* Creature, or of the class of Animals. But there are great embarrassments attending this interpretation, even when the verse is separately taken, and much more when it is taken with the context. For first, will not all the difficulty, that we have before mentioned, in respect to the plural expression, (*Chiim* or *lives*) being particularly applied to Man and not to the other Animals, (P. 9.) will not it, I say, *recur again here?* But, will any one reply, that I have, in a good measure, answered this Question myself, by what I have intimated at P. 5, viz. that this verse is only a more distinct unfolding of one

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Part of the 26th and 27th verses of the 1st chapter,—the creation of man only?—I readily allow, that I have done rather something more than intimated it there ; but I ask, would it not be a most extraordinary way, even in a common Writer, of more distinctly unfolding or analysing his Subject, to leave out the most material part of the composition?—Now, I apprehend, this is really the case here, if the *breath of life* or *lives* is to stand for nothing more than the *animal life*; and this last clause is to be a consequence of the two former, for then the intellectual and rational Part of Man, that is, I think, the most material Part, will really be omitted.—Besides, if the last clause is to be looked upon in the way of consequence to the two former, then there will be an offence against one established rule of artificial reasoning, that is, there is a new Term introduced into the conclusion, which is in neither of the preceding clauses ; and this obstacle cannot well be removed, but by saying that *Adam* and *Napesh* contain exactly the same Ideas and are of the same signification, which I fancy would be an assertion full as difficult to be maintained, as the point it is intended to support. It may, indeed, be alledged, that Moses wrote long before these artificial Rules of reasoning were invented, and, therefore, cannot be supposed to be guided by them ; but Moses wrote by an Art much supe-

prior to even the Source from whence they took their Origin, since what He penned was by divine Inspiration, and these Rules took their rise from observations upon the workings of the natural reason of Mankind, and are nothing but those methodized and reduced under government: It certainly then behoves us to suspect an interpretation, which seems plainly to lay an inspired Writer open to their correction.

These, then, are Difficulties attending this sense of the verse, when it is separately taken; but when it is considered with the context, the Difficulties will grow mightily upon us. I must here be obliged to anticipate my Subject a little, and have recourse to the last sentence of the 9th verse; (I go no farther back in it, because I must, as yet, suppose the sentence immediately preceding a disputed point) — there is mentioned the Tree of the Knowledge of good and evil planted in the Garden. Now, of whatever kind this tree was, it is plainly made the occasion of a *positive* Precept, (here I oppose positive to moral, and not to negative, as you will plainly see) the occasion of a positive Precept, I say; for we read at v. 16 and 17 of this Chapter, that the Lord God commanded the Man, saying, — *Of every Tree in the garden thou may'st freely eat; but of the tree of the Knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it; for in the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die.* The first clause is a

Permission, containing a piece of instruction likewise, that He *might* freely eat without any danger of injury to himself, or offence to his Maker; but the latter is a compleat Law in all its parts, being promulged by a proper authority, having a penal sanction annexed to it; and a res possibilis for the subject matter of it; then there is nothing wanting but a *rational* and *free Agent* for its *Object*, since, I think, it is universally allowed, that the inferior Animals are not capable of Law, in the strictly proper sense of the word, i. e. in the sense that I have just given of it.—But, if only the Animal Nature of Adam is described in the 7th verse, then will there not be something wanting to correspond to this tree of the Knowledge of good and evil, which is made the occasion of such a command?

Will it be said, that that part of the Man, which is susceptible of Law, was before described, and, therefore, that there is no necessity to repeat it again here? May I then ask, why, was there any Repetition made at all? Was it not that the sacred Writer was going to shew, what provision his Creator had made for the Man, by forming a garden or plantation, and placing Trees in it, suited to an animal Nature, and, likewise, one that was made the occasion of a Law properly so named, and which, therefore, called for a free and rational Being as
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the Object of it ; hence, if it was proper to repeat and unfold one part of the human Nature upon this occasion, it was equally proper to repeat both ; may not I, therefore, from these considerations, infer pretty strongly, that more than the animal Nature of the Adam was here intended to be described, and, consequently, have I not, from what hath been said upon this objection likewise, gained some additional strength to the above explication ? And, besides, have I not, at the same time, in a good measure, fulfilled an engagement, that I made to you long ago. — Nay ! it is very excusable if you do not readily recollect it, for I made it at the beginning of this epistle, (P. 5.) and it was to endeavour at shewing that this 7th verse was a sort of recapitulation, or a more distinct unfolding of one part of the 26 and 27th verses of the 1st Chapter, viz. the Creation of Man only ; for if the 9th verse shews the propriety, and, therefore, in some measure, necessity of all the parts of the human Nature being repeated at verse the 7th ; this, upon reflection, you will see, proves the point.

I fancy, that I have now almost worn out your Patience ; and, therefore, shall I give over, and reserve the remainder, of what I have to offer, for another Letter ? But, methinks, I hear you say, since I have got so far, I should be glad to go through with, and make

an end of it at once.—I will, upon this presumption, then venture to go on.

The next verse hath not much in it to stop us long, and it is to be considered rather upon the account of being introductory to the following, than upon its own; yet, there may be some things worthy of notice in it, altho' I doubt not but they are trite to you. In our translation, it runs thus:—*And the Lord God planted a garden eastward in Eden: and there He put the Man whom He had formed.* The word translated *in Eden*, in the original, precedes the word translated *Eastward*, and signifies in pleasure or delight, or a pleasant place; and, therefore, do you think any harm would be done, if it were rendered (instead of making it a proper name) *a pleasant Garden*, and the word rendered *Eastward*, is literally from the East, (Me-kodam) (G) which is an hardly intelligible expression in this passage; but the word (kodam) has another meaning, and that is, *the Beginning*, and, therefore, me-kodam may be translated *from the beginning* or *at the first*, i. e. immediately upon Adam's being created, or it may mean upon the third day of the Creation, when the Herbs and Trees bearing fruit were created; and this, I think, rather the better sense. Then the whole verse will run thus:—*And the Lord God planted a pleasant garden at the first (or from the beginning) and He put therein the Adam,*
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whom he had formed. — By these means, indeed, we shall lose, in some measure, the Geography of this famous garden; but, I fancy, when we think seriously and soberly, we shall be ready to allow, that not only this particular spot, but the whole *antidiluvian* World is pretty much Terra incognita to us. Yet, I am sorry, upon one account, because as our Translation makes it *Eastward*, I suppose it must mean of the place where Moses wrote, and then it would have been a warm Climate; and a warm Climate, I think, the condition of our first Parents necessarily required.

I say warm, upon a supposition that the Earth's Axis kept the same position to the Plane of the Ecliptic in the Anti-diluvian World, that it does in our own; and I have not seen much reason to think it was otherwise. A wild and ingenious Theorist, indeed, in order to improve, as He thought, his first World, supposed the Axis of it to be at right Angles to this Plane, but his more accurate Examiner has shewn, very fully, that its present situation is much preferable; and, therefore, I am inclined to believe it was always thus: But be these things as they may; when I consider, that our great Progenitors were moulded into form, and sent forth from the hands of an all-wise and all-merciful Creator, and that He did not think fit immediately to teach them the use of Cloathing,

I make no scruple to believe, that, in the mean while, He caused a warm, soft, bland Atmosphere to become their garments; and, therefore, that a situation East, or East South-East of that of Moses, might, in all probability, be their place of residence.

I come now to the 9th verse,——*And out of the ground (saith our Translation) made the Lord God to grow ev'ry Tree that is pleasant to the sight and good for food: the Tree of Life also in the midst of the Garden, and the Tree of Knowledge of good and evil.* In this verse, then we have mention made of the *Tree of Life*, which has so frequently excited the curiosity of enquirers, and, perhaps, too frequently: may it not then be said, why should I, by touching it, lay myself open to the charge of adding to the number of those enquirers? I only said, perhaps, it might, and all that I meant by it was, that, probably, it was often canvassed not with so good an intention as a sacred subject seems to require. But, I mean, not to judge any particular person, in this respect, it may frequently admit of a question, whether I have a right to do it; and I can't help thinking, that a serious and sober Enquiry, into any part of the sacred Writings, can never be attended with bad consequences: If any new truth is struck out from thence, or an old one has a stronger light thrown upon it, or a more easy and popular turn given to it; in
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any of these cases, will not the cause of Religion be promoted? And is it not probable such an Attempt may be able to support itself? But, if Error should sometimes creep forth unheedingly, whilst this design is carrying forward, and humanum est errare,—may it not easily (in general speaking) by a proper application of the great Touch-Stone the Scriptures be detected, and thus be likewise made subservient to their cause? So that whether in truth or otherwise, Religion be, at length, really advanced, hath not every well disposed person reason to rejoice? yea! and, if He be thoroughly well disposed, He will rejoice.

After having then thus drawn myself in, as it were, to make too long an Apology perhaps, since possibly you may think that what I am upon, either does not stand in need of such an one, or if it does, ought to be entirely desisted from.—I shall proceed, and I chuse to begin with the *Tree of Life*, because, by doing so, I shall gain an opportunity of considering the whole verse; as in the method that I chuse to view this particular, it will have something to do with almost every part of it.—There are some, then, who look upon this Tree of Life only as an amplification of the just/ preceding Characters of all the Trees of the Garden, or rather only of the last character, their being good for food, or— for life; now, there are

several difficulties stand in the way of my assent to this interpretation.——For,——

1st. If this was the real Sense of the expression, I apprehend, there would have been some difference, both in the collocation and grammatical construction of the words, from what they have, at present. I apprehend, that the (Kal or Kol) universal affirmative would have been prefix'd to the second mention of the (gnatz) Tree as well as the first, and then it would have been: And the Lord God made to grow out of the ground every tree that is or *was* (neither in the original) desirable to the sight, and good for food, and *every* tree that was for (or good and fit for) life; or otherwise the second (gnatz) tree would have been entirely omitted, and (lob) *good* repeated, or nothing at all but (vau chijm) alone; and then it would have been every Tree, &c. good for *food* and *life*.——But, supposing the second (gnatz) to remain, as it now is, in its place, then there will be another difficulty, for the grammatical construction is changed without any apparent reason for it; changed from the dative to the genitive case, since the (gnatz chijm) ought not, in strictness, be rendered a Tree for life, but *of* life, since it has not a lamed prefixed to it, as (Merah and Macal) just preceding have. I do not recollect, at present, that such a change is common, and till it appear so, in some degree, at least, there will be a difficulty here. But,

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2dly. Supposing all was right thus far, there is still another Obstacle, and that is, that the expression (gnatz tob la-makal or gnatz makal) Trees good for food, or Trees of food singly seems to be the common or proper Phrase for trees fit to support life, and none other, and seems to answer precisely enough to our English expression *Fruit-Trees*, which, we know, is used to express all trees that bear fruit fit to be eaten, and those only; whilst, yet, other Trees are, in some sense, Fruit-trees, since all Trees, in general, bear Seed, (I think the Naturalists allow this) and the Fruit is nothing but the Capsula, in which this Seed is contained, or else the Seed itself. This, then, I take to be the proper Idea for (gnatz makal) or the tree of food, whereas the (gnatz chijm) I apprehend, seldom, if ever, bears that meaning: But, that I may not seem to speak here entirely without authority, I shall beg leave to refer you to two or three Texts, where the *gnatz makal* appears to be used just in this sense. — Thus, Leviticus, ch. xix. v. 23. When ye shall have come into the land, and shall have planted all manner of Trees for food. (gnatz makal) — v. 25. And in the 5th year shall ye eat the fruit thereof. — Again, in Deuteronomy, ch. xx. when Moses is giving some rules, in respect to the besieging of Cities, He orders that they shall not cut down and destroy the trees, but eat the fruit of them; but, at v. 20. He says, — only the trees which

which thou knowest that they be not trees for meat (or of food gnatz makal) thou shalt destroy. Here, then, we see these trees of food, or Fruit Trees, are set in direct opposition to all others. Now, the (*gnatz chijm*) Tree of life, I take it, seldom, or never, bears this sense at all, and, moreover, I think it may be shewn positively, where it is highly probable it must bear a different Sense, analogous to that, which I look upon to be the proper sense of it here; but these passages I shall reserve to illustrate that side of the question, which I assume. In the mean while, shall I pass on to my—

3d. and last objection? I know your Complaisance must be ready to say, with all my heart; tho' that is capable of a double view.--- Well then, I say, in the 3d and last place, that, supposing whatever I have yet said upon this point, were thrown entirely out of the scale or accounted of no weight, yet still, I have a difficulty that would keep me from being moved, 'till I could see it taken away from before me; and that is, that the (*gnatz chijm*) *Tree of Life* is said to be in the midst of the garden: The whole clause runs thus, *And out of the ground made the Lord God to grow every tree that is pleasant to the sight and good for food;---the Tree of life also in the midst of the garden, and the Tree of knowledge of good and evil.* Now, does it not seem clear from this circumstance, that the tree of life is a peculiar Tree, distinct from those
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preceding? Since it is plain that every Tree that was desirable, &c. and good, &c. could not be in the midst of the garden, which they must be, if *tree of life* is only another phrase to express them by. I therefore, from hence, conclude it was a peculiar tree: and altho' it must be allowed to be, in some sense, a (gnatz makal) Tree of food, because they might freely eat of it, and, therefore, it was good for food, yet, still considered as the (gnatz chijm) i. e. the Tree of life in the midst of the garden, it was a peculiar Tree and of a peculiar use. And, I imagine, to make the sense, this interpretation would give, current, it should be necessary to cause some alteration in the present position of a letter; as for instance, to put the (vau) preceding the last (gnatz) Tree in the verse, before (be-toc he gin) *in the midst of the garden*; and this, indeed, would throw back the (gnatz chijm) to the foregoing clause; and then it would be,—*And in the midst of the garden was the tree of knowledge of good and evil.* But this is a licentiousness that would not be admitted, in respect of an heathen Author, without authority, much less ought it to be usurped, when we have one that is divine before us, especially when a much better sense can be extracted from the words in their present situation. It may, perhaps, be observed here, that the Tree of knowledge of good and evil is likewise said

to be in the midst of the garden. (Gen. iii. v. 3.) But of the fruit (saith Eve to the Serpent) of the Tree, *which is in the midst of the garden*, God hath said,---*ye shall not eat of it, &c.*— And how can both this and the Tree of Life be said to be there? This may admit of a ready solution; but it will come under my Pen in an easier manner hereafter, and, therefore, to that time I shall defer it.

I have just been mentioning how a change of a letter might give a currency to the preceding Interpretation; shall I just, previous to concluding this point, lay before you a construction of the words partly founded upon this change, which will afford a very good turn, I think, to the verse considered in itself; only it wants authority for the use of one of the words in the sense that I would give it, and likewise an agreement with the Context? Mem prefixed, say the Grammarians, is a sign of the cause of any thing: and, as causes are various, if we understand the *Mem* prefix'd in the words *Merab* and *Makal* to be the sign of the *instrumental* cause, then the former may signify the instrumental cause of seeing or the eye, the latter that of eating or the mouth, and *chijm* the life;— then the sense of the verse may be thus,---*and the Lord God made to grow out of the ground every Tree that was desirable or tempting to the eye or sight, (there is no occasion for any change*

In the first word) agreeable to the Mouth, or Palate, or Taste, and good for life or wholesome; and, moreover, the tree of knowledge of good and evil in the midst of the garden. Here, then, is a clear and full sense given to the first clause; and what ingredient is there, that the most delicate Epicure could call for in his food, that is not here enumerated? Can he desire more, than that it should look well, tempting to the eye, be delicious to the palate, and wholesome for the body? Nay! it is to be feared that He does not attend to so much, and if it have but the two former qualifications, He is apt to forget the last, 'till a train of diseases, the offspring of luxury, have laid too violent hands upon him, for to admit of any release-ment from them. But,---if I go on, I shall be guilty of the same fault of forgetfulness too;—Will not you allow, then, that this is a tolerable sense of the verse? But, will you say that *Makal* is not readily, if at all to be found with this signification? If you should, I shall not be able to gainsay it, nor farther,—can I bring this to unite with, or run smoothly into, the Context. I mentioned it only as a kind of *Lusus* with the words, and partly to shew how necessary a little caution, sometimes, may be, to guard against straining any passage too far from a temptation of this kind.

Shall

Shall I now produce what I take to be the true rendering of this verse? Let me observe to you then, previously, that I chuse to adhere to our Translation almost entirely, except, that I would rather turn the *Tree of life, the Tree of lives* in the plural number; and then the verse will be,—And out of the ground made the Lord God to grow every tree that is pleasant (or desirable) *to the sight, and good for food; (and) the Tree of Life (or Lives) in the midst of the garden, the Tree also of Knowledge of good and evil.* It seems to give a clearer and easier sense to translate the two *vau*'s immediately preceding the two last trees, the first by *and*, and the latter by *also*, rather than vice versâ; but, however, this appears to be a nicety bordering very near upon a trifle, but only when a point of this Nature is before us, one would willingly give it all the exactness, of which the words seem capable.

That the Lord God might make the Earth produce these Trees immediately upon Adam's being created, cannot be disputed, but whether He really did so, or they were created, and this Plantation formed upon the third day of the world, I think neither this passage, nor the preceding verse, will permit us precisely to determine, nor is it very material. I have, indeed, before given the preference to this last notion; and I will here give you my reason for doing so, and that is,
because

because it appears more agreeable to our notions of order and wisdom ; of order, to create all things of the same Species at the same time ; of wisdom, to provide an Habitation ready for the Being that was to inhabit it, rather than that this latter should wait in the least for the former. But, still, as the Scriptures have not been pleased to be explicite upon this point, I must persist in saying, it is not very material ; and, therefore, shall we turn ourselves to what I look upon as more so ;

The Trees, then, were adapted to strike and appear desirable to the Sight from the fair appearance of their products, and thus, to provoke the appetite of hunger to seek its gratification there, and that the Adam might not be disappointed, they had every other Qualification of food ; and, therefore, were *good* for that purpose, and consequently to support the earthly Nature and its union with the sensitive life.

Thus far, then, there is a provision for the Adam (in the strict sense of the word,) and the (Napeesh chi) living creature in the 7th verse. But under what class we are to rank the tree of lives in the midst of the garden, does not so clearly appear ; they might freely eat of it, and, therefore, so far that determines it to be of the common kind, which were good for food ; but, yet, its peculiar name and situation seem to appropriate it to a some more peculiar use. But
what

what peculiar use can be found for it? If we should say it was sacramental, could there be any thing very strange or surprizing in such a notion to a Christian acquainted with the Jewish dispensation? In this last, we see the institution of the *Paschal Lamb* as commemorative of one deliverance, and typical of a much greater; and, in the Christian Dispensation, we have Bread and Wine appointed to be received by the faithful in the Lord's Supper in thankful remembrance of the Death of Christ, and of the Benefits we receive thereby.---And why might not the Deity assign this Tree in the very same way to our first Parents to be partook of by them in thankful remembrance of their creation, and of the benefits that resulted from it, to habituate them to acknowledge their dependance upon him, and above all to remind them frequently of that Capacity of a double Existence, which he had infused into them; a Fitness for a rational Life here, and a completely happy one hereafter.

In this view, do we not gain a very strong and proper Reason for the name given to this tree of (Chijm) lives, the (gnatz chijm) *Tree of lives*, because it was thus peculiarly adapted to the (Nusmeh chijm) *Breath of lives*? This, then, I take to have been the peculiar and appropriated Use of this tree. It makes all God's dispensations, from first to last, relative and
conso-

consonant to each other. It shews his method of dealing with the compounded Nature of man to have been always the same in instituting corporeal Symbols as commemorative of sometimes temporal, but more especially spiritual blessings, and thus making him sensible of his own Nature at the time that He is thankfully adoring that of his Creator.

May not I now add those Texts of Scripture that I promised at Page 42, as illustrating, and, I may add, confirming this Topic? The Passages, that I have my eye upon, are in the Book of Proverbs: There we find this very expression, (gnatz chijm) Tree of life three or four times used, and that it is employed in a spiritual or analogical Sense in those places I shall take for granted; because, I apprehend, the passages themselves must, at first sight, necessarily extort such an allowance, and, therefore, it would be superfluous to insist longer upon it. But, still, it may admit of a question upon what point the Analogy turns; and if, by making the allusion to be to a common Tree for food, the sense should appear dispirited and flat, but to the (gnatz chijm) the Tree of life or lives in the garden (according to the peculiar use of it just abovementioned) it should gain a Brilliancy and Propriety, which otherwise it will be unacquainted with; then, I think, it may be in-

ferred that *there* is the Allusion, and if so, that they illustrate and confirm the Point before us.

The 1st that I shall mention is, Prov. ch. iii. v. 18. The royal Writer is describing the happy effects of Wisdom or Understanding from v. 13. and after having set forth several advantages of it in respect of this world, and said, *that all her ways are ways of Pleasantness, and all her paths are Peace.* He adds, that She is a *Tree of life* (gnatz chijm) *to them that lay hold upon her, and happy* (is every one) *that retaineth her, or of the happy are those that retain her.* Now, if the allusion here should be only to a *Tree for food* or a common fruit Tree, does not every one almost see how jejune it must appear? I suppose, that from verse 17th, at least, He is describing religious Wisdom, since the high character there given of her, will hardly comport with any other; (and, indeed, the whole may not unfitly be interpreted of it) and then, He adds, She is a *Tree of life* to them that lay hold upon her, i. e. plainly as a Tree of life, &c. but if this allusion is to a common fruit-Tree, it will be as *that* is to the body, so is Wisdom to the Soul; but, in the days of Solomon and long before, ever since the introduction of animal Food, Fruit-Trees had sunk prodigiously in their credit, some of the choicest of them, might then, as they do now, send their products to conclude an Entertainment; but,

but, in respect of being the whole of Men's daily food, they doubtless were rejected by every one that could procure any thing else: hence, then to say of Wisdom, that she was to the soul, as a Tree for food is to the body, is giving but a very poor character of her. But if the allusion is to the sacramental tree of life, or lives in the garden, then the sense becomes extremely strong and beautiful; (Religious) Wisdom or—Wisdom will be to thee, as the tree of Lives was to our first Parents, (whilst they partook of it in obedience to God's command,) a Source of continued Joy and Satisfaction; but, if you forsake her, as our first Parents did the *tree of life*, and eat of the tempting, but forbidden tree of folly, as They did of the tree of Knowledge of good and evil, then beware of, in some degree, the same consequence:—*Happy, therefore, (is every one) that retaineth her.* And then the sacred Writer, as being so near the confines of creation, could not help expatiating upon the divine Wisdom, displayed in that stupendous act of Omnipotence. *The Lord (as He goes on) by wisdom hath founded the Earth; by understanding hath He established the Heavens, &c.* This then, I think, gives the best sense to the passage, and, therefore, I must think the truest, and, I hope, you may do so too.

The 2d Scripture, that I shall take notice of, is in chapter the 11th and v. 30th. This verse seems to have no connection with the context, as the preceding had; it runs thus in our Translation: *The Fruit of the righteous (is) a tree of life, and He that winneth Souls (is) wise.* And to be ingenuous, at first appearance, it seems somewhat difficult to extract any tolerable sense out of it; yet, upon a closer attention, and allowing the Tree of lives to allude to the peculiar Tree of that name, there may, I think, a very good one arise from it. The *righteous*, as He produces fruit, must be considered as a Stock, and the fruit, that He sends forth, i. e. his virtuous Life, his good Example, and Sollicitude for the welfare and virtue of others, will, if properly attended to by them, be subservient to produce the same in their breasts, just as the Tree of lives, when partook of by our first Parents according to God's institution, and, as commemorative of his present and future favours, was a means of preserving them in the path of right conduct: and He (not *that*) but the righteous *He* winneth or taketh souls (not *is* but) being wise, i. e. by his wisdom, i. e. He gaineth Profelytes to Virtue by his persuasion and example. Here then, is there not a fair and consistent sense of the words? But if the (*gnatz chijm*) Tree of life is to be understood of a common Tree for food, I do not see that
any

any sense can be extracted from them with either of these Qualifications ; this, therefore, leads me to think the expression must necessarily allude to the particular Tree of Lives, and, I hope, for your concurrence herein.

The 3d Text, that I shall mention, is, in ch. xiii. v. 12. the Translation is thus : *Hope deferred maketh the Heart sick, or (is) sickness of heart, but (when) the Desire cometh it is a Tree of life.* The first clause wants no comment; the last our Translators have certainly given the right sense of, in rendering the first part of it, *when the Desire cometh*, altho' there is no *when* in the Original, and the verb rather may be—considered as the participle in this place, than the verb *present*:—the Desire (i. e. by a common figure the thing desired) the Desire, I say, *coming* with full sails (if I may so speak) towards Men, so as that nothing can, in any probability, interrupt it, and they may reckon themselves already, as it were, in the possession of their aim,—*is a Tree of life.* Now, if this were a common fruit-tree alluded to, every one must, at first sight, see how vastly the sense must fall, if not entirely die away; but, if it is the Tree of Life, by way of eminence, then, I fancy, the Sentence may exert itself, and lay claim to its right, i. e. not only a good, but even a beautiful interpretation. For what did the Tree of lives to our first Pa-

rents? Did it not, and would it not (if they had continued to adhere to it, in obedience to God's command) have maintained them in the station that they were created, i. e. in Happiness? And what does the coming of a Desire, i. e. the gratification of a rational desire? (for, at first sight, none other can be meant) why, does it not confer Happiness? For Happiness is nothing else but such a gratification; and, therefore, may not this allusion be said to give a pertinent sense and a spirited turn to the verse? But this I submit to your better Judgment.—— I shall beg leave to mention one passage more, and then I shall have done upon this point.

In the 15th Chapter of this Book, and at the 4th verse, we read,——*A wholesome Tongue (is) a Tree of life, but perverseness therein is a breach in the spirit.* Now, this, I imagine, is capable of more than one good sense, but, yet, of none that is tolerable, without the allusion that I am for maintaining.——It may intend to convey to us the effects, that a right or wrong use of the Tongue will have, in respect to ourselves, and then it will be a wholesome Tongue, or the Healing of the tongue, i. e. such a Tongue as utters nothing to wound or poison the reputation of another, but, in its general practice, inclines the contrary way, to administer healing medicines, will be to him, that can contrive to possess it, as the Tree of Life

was to our first Parents, a Source of great Satisfaction, since it will lead his fellow-creatures, for the most part, not to offend him with theirs, but to return, (if I may so speak,) the compliment in the same gentleness of language, just as the whole creation smiled upon the first of the human Race, whilst they used no part of it otherwise than its great Author had appointed. But *Perverseness therein* (i. e. the Tongue) is a breach in the spirit; i. e. a wrong use of it will cause great uneasiness to the Person whose it is, for just the opposite reason. Here then, I take it, is one very good sense of the words, and such as they may very readily bear; but does not this interpretation make the verse have too much sameness with the first of this Chapter? I own myself to be of that opinion; and I am ready to imagine, that I have your concurrence. — Would not then a sense, that sets them at a wider distance from each other, be rather more agreeable to the context? Here I am ready almost to take for granted, rather than ask your assent.

May it not be said, then, that the first verse seems chiefly to regard those that are equals, in most respects or nearly so; the latter those whom Providence had put into stations greatly different, altho' their situation may be frequently near to each other, and the relation that they stand in likewise. And that as the former addresses

itself principally to the *Prudence*, so this latter is directed to the *Humanity* of the Man, and is intended not so much to shew what effect this use of the tongue will, in the end, have upon himself, as what it is likely to have upon others. And then, the sense will be, the Healing of the Tongue, or the mild, and even (which by the way is very consistent with being peremptory and resolute) the mild and even language, I say, will be commonly apt to inspire a Contentment and Satisfaction into the inferior stations considered as such, just, in some measure, like unto that which our first Parents felt, whilst they adhered to the Tree of life, but Perverseness therein, if it is used with too much violence, either in kind or degree, with respect to the *Truth* of particular cases, then it becomes a *breach of the Spirit*, will break and sink the mind too low for a proper execution of the useful purposes of life. This, then, I take to be another good sense of the passage.

Will you permit me just to mention one more? May not the Tongue stand for one of its effects or productions by a common figure? And, then, may it not be thus,—the wholesome command was the Tree of Life, i. e. to listen to the command of adhering to it, would have been spiritual Health to our first Parents, but the Perverseness of it (the tongue) i. e. the false and dangerous suggestions of Satan the Tempter,

was

was the subversion of the intellectual Oeconomy in Man. In this view, then, the sentence will become a sort of Parable, and its intended sense will be, that to obey the commands of our Creator, is Virtue and Happiness, whilst to hearken to any other suggestions, in opposition to them, is Vice and Misery. This, then, is another sense that the words may bear; but do not you think it is rather too far strained to be the true one in this particular place? I own myself to be of that opinion, and should have thought so, if I had received it from any one else; and, therefore, I have no reason to be surprized, if that should be your Notion upon the point.

If you ask which of the three I incline to, I say the second is more obvious than this last, and suits better with the context than the first; but, I must, at the same time, observe, that it is not at all material to the argument before us, which ever is embraced, since they all three equally favour it; and, farther, as the interpretations of the three preceding Texts, I hope, make them clearly tend to the same point, it will not, I think, be a rash inference, if, from these considerations, I assert, that the Tree of life, in the beginning of the Book of Genesis, was alluded to in all these passages, and that it was a *peculiar Tree*; and since the beauty and propriety of these texts seems greatly to depend upon

upon its being a *sacramental Tree*, we may, from hence, likewise infer, that such was its distinct and proper use. And, moreover, I fancy, that it carries all the marks of separation upon it in the Original, and very probably did so in common language too, (whilst the Hebrew continued a living one) as it does in our present Translation,

There remains now but one clause unconsidered, and that is, — *the Tree of the Knowledge of good and evil*. I have before observed, (at p. 46.) upon venturing to make the *and* and the *also* of our translation, in the latter part of the verse, change places with each other; that a clearer and easier sense seemed to arise from doing so; my reason for the opinion is this, because, by that means, this last tree is more naturally referred to the midst of the Garden, as well as the *Tree of life*, whereas, according to the present rendering, this latter Tree seems to engross that place to itself, whilst it is left very doubtful to what part *the Tree of Knowledge of good and evil* is to be referred, but it appears (as I have before taken notice, p. 44.) from Gen. iii. v. 3. that the midst of the Garden was its real situation, as well as that of the other; and, therefore, if the change, that I have presumed to make, points out this better, as, I apprehend, it does, it is certainly so far preferable. But I likewise formed an objection upon this

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Disposition, intimating, that they both could not be really so situated; yet, a mighty easy supposition is required to solve it: It is true, if we consider the midst of the garden as a central point, the difficulty would be unmountable, because but one body could possibly be upon it; but, if we suppose a kind of Septum or Nave (if I may so call it) in the middle part of this Plantation, then, whatever was placed within this Septum or Nave might, in a very proper sense, be said to be in the midst of the garden; and, if these two trees were so planted, they might very properly be said to be there.

Would it then be at all absurd, if we should look upon such an enclosure, as the place where the great Originals of the human Race went to make their acknowledgements to their Creator, to participate of the *Tree of Life*, in consequence of God's full permission to do so, and in thankful remembrance of his gift of this temporal Being, and that Eternity which it afforded them a further capacity of enjoying? likewise to view frequently, and by that means, to refresh their memory, in respect to the only prohibition which He had thought fit to lay upon them? I say, why should it appear at all, absurd? We find, that Groves were frequently set apart for the purpose of worship in the ancient world, and, perhaps some obscure Tradition, concerning this first specimen, may
be

be the very best account that can be given of the prevalence or the origin of such a practice. But do I look here suspicious, as if I was going to run from the point in hand? Methinks, I hear you answer in the affirmative, and say, that you are resolved to stop me short, and throw me back into my subject, by asking, what I think of this Tree of knowledge of good and evil?

Why, in the first place, I think it was a real natural tree.—But whether it was one of the (gnatz makal) *Trees for food*, (i. e. naturally good for food) or not, I cannot say with the same authority, that I may the *Tree of life* was one of those that was so, because the Scripture will not give it me; since it allowed, that the latter might be freely eaten of, but absolutely forbid the former; and, therefore, from hence, the presumption is, that it was not proper for food: but when we consider, that after our first Parents attempted to satisfy their fatal curiosity, by eating of it, they still lived to see their children's children unto many generations, we must be far from saying it was absolutely unfit for that purpose. This, then, I believe, is all that can be immediately deduced from Scripture upon this Subject; and, consequently, whatever is advanced farther upon it, must owe its birth, in a great measure, to conjecture.—Yet, still, is conjecture absolutely and entirely to be discarded upon this Topic? provided it is advanced

vanced as nothing more, it can do no harm, and, if it lends a solution to any difficulty, it may be of some service. Because, in points of a religious nature, any method that can, but in a tolerable degree, give a fair unfolding of a perplexity, is to be looked upon as a sufficient answer to bold objections in such cases, where our ignorance is frequently so very great, and our knowledge so very little, altho' it hath no better foundation, than even conjecture, to go upon.

What, then, shall be said further to the nature of the Tree of knowledge of good and evil? We have, indeed, offered a presumption, why it was not proper for food, but we have likewise shewn positively, how it was far from being absolutely unfit for that Purpose: What shall be determined then upon it?

Does not experience shew us, that the good providence of God hath not confined his rational creatures (nor, indeed, many others) to one particular diet, but hath scattered food in great profusion of variety over the face of the Globe, and permitted them freely to partake of it in almost all that variety? But, still, as it is various in its real nature, in its appearance to the eye, and taste to the palate, so likewise hath it not frequently very different operations upon the internal parts of the body? But doth it stop here, will it not, thro' this medium, make
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its way to the mind? Will not the juice of the grape, when prepared by age and a proper fermentation, if taken in moderate quantity, spread its generous warmth thro' the whole animal frame, refresh the spirits, and exhilarate the mind? But, when it is received with too little caution, and by too frequent repetitions, does it not raise a disturbance in the soul, and often throw reason from her seat, before it can do so by that part of the Man, upon which it made its first attacks, I mean the body?—And are there not many other artificial liquids, capable of producing the same effects? Will it be said, that these are but short and temporary, and such as will *really* expire in that only *Image* of *Death*—Sleep! But is this powerful Anodyne capable to efface all remains of yesterday's Debauch, in those that have submitted to it? Will not some intimations of it continue with them for a longer time, and if the same course is closely pursued, will it not frequently bring on confirmed diseases? I have instanced only in the invigorating kind of liquids, because their Effects are usually strongest and most apparent; but will not many other parts of Diet produce the same, altho' in a weaker and less sensible degree?—And as Persons may thus contract habits of body and diseases, so, likewise, may they not propagate them to posterity? Experience will certainly answer in the affirmative, because she herself

shews that it is frequently the effect. And, as Habits of body and Diseases may be carried beyond the persons, in whom they first reside, so, likewise, the temper of the mind, and a turn to particular vices, seems capable, in some measure, of being propagated to. — But is the soul ex traduce? no certainly! I think it is usually, and, I think, it ought always to be, answered in the negative. Shall we now try, if we have gained any thing to the point before us, by this Series of questions?

Could it then be looked upon as a thing *impossible*, or even *entirely incredible*, if we should say, that there might be some *natural Efficacy* in this tree to introduce *death*, and as an easy consequence of that to render the difficulties of obtaining even future Happiness greater than they would otherwise have been, if this transgression had never been committed? Might not its juices contain something heating, and something that might give an uncommon turn, a too violent motion to the blood and spirits; and, as a consequence of this, would they not operate upon the Passions, and cause their government likewise to become more arduous and difficult? Both these effects of diet are, I fancy, points of pretty common experience, (as I have just above, in effect, observed) and, therefore, if our first Parents were made, in any respect, analogous to their children, that such effects might

might be wrought upon them, must be certainly allowed to be *at least* possible.

But what is Life? Is it not a due circulation of the blood and animal juices thro' the body, so as to preserve it a fit mansion for its spiritual inhabitant? whatever, therefore, should give an *undue*, a too violent motion to these fluids, must tend either to break or consolidate the finer canals thro' which they flow, so as quickly, if excessive, if less urgent, gradually, to render the corporeal machine unfit for maintaining (if I may so speak) the Terms of union, i. e. sooner or later to bring on a dissolution. Here, then, we have sown the seeds of death in our first Parents, and if they, under this disposition, proceeded to deliver down existence into the world, that is, beget children; then, from what we have before observed, together with life, they might propagate this adventitious and new acquired propensity to death, and so *Death might pass upon all men.* (Rom. v. v. 12.)

But will it be said, the Cause is not adequate to the effect? We have, indeed, appealed to experience for some Analogy, but the cases alleged do not come up to the point; they suppose a *course* of excess *obstinately persisted* in so as to bring on diseases, and then, that these diseases may or may not be propagated to posterity, (for the consequence is far from being constant and necessary) whereas, what our first Parents did

did, was but one act of intemperance; (if it may be so called, and, therefore, from hence to deduce so constant and universally fatal effect, seems to be leaving a great part of it without any cause at all. That it was a single action in each, that brought on the fatal Catastrophe, must, I think, be allowed; but, then, let us reflect a little, upon the condition our first Parents were in when they perpetrated it: they had not been long come forth from the hands of their Creator, the World was fresh and recent, in full bloom, and their bodies, as well as souls, perfectly pure and immaculate; as they, therefore, had no apparent temptation from *distress* or *necessity*, so might not a compliance without such, in the present state of their bodies, be attended with those consequences that we are willing (for the present) to ascribe to it? Is not every thing, the more pure it is, more capable of receiving a stain?

But will you think this last sentence but a mere allusion, and such as we may see persons sometimes make use of, when they would decently retire from a subject, that they find is not to be supported. For fear that you may be of this opinion, I will re-assume it once more, and observe, that experience may, in some measure, come in aid to us here again, and in a way, likewise, wherein she hath not yet been called upon. For she shews us, that in disorders, arising

sing from too quick a circulation of the Fluids, (such as are those of the feverish kind) the most vigorous and complete constitutions are the most liable to them, and frequently, upon seeming trivial occasions, are hurried into dangers of this sort, whilst weaker and more tender habits of body escape them. If this, then, should be applied to the case before us, may it not help to promote it a little? As our first Parents were the *more immediate* workmanship of the Almighty, have we not reason to think that they partook of the highest excellence of the corporeal nature, and this too at their very birth, since they did not go thro' the usual stages allotted to their offspring; if, therefore, they made too free with any thing that was not well adapted to the human constitution, might not its operation be more violent, according to the fullness and perfection of their frame, or if it is thought that a very great violence of it, in the degree, would not have been consistent with life, might it not, altho' more favourable in its first attacks, become permanent, insinuate itself thoroughly into the blood, remain rooted there, and from thence spread itself over the face of the whole earth? Might not some such method, then, as this, I say, have been the secret process in this important Catastrophe? — Here the queries come thick upon us; I must proceed a little further with them.

I have a little before asked, what is Life? May I now be permitted to ask, what is Virtue? Is it not a due regulation of the animal or sensitive nature, so as to make it become a Vassal and Instrument of reason? And what ought reason to be but a Subject to the Will of God its Creator and Lord? Is Virtue, then, any thing more but true Piety, and can there be any true Piety without some good degree of real virtue? But a little reflexion, I apprehend, will shew, that the very same cause, which we have just considered as introductive of death, may, likewise, be considered as injurious to the cause of virtue; since, if it consisted in giving a preternatural and undue heat to the blood and juices of the body, and, after this, by a natural process hastened its dissolution; so, by the very same, it might give an undue impetus to the animal appetites, and, consequently, render that regulation, wherein Virtue consists, more difficult, and to keep it perfect impossible.

This, then, would endanger the fruition of Heaven, which seems not only the appointed reward, but, in some measure, the natural consequence of Virtue; and, therefore, might not the very same kindness and benevolence, that induced the Creator to give Man a Being, and endowed him with a capacity for a *rational* eternity, make him not to be forgetful of those attributes in the midst of Judgment, but find a

way for the criminal to escape without the infringement of the authority of his own Laws. Here, then, seems to have commenced the necessity for an Atonement in respect of this last particular, and likewise some one to perform the part that Adam was to, and would have performed, if He had never offended, I mean,—*perfect righteousness*: so that as in Adam all died, a temporal death, so in Christ all (that would accept of it) might be made alive, by a truly spiritual and everlasting life. Will not this, then, account for that otherwise, in a great measure, unaccountable Phænomenon, the general prevalence of sacrifice in the early ages of the world, considered as a typical and prophetic Atonement, and likewise for Christ's appearing at last in the flesh, to fulfil all righteousness? Whilst the righteousness of man was to hang upon his, and the strict notion of it to consist rather in an habitual sincere endeavour after amendment, and faith in the promises of God, rather than real positive righteousness. But I shall again be in danger of forgetting what I am upon, if I launch into this Abyss of wonder and mercy; let me, therefore, recollect myself, and think of the Tree of Knowledge of good and evil.

Will you then, do you think, acquiesce in this account of it, or only think it fanciful, and such as there is not a sufficient foundation for?

If

If the former should happen to be your disposition of mind, I shall only add, that the Name given to this Tree by the sacred Writer seems to be by anticipation; and yet, even then, it does not appear readily why it was called *the Tree of knowledge of good and evil*, since our great Progenitors might have been fully acquainted with good before ever they tasted of it, and evil was the only thing which, at first sight, it seemed to teach them. But if we reflect, that, perhaps, we never see good in its truly full light, but when it is contrasted with evil, and we have felt that as well as the other, then whatever instruction this experience might give our first Parents concerning the nature of good, beyond what they had before, and wanted to make up the just Idea of it, (and it seems plain some was wanting from their disobedience.) I say, all this might very truly be said to be the instruction of this tree, and consequently it might, in a very true and proper sense, be said to be *the Tree of Knowledge of good as well as evil*.

But if you are inclined to think this account fanciful, and such as there is not any sufficient foundation for; then will you permit me to offer you one or two more solutions upon it, for it is a Topic I should chuse to have adjusted as I have entered so far into it?

Do you think it may be said, that the propagation of the disorder introduced into the human nature was not according to the account above given from the body to the soul, but the contrary way? As experience shews, that the passions have very strong effects upon the corporeal part of us, as Grief produces tears and deliquiums, violent Anger heat, and so of the others, might not the conscious and stinging remorse of our first Parents, upon having transgressed the command of their Creator, have produced violent effects upon their animal frame, such as might naturally lay the foundation for death in themselves, and likewise all that disorder, both natural and moral, that was introduced amongst the human Species? I will not assert peremptorily, that it might not, but I will offer you a reason why I think the former account preferable, and that is, that such a temper of mind, as was expressive of sorrow and repentance, was really the true and proper disposition that became Persons in their circumstances, and, methinks, it seems not quite so agreeable to the mercy and goodness of God, to lay the foundation of their punishment, and all the misery that was introduced into the world, upon that which seemed to be the properest atonement which they could possibly make for their crime: it would be discouraging those qualities, which

He

He himself hath required in all his faithful servants.

I shall mention but one solution more, and that is, may it not be said to be better to resolve it all into the absolute Will and good Pleasure of God, to make this last Tree as incapable in itself of any way introducing death and misery, as the former was of conferring immortality, and that they were both of them *entirely* sacramental, visible signs or seals of God's promises or threatenings, and, therefore, whatever followed upon the transgression was the infliction of the immediate hand of providence without any natural concurrence at all, unless it were the efficacy of the suggestions of the Tempter to persuade, and their bare eating in consequence of it? I must beg leave to observe upon this point then, that the reason does not seem to be the same in the one case, that it is in the other. The Expediency of the Tree of life's being sacramental may appear (over and above what hath been before said of it) from this consideration, that the natural Tendency of the body of man is to dissolution, since we see that mere old age will bring it on, and we know of nothing in nature that hath the least pretensions finally to prevent it; hence we may, I say, be readily led to look upon this Tree as *entirely* of this kind; but the case does not hold the same on the other side, since we know of many pro-

ductions that can both inflame the blood, and likewise bring on death; for this cause, I say, there is not the same expediency to suppose this Tree to be in its appropriated state entirely sacramental, as what was to follow from the use, or rather abuse of it, might be done by means of natural efficacy in a good measure, even according to our present conception of things. In the former case, to confer immortality by any material means must have been utterly to over-rule all the known laws of matter, and to have added an absolute new property to it, if that could be, in any proper sense, really called a property of it, which is so thoroughly beyond its nature and strength; whereas to introduce death, and by the same means likewise a depravity of nature, so as to render moral conduct more difficult from thence, little more may seem to be necessary than a permission to let some of the known laws of nature have their course, since we may have experience of many things, that even at this day, will, in some degree or other, more or less, produce these very effects] upon our own bodies; and it is but making allowance for the extraordinary strength, or rather permanency of its operation upon the pure and immaculate bodies of our first Parents, to make it in a manner sufficient to account for the appearance.

I, therefore, must still, notwithstanding what has been suggested under these two particulars, think myself rather authorized to give the preference to the first solution. However, the notion or light, in which it sets the Sin of Adam and the consequences of it, seems to agree so exactly with the 9th Article of our excellent Church, that I cannot help transcribing a great part of it, both as a confirmation of the point, and likewise for the sake of giving, in our turn, some illustration to the Article. I hope it will not be too fatiguing to you to attend a little to it.

Original Sin standeth not in the following of Adam, (as the Pelagians do vainly talk) but it is the fault and corruption of the nature of every man, that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam, whereby man is very far gone from original righteousness, and is, of his own nature, inclined to evil, in that the flesh lusteth contrary to the spirit; and therefore, in every person born into the world, it deserveth God's wrath and condemnation.

Here then, in the first Place, does not the Article assert, that what she meaneth by *original sin* doth not consist in following Adam, (as the Pelagians, &c.) These asserted no alteration made in the human Nature, by the transgression of our first Parent, but that all men come into the world as perfect in a moral view, as He did;

did; and, therefore, before they can have any thing in their condition similar to his fallen one, they must do what He did, that is, transgress, or be guilty of actual Sin. Whereas the Article on the contrary asserts a *Depravation* of the *fleshy* Nature *derived* from him, and in consequence a *Bias* thrown upon the *spiritual*; just according to the account above given. But will it be said, that the Article positively asserts, that *this deserves* God's wrath and damnation in every Person born into the world? It doth so,——and certainly, if Adam, when perfect could merit nothing from his Creator, could in strict Justice have no demand upon him; as far as that perfection is lost, so far there will be the Idea of Demerit given us, and with it a *Liableness* to all the consequences of it.

Will it be said, that Adam's Sin was personal, and so, it should seem, ought the punishment to be too? I answer, it was, in some degree, personal, especially, in one respect, it could not be otherwise, I mean, in the compunction that He must feel for having offended, whereas his offspring fly to this very transgression of his, as one of the best excuses for their own failings, whilst our first parents must have started from it, as they ought to have done from the Seducer that drew them into it. But still, is it not looked upon, as consonant to the Rules of the strictest Justice, that children should suffer for

for the crimes of their parents? nay! if we reflect such suffering is frequently but a part of, or a necessary consequence of the Parent's punishment; as for instance, if He is deprived of Honours or Estate, He cannot leave them to his children, as He might otherwise have done, consequently They must suffer this loss by reason of his fault; and if They, moreover, betray a *disposition* similar to his, then they may likewise have some positive and distinct punishment inflicted, to guard against the excess of evil that they might otherwise commit, and to keep up a quick and due sense of the crime of their Forefathers in their minds, and those of the whole community to which they belong.

Besides,—when the Article saith, it *deserveth* God's wrath and damnation, it *specifieth* no degree of that wrath and damnation, and if they are to be understood here in the light of *actual* punishment, we all know that punishments may be infinitely various in degree: but the Article only saith, it *deserveth*; and, therefore, if Persons die out of the Christian Covenant, and have not wilfully rejected it, it still leaveth them to the uncovenanted mercies of God, which we know are over all his works, and, in all probability, his covenanted would have been over the whole earth before this time, if Men had not loved darknesss rather than light, because their deeds are evil.

But

But to go on with the Article. — *And, saith it, this infection of nature doth remain, yea, in them which are regenerated, whereby the lust of the Flesh, called in Greek φρονιμα σαρκος, (a beautiful and strong expression implying as if it were the entire offspring of the Flesh, and as if the Flesh could be even productive of intellect) which some do expound the Wisdom, some Sensuality, some Affection, some the Desire of the Flesh, is not subject to the Law of God. And altho' there is (assuredly) no Condemnation for them them that believe and are baptized, (because then they come expressly within the Covenant) yet the Apostle doth confess that concupiscence and lust bath of itself the nature of Sin. That is, the fleshly Appetites, when they are too intense (which is now their natural corrupted state) have rather more weight given them, than is consistent with the true Equilibriety of the moral Oeconomy in man, so that the office of reason (I mean assisted reason) is now not only to guide, but, in some measure, to subdue them; I say, whenever they tend to go beyond the allowance of this principle (and they have always a tendency more or less to do so) they have of themselves the nature of sin, i. e. (if permitted to go on) will produce nothing else in respect of the Person or Agent in whom they subsist. This then, I apprehend, to have been the sense of the Compilers of the Articles upon this subject, and if we sometimes meet*

meet with expressions that carry the point higher than this, I fancy, by the allowance that common sense always requires for the popular stile, they may easily be reduced to this standard.

But here it must be remembered, we are all this while speaking of *original sin*; because when Persons come to those years that they are capable of a moral Rule of action, and by consequence of actually transgressing against it, then the matter is placed upon another Basis, and the Christian Doctrines of a necessity for repentance from dead works, and of turning truly (i. e. according to the mediatorial scheme) to serve the living God, will take place in their fullest sense, in respect of all those that are, or might have been acquainted with them.

You will now, perhaps, think it is high time to close the subject of these three remarkable verses of the second Chapter of Genesis, I am sure, if you do not; it must be nothing but entire good nature that prevents you.——I have done.——But still, you must bear with me a little longer, whilst I consider two particulars more, which may be looked upon as a sort of Corollaries to the Topic that has hitherto been insisted upon.——And the——

1st. Is the old and famous objection to all the moral evil that ever has been, or now subsists in the world, and i. e. the infinite Perfection of God's Fore-knowledge, as applicable to this parti-

particular case. He perfectly foresaw every the minutest part of the conduct of our first Parents; and, therefore, how came his goodness to place them in such circumstances? or rather, as He foresaw it so perfectly, it could not be otherwise; and, therefore, were our first Parents free Agents? The first question may easily be got over upon Christian Principles, if we can get over the latter.

And in order to this, may it not be observed, that if the Fore-knowledge of God is inconsistent with the freedom of any the least creature to whom it is imparted, it is inconsistent with his own, since He as perfectly foresees all his own actions, as He does theirs: but if so, He is a necessary Being, in the strictest sense of the word; and as nothing can communicate what it has not, an absolute and universal Fatalism must have prevailed in nature, a *dura necessitas*, indissoluble by any palliations or contrivances whatever. But if this were the case, how came the Idea of freedom to obtrude itself upon the world? I fancy, if all the Philosophers that ever were in it, were brought up into life again at once, and formed into a Consistory, to debate about finding five other different ways of sensation, besides those that we now enjoy, it will be readily allow'd, that they would break up without coming to any discovery or resolution: and, I apprehend, it is every whit as difficult

ficult for any the least notion of Freedom to have stepped into the intellectual world, if it had not first a real existence in it; the Idea, therefore, of Freedom, is, in this case, a strict and compleat demonstration of the reality of its Being. And consequently, whatever difficulties may be raised in our conceptions upon the application of God's Fore-knowledge to it, must be resolved into the just and common Answer upon these occasions,——the Narrowness of them; as we see it is replied, when there are seemingly opposite demonstrations made upon the turning of the mathematics to the aid of natural Philosophy.

And let me add here, in this case, that for it to be otherwise would be a palpable contradiction, i. e. to suppose there should be no difficulties in our consideration of the attributes of the Deity (especially those that are not properly moral) and the relative application of them to created Substances; to suppose this, I say, would be an open contradiction, since it immediately implies the comprehension of that which is infinite in that which is finite. When then to this is added the moral Law of our Nature, or Reason approving what is right and condemning the contrary as practical, the two Testaments of the Law and the Gospel *all* proceeding upon the supposition of freedom, and entirely inexplicable without it, nothing, I think, can be

be wanted to a reasonable Enquirer for its establishment in general ; and when that is once done, its subsistence, in the case before us, is extremely easy to be proved, as an unexceptionable particular included in the general reasoning. For what cause can be assigned, why it should be excepted ?

I had really almost overlooked, and was going to leave the other part of (what the Logicians call) the disjunction uncanvassed ; but you may remember, that I said it might be easily adjusted, provided we could get over this latter difficulty, and I find no reason to retract the assertion, which probably was the cause that my Attention did not adhere so much to it as it ought to have done.—I say then, that if it is contrary to the Goodness of God to produce Beings that He foresees may possibly offend, it is contrary to his Goodness to have produced any free Agents at all, since the very highest of that order must *necessarily be endowed* (if I may so speak) with that capacity, as Offence against the eternal Laws of Truth and right Reason cannot imply a contradiction to their nature, since they are infinite in no respect, much less in all perfection, and such a contradiction belongs only to that Being that is so, i. e. to God himself. But if we consider, what a dreary and unfinished appearance creation must have worn, if Intelligence, and consequently Freedom (F) had

had not been inspired into it, certainly it must be concluded, that it is much better to have such an addition made, notwithstanding the fatal consequence that naturally attends it; but if it is much better, then the Goodness of God is not only acquitted in giving, but likewise challenged, in some measure, to confer it, and that surely cannot be reckoned a contradiction to this quality, which thus will appear to be one chief ingredient of it.

And if the case is thus, when we consider Freedom in general, certainly the dispensing of it in various degrees or portions, or in a kind of subordination, as it were, cannot be looked upon as an infringement of this Quality of Goodness, since each Being that receives any share of this excellence had no claim to it, and since such a Variety contributes greatly to the beauty and fullness of the Universe. But if we once gain an admission for this Variety, then it will necessarily follow that there must somewhere be in particular such a creature as Man, in the scale of Being; and, therefore, no Arraignments can be drawn from any foreseen abuses of his freedom against the goodness of God for bringing him into existence;—especially, when we consider what a grand and wonderful scene of wisdom and goodness united this very abuse opened to our view; I mean,—in the Redemption of Mankind. And doubtless, abuses of

the same nature in the higher or celestial Beings, may be as fruitful, may give as full a display to the goodness of God, as the offence of Man did, altho' the methods, by which they do so, may be beyond our comprehension at present. No arguments, therefore, ought to be drawn from the wrong use of freedom in any part of the creation, for the entire removal of it, or the not conferring it at all; and consequently, from what hath been said upon this point, I hope, that we may have gained a sufficient answer to the question, why the goodness of God placed our first parents in such circumstances, as that they might, and really did offend. More might be said, but, I fear, that you may think I have said rather too much; but whatever you think, may not I prevail with you to speak it?

I come now to the 2d particular, that I stipulated for, and that is, to consider a little the novel notion, that the whole Relation, concerning the state of our first Parents in Paradise and the Transactions there, is a mere Eastern fable. I call it novel, because it hath lately been advanced by a very ingenious Writer upon heathen Topics; although, I believe, it is far from being so in point of time, yet, in respect of Truth, I fancy, it may have fair pretensions enough to that Character, as being rather an *innovation* upon it.

But

But here, as my subject leads me to dissent from him, it would be extremely ungrateful not to make some acknowledgement for past favours; as I have received very great pleasure from several parts of his writings, where He hath endeavoured to do justice to a Subject of Ethnical learning, to draw off some obscurities that lay over it, and to give it that finishing touch, which such a masterly Pen as his was capable of doing;—so if I did not reap some advantage too, I am sure, it was entirely my own fault, and, therefore, my obligations to him are, as if I had received both. But, in the piece that I have my eye upon at present, I cannot help thinking, that if the subject matter of it had been a little more maturely considered, and a little less personal Sarcasm (for in some places I can scarce call it any thing else) against so high a Character had been employed in the management of it, that the former might possibly have gained some more weight to it by that means, and from the omission of the latter nothing, in the least, would have been lost to the Politeness and Elegance of the composition;—nor farther to its power of persuading, since in different Persons are rather led from thence to think that there is something more than the cause of prophecy veiled under that disagreeable appearance.

But to enter fully into the merits of that dispute would be going very much out of my way, —yet suppose it were otherwise—non tali auxilio, &c. All that I have to do is to vindicate a little *the Plantation of a Paradise for the Habitation of Man; the Tree of Life, and the Tree of Knowledge of good and evil in the midst of it,*—from being parts of that mere Eastern Fable.

If I should be so vain as to think that the view in which I have endeavoured to set these points, has, in a good measure, done it already, might I hope for your concurrence?—But, in order, to give a sort of roundness to my subject here, shall I offer you a few reflections more, in the way of conjecture, what could draw this Writer into such a notion, since He has not, that I recollect, offered any grounds for it himself, in the points that I am concerned, except *that it was the prevailing Taste and Custom of the Nations around Moses to instruct, or inculcate truths of a sublime Theological kind by Fables and Allegories, which conveyed a summary notion of the Doctrine proposed to be taught, by a way the most striking and entertaining to the generality of mankind.*

But what necessity was there, that Moses, an *inspired* writer, must have recourse to this method in the beginning of an *History*? was it, that the People, with whom He had more particular concern, were like the generality of mankind,
only

only to be gained by what was striking and entertaining? And could not the Origin of the Universe and of human nature furnish a sufficiency of that, without having recourse to Fable and Allegory? Could not the God of Truth describe his own proceedings, in fashioning the world and its decorations, according to it? familiar and sensible Images and Ideas, I agree, that He must make use of, in order to be understood; but these may be employed without swelling into Fable and Allegory: nay! I must add further, that if they go so far as to fall into these latter, they will bid fair to defeat themselves; since Fable and Allegory are oftener employed to veil than display the truth.

Yet not to deal so much in generals, and to come a little nearer to the point.——Why must the Plantation of a Paradise for the habitation of Man be of this kind? Is it that the literal story is so incredible from what we read of the first rise of almost all nations? But Woods or Caves seem to have been the chief habitation of these Originals, and no cloathing, or some very like unto that, our first Parents made use of, what they delighted in. Is it intirely incredible, because we hear or see nothing, in the least, resembling it in our present world? But this cannot be said, when so many have either seen or heard what is going forward in the inland parts of Africa and America at this very time? Per-

haps, it may be thought, that it is doing very little Honour to those, from whence we all have sprung, to bring the Savages of these large continents as an illustration of their case; and if the comparison was intended to be total, I must allow the charge, but I mean to extend it no farther than to the simplicity of their Habitation and Dress.

Will it be thought, that their Origin from the Earth and their Diet, when settled upon it, may give a sufficient handle for an allegoric interpretation? since the literal description sets them too low here likewise: but his, I dare to say, much and justly admired Horace, has set mankind, at their first appearance, much lower.

Cum prorepserunt primis *Animalia* terris

Mutum & turpe pecus, glandem atque cubilia
propter

Unguibus & Pugnis, dein fustibus, atque ita porro
Pugnabant armis, quos fabricaverat usus, &c.

Whereas the literal story in scripture makes our first Parents not entirely of terrene Original, but breathes into their nostrils the breath of lives from God himself, and endows them with language, and unites them in conjugal love and amity. And if their Fruit-Diet is any Foundation for rejecting the letter, it may be sufficient to allegorize the whole Anti-diluvian History, since I think it is commonly allowed, that none
other

other was made use of 'till the *Grant* of animal-food to Noah.

Let us suppose, that Moses, after the six days Creation, had described a sumptuous Palace springing forth from the Earth for the Residence of Adam and Eve, furnished with all the elegance of modern refinement, and filled with a splendid train of Courtiers and a numerous Retinue, whilst our great Forefather with his Consort reigned in peace and wisdom over a joyful and well inhabited world. May I ask, who would have been with the first to call it an utterly incredible Romance? or to alledge, that the Author ought to have described this first Pair in some calm rural Retirement, to have furnished them with a soft agreeable bower to screen them from the inclemency of the sky, or to have placed them in a Climate where there was no occasion for any, and to have permitted them to come forward gradually into improvements, as, History and Experience shews, has been the general course of all the rest of the World; and not to have made them launch all at once into the highest Pitch of civil improvement, or to gain subjects by any other means than as Children furnished them? I need not ask you a second time, I fancy, who would have been with the first to make the outcry? And if this is the case, may it not conduce to shew how natural and probable the *present* literal account is, and, therefore, how little occasion

for recourse to Fable and Allegory, for maintaining this piece of the Mosaic *History*?

But the charge may here be entirely altered, perhaps, and it may be said, that the story is allegorical, because Adam is placed, in some respects in too high a station, admitted to a sort of familiar converse with the Deity, such as ancient Legislators were used to pretend to, and seems, in some degree, rather to be one belonging to the Court of Heaven, than a real Inhabitant of this Earth. But certainly, this suggestion must vanish, when we consider the high dignity of the human nature, in respect of the breath of lives that was infused into it, how that Adam was a more immediate Son of God, than any of his Offspring can pretend to be, (the great Author of our Religion excepted) and altho' endowed with the strongest natural capacity, perhaps, yet as unexperienced as the sucking Infant. These things laid together may shew the expediency of that condescension that the Mosaic History ascribes to the Deity upon this occasion : to acquaint our first Parent with the Author of the Universe and his own Being ; at once to tell him who gave him the rational capacity, and to furnish him with proper Data for the exercise of it ; and to lay the best foundations for his piety and adoration, by setting the only proper object of it in the most amiable light

light before him, i. e. the Deity, as his great Benefactor.

These things, I say, might very probably be part of God's conversation with the first of mankind, altho' the records of the History will not directly authorize us to say positively that they were. Only there is one circumstance, that I shall beg leave to hint, as confirming this supposition; and that is in the 2d Ch. of Genesis at v. 19. where it is said,——*And out of the ground the Lord God formed every beast of the field, and every fowl of the air, and brought them to Adam, to see what He would call them: and whatever Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof.* Now it is observed by the Adepts in the sacred Language of the old Testament, that the names of the generality of Animals in it are expressive of their nature, i. e. are taken from roots that express something correspondent to a leading property in the Animal: if then, the sacred was Adam's language, (as, I think, it is generally agreed that it was) (G) He must have been tolerably acquainted with the natures of these creatures, in order to discern these properties, and apply a suitable name to them; but this, in a natural way, would have required an age almost of experience to have accomplished, and Adam appears to have done it soon after He was created; what is the inference then, but that God thought this a necessary

cessary piece of instruction in his circumstances, and, therefore, gave it to him : but if He did so in things of an inferior nature, certainly it were reasonable to think He would not omit the higher topics of information before enumerated. But, however, be these as they may, thus much is certain, that if we can, from considering the nature and circumstances of the first Man, form only a *probable* conjecture that much higher and likewise more full and complete informations must have been given to him by a wise and benevolent Creator, than are at present recorded, certainly no inference can be drawn from the too high honours conferred upon Adam for a necessity to leave the *literal*, and have recourse to an entirely allegorical interpretation upon the occasion, but rather the contrary.

I, therefore, from these considerations, must beg leave to conclude, that neither, from our first Parents being placed in too low, nor yet too high a station for the credibility of literal History, is there any occasion for recourse to Eastern fable and allegory, in order to support the credit of the Mosaic account, as far as *the Plantation of a Paradise for the Habitation of Man is concerned.*

If this World and Man had ever a beginning at all, it must have it by some particular method, some way or another, thus much is certain; and it will be allowed, likewise, that the
Deity

Deity must know this particular method, and could reveal it, if He pleased to do so; and we have shewn, I hope, that there was no occasion for fable or allegory in this particular case, in order to make it striking and entertaining, (the only reason, I think, that this Author assigns for the introduction of them) since such is the subject-matter of this History, (as far as the present point is concerned) that the *literal* account is itself sufficient for that purpose; and farther, that even according to the rules of probability from the experience of past and present times, as far as they can be aiding in this respect, and likewise from the nature and circumstances of the first Man; that, I say, the literal Account must be the true one;—if then, to this be added, that the whole carries the calm easy Air of Historical narration, without the least sign of the introduction or exit of a Fable or Allegory; what can we conclude from all this, but that—*The Plantation of a Paradise for the Habitation of Man is not a mere Eastern fable.*

But to advance to the next particular. Will, what hath been said above, serve to vindicate reality to the Tree of Life or Lives? Perhaps, it may be said,—no,—because it is written (Gen. ch. iii. v. 22.) *And the Lord God said,—And now least He put forth his hand and take also of the Tree of Life (or Lives) and eat, and live for ever:*

Here

Here then the Tree of Life is positively implied to be the Tree of Immortality, and that seemingly in a different sense, from that wherein I have allowed it to be so; but as no mere Tree can *possibly* be endowed with that property, this circumstance is, therefore, part of an Allegory. Am I not here, then, naturally called upon to enquire a little into the true import of the word (gnolam) that our translation here renders *for ever*? And how can I do better (for conciseness sake) than refer myself to Marius de Calasio's Concordance, where it is said, that (gnolam) significat Seculum perpetuum, *eternum*, sempiternum: interdum Tempus longum, aut multum, *nonnunquam* Tempus alicujus Vitæ. Aliquando (nonne sæpe?) usque ad Jubilæum. And might it not be added to the End of the Jewish Law is a frequent sense enough of it, as for instance, (Exod. ch. xxix. v. 9.) *And thou shalt gird them with girdles (i. e. Aaron and his sons) and put the bonnets on them, and the Priests office shall be theirs for a perpetual statute: and thou shalt consecrate Aaron and his Sons.*

But the question is, how it comes to signify future time at all? when that is determined, I fancy, all the particular senses will follow of course, and that, likewise, which the context seems plainly to require for this particular place. And all the mystery appears to be only this, the root from whence the word comes signifies

to hide, and as all future time is hid from Man, it, in its first sense, may justly signify *future* time in general? but altho' we can have no certainty in this respect, without God's immediate interposition, or mediate by means of the Spirit of Prophecy, yet still conjecture hath liberty to operate here in various degrees, and may be stronger or weaker, according to the different distances of the Periods at which our conjectures aim, together with other circumstances.

But as Eternity is *infinitely* removed from us, and, therefore, in a peculiar manner hid from our eyes, it may supereminently signify Eternity: (altho', I think, it is said, by some Jewish Writer, that it never stands for a proper eternity, unless (*gnad*) is joined with it,) but that is not material, at present, since our Translators always, I believe, give warning of this, by translating it (*for ever and ever*;) (H)——It is put, likewise, for a long determinate time, which altho' it may not properly be hid, yet the contents of it most frequently are; but not to dwell any longer upon this point, as it may thus come to stand for future time in general, so it may be put for any particular portions of it, and thus it may be put for the time of a person's life; as for instance: (1 Sam. ch. i. v. 22.—the latter part)——*I will not bring him, 'till He is weaned, that He may appear before the Lord for ever*

ever (la-gnolam) i. e. for his whole Life; and this undoubtedly is the sense that the context requires for the verse before us.——*And now least He put forth his hand and take also* (or again) *of the Tree of life, and eat and live for ever* (i. e. to the time that I have appointed for his abode here) or live on all his days in the method that I first ordained, before He stood in the relation of a criminal to me; i. e. go on to act a lye, or to deceive himself, and to think that no atonement is necessary on his part or vindication of the authority of my commands on mine, *so the Lord God sent him forth from the garden to till the ground, from whence he was taken, &c.*

This sense, then, as it entirely delivers the text from so harsh a construction, as that Adam might, by persisting to partake of the Tree of life, even in opposition to God, have lived *for ever* in opposition to him likewise; or that God had annexed such a virtue to this Tree, as might guard a criminal from his anger, and preserve his life even in defiance to himself; and as the word, both by the right of Etymology, and likewise long practice or prescription, is justly entituled to the sense now given it; do not you think it would be injustice to refuse it here what it has this threefold claim too? But if this construction is admitted, then all arguments for the *tree of life* being an allegorical tree, from its being too properly, according to the literal sense,

sense, a *Tree of immortality*, will fall to the ground, and, consequently, if this then was any reason for the above-mentioned Writer's making it an allegorical tree, its reality in the scriptures may stand as firm notwithstanding, as the Tree itself did in the plantation when our first Parents partook of it.

Shall we now just touch the next circumstance? I mean, *the tree of knowledge of good and evil*, the last particular that I am concerned in. And what, may we imagine, can be the reason of making this of the fabulous and allegorical kind too, besides that general one of humouring the people, by telling them striking and entertaining Fables, which certainly there was no occasion for, when it was very possible to tell them, upon this subject, striking and entertaining truths (as I have before had occasion to observe)? I cannot think, then, that much more is very necessary to ascertain the reality of this Tree also, beyond what has been already said upon it. But — may it be thought, that the moral duties were more worthy of God to enjoin, and of Man to hearken to, and likewise to have a penalty annexed to the breach of them, than a mere positive, (here I oppose it to moral) a mere positive Law, I say, concerning the not eating of a particular Tree? Doubtless, as God hath declared, that he will have mercy and not sacrifice, (Hos. vi. 6.) so the moral Duties were always

ways preferable in his eye to those that have the name of positive given to them; and, therefore, was the Tree of Knowledge of good and evil any thing more, when stript of its Allegory, than the doctrine of virtue and vice, with the penalty of Death annexed to the commission of this latter?

Not to mention, then, the violence that must be offered to the language and context upon this supposition, since this tree carries all the marks of reality upon it according to them, that the (gnatz makal) Fruit Trees do (except, indeed, its sacramental name) for which we have assign'd a sufficient reason, I hope, above; I say, passing this by, let us rather consider, that in Adam's circumstances, this was really a more proper Test, than an injunction of a strictly moral kind, for altho' the seeds of these latter duties were sown, after some sense, in his constitution at his first formation, yet they could hardly have any opportunity of exerting themselves at the time this command was given to him, since He was then alone, and, therefore, all the social duties were unable to make their appearance, and as to that of Temperance and Sobriety in the cool and regular disposition of his body, where all the passions were under a due Equilibrium, these virtues would be rather matter of choice to himself, than a proper subject of injunction from another; and as to his duty to God, as soon as
this

this prohibition was enjoined by him, it became a necessary part of it, and considered in the light, that I have above set it, the most necessary too. He shortly after, indeed, had a companion given unto him, of the same nature with himself, and then society, and, consequently, an opportunity for the social Duties, in some degree, commenced; but, still, at the first sight of this *help-meet*, He acknowledged her to be *bone of his bones and flesh of his flesh*, and, therefore, she was but as another self; and when we consider what a fatal influence she,

— With (her) sweet attractive grace,

(in the language of Milton) probably gained over him; it is not surprizing, that we read of no commands concerning conjugal love laid upon him, the surprize may rather be why He was not cautioned to keep the reins of his affections closer here, since it was from an undue compliance with her, that they both came into the same circumstances of disobedience. — But, — I forbear, — lest I should, thro' rashness, become guilty of prescribing to the Almighty: — we are assured, that the woman was informed of the prohibition as well as the Man, and we may be assured, that they both *might* have escaped without transgressing. But if it should be further asked, why God did not interpose with his power to prevent the real and eventual consequence?

quence? all that can be said, is, that probably such interposition would have been inconsistent with his established rules of governing free and rational creatures; and besides the very injunction supposes no violence was to be used, so as to force a conformity to, or prevent a breach of it, because, then God might as well never have given it.—But, enough,—from what hath been thus further said, I think, the inference is still strengthened, that the Tree of Knowledge of good and evil was not a mere allegorical Tree, and, consequently, that it is not a part of a mere Eastern fable.

I am now, in earnest, drawing towards a conclusion, and should have come much sooner to it, if I had not thought myself obliged to use some feint endeavours to guard against an opposite opinion maintained by so potent an Adversary as the above-mentioned Writer; yet, still, you must permit me to advance two general observations more, that seem to arise out of the subject, and to claim this place as the best station that I could put them in. I shall mention them by way of Queries: And they are too (what I think) probable reasons for the variety, and, I may say, opposition of opinion, that hath been upon this subject; *The Plantation of a Paradise for the Habitation of Man; the Tree of life, and the Tree of Knowledge of good and evil in the midst of it.* And,

1st. May it not be justly suspected, that, in our approaches to the scriptures, we are apt not sufficiently to consider our own nature, and, consequently, to pay too great a deference to one part of it in prejudice to another, i. e. to careſs the understanding conſidered as ſpeculative, ſo far as not to pay the regard that is due to the moral part of it, or conſidered as practical? Hence do we not become too complaiſant to the former, and exert ourſelves, perhaps, even too much, in looking out for gratifications for it, whiſt the latter, which only can make us truly good and great, is bid to follow at a diſtance, or not permitted to come at all into the preſence of our thoughts upon theſe occaſions? and hence is not the former apt to acquire a kind of faſtidiouſneſs, or falſe delicacy, (not unlike what a luxurious indulgence often gives to the bodily appetites;) and, therefore, it frequently cannot reſiſh, but overlooks what is plain and healthy, altho', perhaps, to a *rightly diſpoſed mind*, it may be truly rich and delicious entertainment, but muſt have it dreſſed with foreign additions, muſt have plain Hiſtory trolled up into entire Eaſtern Fable and Allegory, before it can be, in any degree, digeſted by it; becauſe, forſooth, the old Bramins or the Egyptian Magi made uſe of ſuch methods to diſguiſe truth, (or, perhaps, oftener falſhood,) in order to make it palatable to their diſciples? But does it not be-

hove us to consider, that the great end of all God's Revelations, in the last result, is practical obedience? and if it may be thought that something striking and entertaining to the imagination is necessary to this *very end*, and, therefore, when recourse is taken to Eastern Fable and Allegories, it is not solely to give a full play to airy speculation, but to put truth into the best light, in order that it may have a *stronger* influence upon the heart, than plain Narration can give it; I hope, it has appeared, that *in this particular case*, there was no occasion for employing them upon that account, because the bare History (such is the subject Matter of it) might contain enough of those qualities without doing so. And, certainly, then there was nothing, in the least, to justify such a violent liberty with it, but only that the *literal* interpretation was absolutely inconsistent with an Historical narration, which, I hope, (as to what I am concerned with) may appear from the preceding remarks far from being the truth of the case. But to return—practical Obedience, I say, is the great end of all God's dispensations, and, therefore, all our religious speculations ought to point some way towards it; but if we neglect a proper attention to this, and canvass the divine Writings not so much seemingly to find out proper rules of conduct and the motives to obedience, as to adapt them to some pre-conceived Speculations of our
 own,

own, if we suffer the understanding to roam indiscriminately with the same latitude thro' the sacred, as we do thro' human Authors, and instead of submitting our notions to those we find in them, we only labour to strengthen and enlarge from thence, those we have already conceived; where is the wonder, if, when we meet with any thing there, that directly crosses our opinions, we should treat them with almost as little ceremony as we do human Writers of contrary sentiments to ourselves? If we should strain and distort them unnaturally, in order to make them speak our own sentiments, and almost threaten, if they will not at length submit, that we will pronounce them absurd and ridiculous?

But ought it not to be considered, that, when we open the Book of God, we step, as it were, upon holy ground? and what is the indication upon doing so? why, what said the Lord unto Moses? (Exod. iii. v. 5.) *Put off thy shoes from off thy feet, for the place whereon thou standest is holy ground,* and so, in like manner, ought we to strip off very much of that liberty, that we may allowably approach common Authors with, when we take hold of those that are confessedly divine. Our Business *here* is not to dispute the notions advanced, but first to find out the real sense of the passages, and then try what useful notions they will yield; in order, indeed, to the former discovery, the same method is to be

used, that is employed in the perusal of all other Writers ; but when the discovery is made, then commences the difference, in respect of the sacred Authors we are to submit and acquiesce in the sense, whatever it is, when we are *upon proper grounds* satisfied that we have found it ; but in regard to human Writers, such submission or acquiescence is accidental, may or may not take place.

But will you say, suppose the question should be, what is the true sense of any passage, what is to be done then, since the notion, that is to be thoroughly acquiesced in, cannot be determined, 'till the former is established ? To this, what can I answer more, than what I have said at the entrance of this very letter ? Must we not proceed to examine the words, parallel places and the context, and if the words appear to have or admit of an obvious sense, if that sense is supported by several parallel places, and if the context gives no just occasion to look for a hidden or secret meaning upon the whole, then that obvious sense is, I apprehend, to be acquiesced in, and we must endeavour to make the best of it, and not to force what has all the appearances of *Historical narration* into an entire Allegory, to the utter confusion of all Historical truth whatever, for it may be all allegorized upon the same principles. But are not, say you, in the person of an objector, the circumstances of the particular

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ticular narration, now before us, somewhat very extraordinary in their literal sense? But let us, just for one moment, only *suppose*, that there were a real History of the Creation of the World, and the placing the first of the human Race upon this earth, and then let us ask of what kind must the circumstances of it be? would not any one answer, very extraordinary to be sure? and, certainly, then that can never be brought as an objection to the reality of such a History, which, *supposing* it real, must follow from the very nature of it. But—not to anticipate,—this brings me to the——

2d. Observation that I proposed to offer to you, as a probable reason for the opposition of opinion upon this Topic, and that is, do not Persons, think you, frequently come to the consideration of it with too many civilized Ideas in their Heads, which being strongly contrasted with the circumstances of this Narration, are apt to induce the further Ideas of improbable, incredible, if not impossible, and, therefore, they fly for shelter to Fable and Allegory? But why thus, I pray? when Israel (Gen. ch. xliii. v. 11.) sent his children a second time to buy corn in Egypt, and commanded them to carry a present for the Man; of what did it consist? did it not consist of the products of the Land of Canaan? And when the God of heaven is pleased to present us with an History of the formation of the Uni-

verse, and his creating and placing our first Parents as Inhabitants upon this Globe, what are we to expect? are not we to look for the products of a new-born Infant world, in full bloom indeed, but without one of those emoluments, for the attainment of which art and time are required?

We find a variety of creatures, over which Dominion was given to the rational Creature, Man; and He was, very probably, led and instructed so far by his Creator, as to make him a fit Object of Law, and likewise capable of maintaining that Rectitude that was bestowed upon him. Is not this entirely agreeable to the goodness of God, and, moreover, such a notion as Men might, in reason, conceive and entertain of the first origin of things? nay! is it not much superior to any that hath been seriously given, and was not derived from it? why, then, should the modern Ideas be suffered to obtrude and deface these juster notions? what is it that makes a thing impossible? nothing to the Deity, except a contradiction in the thing itself or to his own nature. And certainly, neither the one nor the other can be alledged in bar to the literal account of the Subject now before us. — What is it that makes a thing improbable or incredible? is it the uncommonness of it? But, if the Fact is of such a nature that it cannot be otherwise, this cannot be objected justly against it.

it. Is it that the Relator is incompetently qualified to furnish the account, and, therefore, however probable or credible the things may be in themselves, yet, as from him, they become otherwise? But, certainly, this cannot be suggested against a divinely inspired Moses, and, therefore, we must either deny his divine inspiration, or allow that this charge passes over him, the former must be taken for granted here, and, therefore, the latter must be admitted as the consequence. As then none of these Dictates of modern notions are well founded, ought they not to be kept at a distance, and prevented from prejudicing the truth in the case before us?—

But will it be said, that the ingenious Writer, that I was above, as it were, compelled to refer to, must be exempted from the suspicion of being influenced at all by these modern Ideas in his entirely allegorical scheme, in opposition to the literal, by me at least, since, supposing the History had been completely pen'd according to the present prevailing notions of improved life, I have ranked *him* amongst the first in the outcry against it? I allow it, that I have done so, but still, notwithstanding, I cannot consent, that even He might not be very much swayed by his view of the present state of the *civilized* world in his proposals for interpreting, or rather, indeed, new modelling the Mosaic History in this particular. Because, altho' the strong contrast of

the state of our first Parents, with that of their children, which we see *around* us in the present times, may have a great share in leading to an entirely allegoric interpretation, in prejudice of the literal; yet it does not follow, if the description had been more modern or agreeable to civil improved Life, that the literal interpretation would have been admitted by those very Persons. This, perhaps, you'll say is *bizarre* and quite unaccountable; be that as it will, I fancy, this to be truly and really the fact, and that it is far from being an uncommon situation of the soul, and that I cannot give a fuller Idea of it, than by that trite expression in our common conversation, which we apply to a Person, that we can't please by any thing that we can do, viz.—*that he seems not well to know, what he would be at.*

You may then, perhaps, say, what can be done in this case, or what possible use can be made of this observation? one very good one at least, that we should correct ourselves a little, before we undertake to correct, or rather set aside the literal sense of plain Historical narration in a Divine Writing: we should lay apart as much as possible this present *civilized* world, when we contemplate so ancient and simple an one as that which our first Parents lived in, since retaining it in this case serves but to throw a false Bias upon the mind, and seemingly conduces not a little to hurry it into unjustifiable Excesses of speculative conduct.

duct, to render it dissatisfied with any plain account of divine and ancient Transactions, and to give such a turn to it, as would be unsupportable, perhaps, in any Author, or if listened to, it would be only as to the gay reveries of a lively and enthusiastic imagination, and not a sober copying after truth. (K)

Now, Sir, I shall tantalize you no longer, and I am not only drawing *towards*, but, really, *upon the point* of concluding. I shall not solicit your candour and good nature here; for, altho' I professed to set out in a method, that might be a means of removing any backwardness in you frankly to give me your opinion, which might arise from these qualifications, yet, if that obstacle is once removed, so far as to permit you to deliver your sentiments, my little Artifice will be entirely satisfied: it was only to serve for a sort of Preliminary, and I do not desire its influence should extend further, so as to affect your actual Judgment in the case itself, but rather the contrary: my fear is, that I shall meet with too much, instead of too little, of those qualities from you, and that your Talent for Criticism may be injured by being polished into compliment. There are but too many in the world, who are apt to make truth *personal*, i. e. to consider more *who* says, than *what* is said, and to be frequently rather more acute in looking out how any thing may be turned to the

disadvantage of the writer, than to the cause that is before him. You must let me be so free, then, as to tell you, that you are, in some degree, capable of this offence, but then it is by too much indulgence, and not by a sinister and wrong intended rigour; however, you must consider, that the cause of truth is an equal sufferer either way, altho', to indifferent By-standers, the Amiability of your Character (which you have no reason in the world to be anxious about) will appear stronger from the former light than the latter.

However, not to distress your humanity too much, I shall just, in short, mention two particulars more, and, perhaps, I may by that prevent the uneasiness of some little hesitation to you. Will you think, (but to mention this, looks, indeed, as if I was writing to the world, rather than to you; but as I have begun, I shall proceed) will you think, I say, that I have in some places taken a little liberty with our English translation of the Bible? — I have only done what multitudes have done before me, and it can be no prejudice against our truly excellent Church, or the Translators of the sacred Writings, except, perhaps, with those who are utterly unacquainted how arduous a task it is to give one completely perfect in every part, and yet ours is, perhaps, notwithstanding, one of the best extant upon the whole; (I speak not this
from

from personal knowledge; as you will readily imagine, for I have not had the opportunities of making the comparison; but, however, I say it from what I look upon as competent Authority;) and, moreover, I apprehend, that there is no important Doctrine of Religion, so far affected by any mistakes in it, but that if it happen to be a little obscured in one place, it may be plainly found in another.—To mention thus much, then, I thought might possibly be proper, altho' hardly necessary to deliver you from a little anxiety.

Will you farther ask or conjecture with yourself, why I chose to throw a subject of this nature into the form of a Letter, and did not rather send it to you in that of a Treatise or Dissertation, with the former accompanying it? well then, to be ingenuous, I thought, that the Ease and Freedom of the Epistolary Stile gave me a better opportunity of saying what I looked upon as conducive to illustrate my subject, than other methods that offered themselves. The Elevation and kind of Austerity, that I think very properly belongs to set Treatises or Dissertations upon religious Subjects, did not fully answer my purpose here, and to have thrown it into a Dialogue would have made a greater breach in the connection, than even the present method does; besides, I could not in any other way have so well supported the Character of a Querist, that I professed to set out with, tho'

you

you will doubtless observe, that I have often forgot it notwithstanding.—This, then, is the best Apology, that I can at present think of for throwing so important a subject as the 7, 8, and 9 verses of the 2d chapter of Genesis, with some kind of Corollaries from it, into the form of a letter, and likewise, Sir, for troubling you with so long an one.

I am,

with the greatest respect,

your most, &c.

PHILALETHES.

ESSAY

E S S A Y II.

S I R,

I was in hopes that my first Letter, wherein I treated of the 7, 8, and 9 verses of the second Chapter of Genesis would have been the last trouble that I should have given you upon that subject. But since the writing of it, I have had the pleasure and mortification too to read the industrious Mr. Holloway's Originals, Physical and Theological: Pleasure, I say, because I found many learned and some uncommon observations advanced in them, and you well know, by your own frequent experience, what an agreeable effect Learning and Novelty united must have upon any Mind, the Possessor of which is called upon by his way of life to the pursuit of Letters; but my Mortification arose from my not being able to subscribe with a full assent to every thing, that I met with there, which had fallen from his Pen. A Mortification! that you will readily imagine, was the more acute and sensible, as the Dissent must, I apprehend, appear to be from a well-meaning

meaning and sincere, as well as an industrious and learned Gentleman.

After I have given you this, as my opinion of the Writer, it may, perhaps, be the more necessary to throw in somewhat by way of caution against, or excuse for any warmth of expression, that may occur in the future handling of what I am now about to be engaged in, and which I cannot promise to be so far Master of myself, and so absolutely cool as to be entirely free from.—What shall I say? you know that truth, especially religious Truth, is in itself beautiful and amiable, and you know, likewise, that when rival Contenders for earthly female Beauty, in the eagerness of Passion and hurry of Spirits, which such a situation is apt oftentimes to inspire, when, I say, they utter any thing to the disadvantage of their Antagonists, the World is generally sagacious enough to discern the real Cause, and good-natured enough too to make some proper allowances for it; if, therefore, in this similar case, any thing, that betrays an undue Warmth or Passion, should proceed from your humble Servant, which is not rigidly justifiable, according to the strictest Rules of Complaisance and Humanity, I hope that your Candour will see through into the cause, and likewise pardon it.

But it is very possible, you may think, that the Illustration, which I have endeavoured to accom-

commodate to my purpose, falls in a very material Article, the lovely Object of conjugal Affection can be possessed but by one, whereas intellectual Truth is capable of being received by multitudes, nay! and (if the thing is rightly considered) its Value ought to be enhanced from that very enjoyment; like the Sun, it loses, or, at least, ought to lose nothing from the number of those, who feel its beneficial influence, but gain greater credit to its usefulness from that circumstance:—to this remark, then let me just add another common one, which is, that each particular Truth can be but one and single, whereas the Deviations from it may be manifold: so that whenever there are two Disputers for it, it is very possible that they may both fail of obtaining it, yet it is impossible, that more than one of them can gain it; thus far, therefore, you will readily see my illustration is direct in point, and farther I did not mean to carry it.

But, however, let me beg of you to look upon all, that I have hitherto said in this respect, as a sort of caution to guard myself against a failure of this kind, or as some alleviation or excuse, if I should be so far overtaken with forgetfulness as to fall into it, rather than as any vindication of it. — I have occasionally given you my opinion of personal reflexions in my former Letter, and altho' there may not be

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perhaps,

perhaps, an equal Danger of the same aggravating circumstances here, that there was in the case, which I then took an opportunity to condemn; yet, as it is, what I universally disapprove of, in points of this kind, as most frequently tending to injure the Cause of Truth, and seldom, if ever promoting it, upon this account, therefore, exclusive of the moral and religious Light, in which a thing of this Nature is capable of being viewed, I think it becomes me to take some proper precautions, either to guard against the actual commission of such an offence, or to soften its malignity, if I should unfortunately be betrayed into it.

As then I have thus endeavoured to do so, nothing more now remains, I think, but that I propose my subject to you, which is to offer some more reflections in support of *that* Sense of the (*Nusmeth Chijm*) in the 7th verse of this 2d Chapter of Genesis, *which* I adhere to, and as this learned Writer agrees, in some measure, with me in his interpretation of this expression, I wish it were in my power to do so entirely with him, by giving up the difference, but there are some reasons, that as yet sway so far with me, as to make me stand my ground, without thinking that Truth is the least injured by my obstinacy, but on the contrary I should imagine it would suffer if I was to do otherwise.

At P. 350. V. 2. He says, that by *Nusmetb Chijm*, in this place, (Gen. 2. v. 7.) either the Divine Part infused by God is chiefly spoken of, or, at least, the *animal-human Soul*, as considered in union with it. But at p. 362. He observes again, that Man was created an Animal constituted of *an Animal Soul and a fleshy Body, with a Divine Part* superadded to him from God, and from another System above and beyond this; but then asserts a little lower, that the account given in this very passage under our present consideration *does not reach this*; now how to reconcile this assertion with *that of the Divine Part being chiefly spoken of there*, I am utterly at a loss to know.

But waving this, let us suppose that the *animal-human Soul*, as He calls it, in conjunction with what is named by this Writer, *the Divine Part of the Mind*, is here treated of, and then let us try whether it will adapt itself better to the preceding and following clause of the paragraph than the interpretation that I am endeavouring to support. And in order to this, I shall consider the last sentence either as a sort of conclusion from the former parts of the verse (which seems to be the light in which our Translation views it,) or as the carrying on of a descriptive Narration, (which is the Sense that I myself incline to;) and if the expression, now under our consideration, as thus interpreted, will not mix

kindly with it in either of these views, then, I apprehend, this will be a fair presumption in favour of another interpretation.

But here it will be necessary to proceed step by step, and with a good degree of caution; for otherwise there will be some danger of falling into a Perplexity and Confusion, from which it will not be very easy, perhaps, to extricate ourselves: and pray is not this circumstance itself a laudable presumption against the interpretation?—yet, let me proceed without these interruptions.

1st. Then, let us take the last Sentence of the verse as a sort of conclusion from the foregoing parts of it; and here I shall for a few moments, and just, *pro hac vice*, wave the nicety (hinted at in an observation upon the Terms used in this verse, at P. 32 of the former Letter) with respect to the Legitimacy of the reasoning in this view of the Passage, and *suppose*, that thus far all is well.—The last Sentence, considered as a sort of conclusion from the foregoing, may be beheld in two Lights.—1st. As our present vulgar Translation has it,—and—*Man become a living Soul*, that is,—(as I understand it, or as, I suppose, our Translators understood it) *a rational Being or Agent*: here then, if this is to be the meaning of the Sentence, it will require the *Nusmeth Chijm* (the Breath of Lives) to be understood of the superior or Divine Part of the
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Soul, or that branch of Intellect, which appears to be peculiar to Man; but it demands no more, and, therefore, that complex acceptation of this expression, that comprehends the *Animal* as well as the *Rational Nature* in it, will, as far as it does so, be merely arbitrary, in respect of this passage, and any Man, that was in a humour for it, might, upon as good grounds, foist in an hundred other Ideas, and say, that it was his Will and Pleasure that *Nusmeth Chijm* should stand for them all, as well as that of the *Animal Nature*, for they would all have as much relation to the inference upon this view of it, as that has; that is,—just none at all.—

Let us now, if you please, consider the last Sentence in the other light that it is capable of being view'd, that is, with the *Napesb Cbi* translated, as it is in Gen. i. v. 20. a living Creature, (or *Animal*) and then suppose it to be a consequence of the two preceding Clauses, and it will require the *Nusmeth Chijm* only to signify the *Animal Life*, just as in the foregoing Paragraph and Translation, it was required to stand for no more than the *Rational*, for here the inference will be likewise good, as it was there. So that in either of these ways of beholding, this last sentence (when it is considered as a sort of Conclusion of the preceding clauses) the *Nusmeth Chijm* is obliged to stand for only the *rational* or *animal* Soul exclusively; but it cannot

regularly appear from thence, that it comprehends both of them; and, therefore, from these considerations, I think myself authorized to say that such an Interpretation of the *Nusmetb Cbijm*, as this learned Writer advances, is not, in any proper manner, strictly defensible, when the Passage is thus considered as a short chain of reasoning.

I have just said, not, in any proper manner, strictly defensible, altho' I have mentioned but two methods, in which I have declared this Interpretation not to be so; the Reason is, because I am not, at present, master of, nor can I devise any more senses than these two; that the Language, together with the present Context, will permit the Terms of the last Sentence to assume with any tolerable appearance of reason; and, therefore, I am ready to think that there are none others, and, consequently, whilst I do so, I may yet adhere to my assertion, notwithstanding those two methods only have been advanced in support of it.

But still, before I take my final leave of the Passage in our present view of it, I will just point out a way how this learned Writer, should, I apprehend, have proceeded, in order to maintain his Interpretation of the *Nusmetb Cbijm* here, so as that he might gain credit, and give a currency to the truth of it. — If he had translated

lated the *Napesb Cbi* in the last sentence a *rational Animal*, and had shewn, from the approved methods of investigating the sense of Terms in a dead Language, (especially the sacred) that these two words together taken were fairly capable of, and intituled to that interpretation; if He, moreover, had clearly shewn, that the last clause of the verse must necessarily be considered as a conclusion drawn from the two preceding; after He had duly settled these Preliminaries, then He might have given his Sense of the *Nusmeth Chijm* with a force almost irresistible, because the Terms *Napesb Cbi* would, upon this state of the Case, necessarily require it, since the inference, that the Adam became a *rational Animal*, could not have been made without doing so. But these things are not done, and until they are done, I must think myself at liberty to keep back my assent from his interpretation, and, likewise, to have a strong motive not only to look out for, but also to maintain another.

All that has as yet been said, then, you will readily perceive, proceeds upon the supposition that the last Clause is considered as a sort of inference from the two foregoing; but, perhaps, it may be thought, that it was not this learned Writer's intention so to view, but that He looked upon it in the other light, (which I profess myself a Votary to,) as the Carrying on of a descriptive

Narration of the Frame of Man; this, therefore, naturally brings me to the

2d. Way, wherein I proposed to consider his interpretation, and this seems capable of being done with less expence of your time and trial of your Patience than the former. Let us see, then, how his interpretation will co-incide with the Context upon this inspection of it: it will run some how nearly in this manner, — *And the Lord God formed the Adam* (i. e. the gross Body of the Man) *out of the dust of the ground* (or Admah) *and breathed into his* (its) *nostrils* (or Mouth) *a divine* (or rational) *and likewise an animal Soul*, and the Man was (moreover) a living Soul (or rational Being) or a living Creature (or Animal) (such as the other inferior living Creatures of God are described to be :) here, then seems to be a direct and palpable Tautology, whether the last Sentence is translated a *living Soul* or *living Creature*. For if both the rational and animal Nature of Man are comprehended in the Terms *Nusmeth Chijm* in this place, one of them will be immediately repeated again in the concluding Clause of the verse, but such an apparently vain repetition is not to be imputed to an inspired Writer, and, therefore, the indication, in such a case, most certainly is, that we must look out for another interpretation.

But if the *Nusmeth Chijm* is here to be understood entirely of the rational part of Man, and his

his capacity for a double existence here and hereafter, I apprehend, this difficulty will be wholly avoided, since then each sentence of the verse will describe something that was not described before, and the whole of it will contain altho' a summary, yet a full and complete enumeration of the *chief constituent Parts* of the human Nature. And farther, if this is admitted as the sense of the *Nusmeth Chijm*, then the whole verse will be perfectly agreeable to the future revelations of God in the Gospel, and the truth of things, and, moreover, to the very intimations of our own minds; for we may say, here, in the Language of a most elegant Writer :

Else whence this pleasing hope, this fond desire,
This longing after immortality?
Or whence this secret dread and inward horror
Of falling into nought? why shrinks the soul
Back on herself, and startles at destruction?

But you will, perhaps, reply, that these intimations are nothing more, in the last result, but the offspring of Revelation, and add in the words of the same Writer, altho' with some little variation of his sense : —

'Tis heaven itself, that points out an Hereafter,
And intimates eternity to man.

If this should be your opinion, I hope that you will think it does so in this very expression, under

der our present consideration, for the reasons just above given. However, without urging you too far, I must frankly declare for myself, that, upon their account, I cannot think, that the Divine (or rational) and Animal Soul, are both comprehended under the expression of *Nusmeth Chijm* in this place, but only the rational, and that as considered capable of a double existence; hence, therefore, as well as because of what hath been already said in the former letter, I must still adhere to the interpretation that I have espoused, notwithstanding what may be suggested to the contrary in favour of this other.

But yet, as I have been in a manner compelled to say somewhat by way of guarding against that part of the interpretation from so learned a Writer, as the author of the Originals, where it differs from my own, or that which my sentiments upon the subject have inclined me to, so it would be but fair and candid to consider a little further, what He says in support of his intimation or assertion.

And 1st. He observes, that (*Nusmeh*) together with (*Ruach*) is in the 7th Chapter of Genesis, at 21 and 22 v. referred in one complex term to the *animal Soul*, and (as He styles it) to its *expansive acts*, that is,—*the operation of breathing*. Wherein, He says, the terms, expressive of the Reciprocation of the Halitus of the

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the Breath of Lives, are applied not only to the Souls of Men, but of all other Animals inhabiting the dry Land, in contradistinction to the fishes inhabiting the Waters, and so must signify animal Souls.

Just give me leave previously to observe, before I come to the consideration of this Text, that I am not bound (for my cause does not require it) to maintain that the expression *Nusmeth Chijm* must always and constantly, wherever it happens to occur in the sacred Writings, signify the rational Soul, as capable of a present and future existence and nothing else; it is sufficient for my purpose, that, if in this particular Passage of Gen. ii. v. 7. the Context and the singular application of the expression to Man alone at his Creation, and not to the inferior Animals, seems strongly to call for this Sense, and the words themselves appear fairly and plainly capable of it, nay! perhaps, are more finely accounted for, from that supposition than any other: I say, if this is the case, it is sufficient for all the purposes that I, at present, want, and, therefore, whatever may be said in answer to any other Texts alledged, wherein the *Nusmeth Chijm* may seem to require a different sense from that which here is given to it; I say, whatever is thus advanced, must not not be considered as absolutely necessary to support the present Point, but rather only as *ex abundanti*; however, I
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hope, it might be some pleasure to you as well as myself, to find that this Passage, that I am just about to consider, and some others, not only do not interfere with, but are, in an easy manner, capable of such a view, as to be made even subservient to my interpretation.

Thus much being premised, I come now to this Scripture of Gen. vii, v. 21 and 22. and the first thing that offers itself as remarkable in it, is, that the Prefix—*Besh* (in) as our Translators render it *of*, set before every Species of Creatures enumerated as depending upon the general noun *Besher* (Flesh) at the beginning of the verse, is omitted before the Species Man: if it had been inserted before the first kind of Creatures, immediately mentioned after the general Noun, and omitted before all the rest, there would have been nothing extraordinary in it: but to be employed before each in particular, and only dismissed when the sacred Writer comes to his own Species; this, I say, is somewhat striking, and seems to suggest, that every Man is not to be referred to the general Noun *Flesh* at the beginning of the verse, but is to be taken simply and absolutely, (if you will allow me so to say)—in—the nominative Case,—and every Man. But if the Man appears thus to be, in some measure, distinguished from the other Animals, even at the very time that He is sharing their Fate, or rather that they are sharing his: may

may not the whole 22d verse be capable of a peculiar application to him likewise? and then the sense will be—*and every Man*. All (or every one of them) in whose nostrils was the Breath of lives (or the Divine and Rational Spirit) even of all these, that were upon the dry land, none escaped but all died. And then,—*upon the dry land* must not be put in opposition to the fishes, but to the eight persons that were gone up from it into the Ark.

And let me add here, that the distinction, which seems to be kept up and continued in the 23d verse, between Man and the inferior Animals, favours this interpretation, for there it is said,—*And every (living) Substance was destroyed, which was upon the Face of the Ground, not both Man and Cattel, (as our Translation has it) but—from Man to Beast, or (as *grad* oftentimes has, I presume, the force of *usque ad* in Latin, or *even to* in English) it might be rendered *even to* Beast, &c. which forms of expression intimate and maintain better the distance that is between their Natures than the other does, and likewise point out, with more exactness, (especially the latter rendering) where the chief fault lay: for as Man was much superior in Dignity of Nature to the Beasts, He had a kind of right upon that score to be distinguished from them, and to be preserved whilst they were permitted to perish; but as he was the only*

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Criminal, when Punishment came to be inflicted, they seem to have a kind of claim in this view to be distinguished from him by an exemption from it ; but as it pleased Almighty Wisdom, (who is the absolute Lord of Life and Death,) to involve all in one common ruin, when it is said, He did so from Man to Beast, or even to Beast ; this manner of expression appears more conformable to strict Propriety, and the Truth of the fact.

But, notwithstanding, by this, as I think, fair and easy interpretation, the whole 2d verse is secured to Man alone, as endowed with the higher Principle of a rational Soul ; yet, still, there are Words sufficient left to secure their living Nature and Frame to the inferior Animals likewise, such as are those of *moving* and *creeping*, or even Death itself, which (as I have had occasion to observe in my former Letter) necessarily implies Life ;—but if any one chuses still to ascertain their Claim to this 22d Verse, and, by consequence, the more lax and general Interpretation of *Animal Soul*, *Life*, or *Nature* to the expression of *Nusmeth-Ruach-Chijm*, I am not bound to contend it with him. I have already observed, that what I might say upon this Point, should be looked upon, in a great measure, as *ex abundanti*, since whether my account of the *Nusmeth Chijm* was admitted here or not, it might never the less keep itself firm and

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unshaken in the 7th verse of the 2d Chapter of Genesis, for the reasons already given.

But I must now apply myself to a more material Article, which this learned Author alledges in favour of this expression *Nusmetb Chijm*, or the word *Nusmetb* being chiefly referred to the *Animal Soul*, and only applied in a more general and comprehensive Respect, to the other Divine Part in the said Soul of Man, and it is this—— that there are other words, which (when spoken of Man as descriptive of something in Man) do properly signify that noble Part in his Soul derived and infused into him by God.—The chief of these words are, He says, (*Ner*) a Lamp or Candle; and (*Or*) Light; to which, He says, may be added (*Shebib Esh*.) the *Spark of Fire*. But this last He seems to give up, and confines himself to the two former, and, therefore, I shall do so too.

And previous to my going over the Texts that He has brought for his purpose, I shall just beg leave to observe, that each word, both in its literal and proper, and in its tralatitious or metaphorical Sense, is of very common and extensive Use in the sacred Writings; and, therefore, it may be somewhat difficult to set forth all the views in which They are, in this last respect, i. e. metaphorically applied to Man; but, I fancy, they may safely enough be considered as expressive of temporal success, or even excellence

cellence in general, or they may be considered as signifying the very same with our *Nusmeb*, or some action of it, or rather as determining *Nusmeb* to that sense, which, we apprehend, Truth requires it to bear in the Passage now under consideration; or lastly, as signifying something infinitely superior to it, either the Word of God given for a Rule of its Conduct, or the Co-operation of the Holy-Spirit, assisting and enabling it to perform the Prescriptions of that Rule. To come now to the Examination of the Texts alledged.

1st. He says the *Divine Part* in our Soul is called *Ner*, our *Lamp* or *Candle*. And the first Text brought for this purpose is that of Psalm the 18th and v. 28. Here, says the Psalmist, *Thou* (addressing himself to God) *lightest or keepest light* (or wilt make light) *my Candle or Lamp*; which last word, says this Writer, is to be referred to the *Divine Part of the Soul*, but, certainly, most other Writers would say, it is to be applied to the *temporal Success* or Prosperity of the royal Psalmist. For in the verse immediately preceding, He is speaking of the *Mercy* and *Justice* of God, *in saving the afflicted People, and bringing down high looks*. And then He adds, *Thou wilt light my Candle or Lamp:—the Lord my God* (or rather God my Lord) *will enlighten my Darkness*, i. e. plainly in humble confidence, I hope, from what I have already experienced,

perienced, that Thou wilt put or keep me in a prosperous and happy condition, and wilt remove that Darkneſs of Affliction, which may intervene to ſully and deſtroy it. And then He immediately adds, as one of the greateſt inſtances of Proſperity to a King and a Warrior, as David was, that by God's aſſiſtance He has (or ſhall) or both has, and, therefore, hopes He ſhall again run thro' a Troop, i. e. gain a complete Victory in the open Field,——and by the ſame aſſiſtance He has, and thence hopes He ſhall again leap over a Wall, i. e. take Towns by Siege or Storm, both remarkable inſtances of Succeſs and Proſperity, and which, doubtleſs, (according to the *obvious* and *literal* Senſe of the Paſſage) was the chief, if not the only point in the inſpired Pſalmiſt's view, and, therefore, how it came into the mind of his Commentator to conceive that *the Divine Part of the Soul* is here repreſented under the notion of a Lamp, is to me moſt inconceivable.

The next Paſſage is taken from Pf. cxix. v. 105. there the Writer ſays,——*thy Word is a Lamp to my Feet or Foot*, נֵר לְרַגְלִי דְבָרְךָ,——*thy Word*, i. e. ſays this Commentator in a Parentheſis, Chriſt; now that *Dabir* or Word (the ſecret thing revealed) is one of the Titles of Chriſt, is moſt undoubtedly true, and that it was commonly underſtood by the Jews to be ſo, is highly probable, from the beginning of St. John's Goſpel, &c. but that this muſt be the

Sense of the expression in the place before us is far from being clear, nay! the contrary seems to be so, because, immediately, both before and after it, the inspired Writer is speaking of the Commandments, the Testimonies, the Precepts and the Judgments of God, from whence it is reasonable to think, that *thy Word* here is but a synonymous Term with these; yet, however, we must not enter into a Discussion of this point, which would carry us too far, and, at the same time, is not properly the Subject in question, since that is whether the word *Lamp* signifies here the Divine or Superior Part of the Soul of Man; yes, says this Commentator, thy Word (Christ) is a Lamp to my Feet; my Feet!—that is, to my inferior or Animal Part; and, therefore, I suppose, the inference is, that *Lamp* must signify the superior (divine) and rational. But, in the first place, it is by no means plain, that Feet must stand here for the inferior or animal Part of Man, exclusive of, or in opposition to the superior, nay! from the remaining clause of the verse, it should appear rather otherwise, for there it is added,—and a *Light*, (the very other Word *Or*, that this Author has assumed for his consideration) a *Light*, I say, *unto my Paths*, which is assuredly nothing but an amplification upon the former Sentence; now we know that Paths and Walking are Scripture Terms most frequently employed to express the Conduct of Man, as such, or moral Conduct in general; and

and, therefore, when they are thus metaphorically applied, they must comprehend the superior Part of the Soul however, if not in strictness, that only, since it is in that alone that Morality (properly speaking) resides. But to give this up for a moment, and suppose that the inferior or animal Part is alone signified by the Terms Feet and Paths, yet it will by no means, even from hence, follow, that the Term *Lamp* must signify the superior, or, indeed, any Part of the Soul of Man: For whatever the sense of it is, it is affirmed of the Word of God, and, therefore, belongs to it; the Word of God, I say, i. e. according to this Author, *Christ*; but, if I may be allowed to suggest my opinion,—the written Revelation of that Time, the Jewish Gospel, (if I may so call it) or the five Books of Moses, together with whatever other Writings of divine Stamp or Original, that were subsisting at the time this Hymn was composed, to this, (or these) therefore, the Term *Lamp* is plainly to be referred, and the Sense of the whole Passage seems to be this,—thy written Revelation is primarily (and if any one pleases *Christ* secondarily as far as He is *there* to be discovered by his Types, &c.) a Guide and Direction to me in all the Duties of my Station, which I owe to thee my God, or to my Neighbour, or to myself; i. e. in the whole of my moral Conduct, just as a Lamp is a Guide to my material

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Part, whilst the dark Shades of the Night prevail, or as the Sun is more effectually so to all my Paths, whilst He gloriously reigns in our Hemisphere. This, then, I take to be the true paraphrastic rend'ring of the Passage, but if it is so, no argument, in the least, I think, can be deduced from it, to shew that (Nur) Lamp is a peculiarly proper Term for to express the superior Part of the Soul of Man; since it plainly stands here for one property of the Word of God, and that only.

I shall now proceed to the third Text alledged from Prov. Ch. xx. v. 27. and it is this, *Nur Javoh Nusmeth Adam*, — to take the whole verse together, *Nur Javoh Nusmeth Adam chepesht cal chedari Beiben*. This Writer observes (which is common in the conciseness of the sacred Language) that there is no verb in the first part of this Sentence, which, therefore, He thinks is to be supplied, not by the Verb Substantive (is) but by some Verb expressive either of the Act or Effect of the Substantive *Nur the Lamp*; so that the rendering, according to him, should be thus:—*Nur, a Lamp of Jehovah enlightens, informs, animates and supports the Nusmeth or Animal Soul of Man; investigating, exploring, examining (the act of what we commonly call Conscience) all the inner Chambers of the Belly, i. e. of the Heart and Reins, the Seats of the Passions.*

But may I not be allowed to ask here, is it not a known Rule, and agreeable to the plainest Reason, that in all cases, where an Insertion of this kind is required to be made, *cæteris paribus* the most simple is the most preferable, as, therefore, the Verb Substantive is nothing but a connecting Term (as it were) and makes a bare assertion without bringing any adventitious Ideas along with it, it certainly, in all such Instances, ought to have the first Offer, and if it can maintain its place with a Propriety equal to any other word, it will, from what hath been just said, maintain it with more, and, therefore, ought to enjoy it unmolested. Let us, then, try if the Verb Substantive may not stand here with as good a Grace, at least, in point of Sense, as that He would have inserted, if it will, it has a preferable right, for the reason just this moment given. — It will then be — *A Lamp of the Lord is the Soul of Man, or the Soul of Man is a Lamp of the Lord, searching, &c.* but will it be said, that here is a sort of begging the Question? the Point in agitation is whether *Nur* does not signify the superior Part of the Soul of Man, and *Nusmeb* the inferior or animal Part, and that, by inserting the Verb Substantive, the one is merely affirmed of the other, and, therefore, they are both the same, or, at least, one is a Part of the other, and, therefore, if *Nur* signifies the superior Soul of Man

(if I may so say) in this view, so must *Nusmeb* too, which may be thought, perhaps, not quite a clear nor fair way of reasoning?

Let us now see how this Writer's application of the present Text stands, in regard to this Charge; does not He insert a Verb taken from the Act or Effect of the Substantive *Nur*, which rivets down the Word *Nusmeb* to the Sense of Animal Soul, *that* which He chuses to have fixed upon it here, and, therefore, this may be called as much a begging of the point in Question, as the other, and is so much the more disallowable, as his Insertion is the bolder of the two? But there is an after-consideration more material than any that has yet been advanced, and that is, there is absolutely no occasion for any Insertion at all, nay! the Passage absolutely forbids it, in some measure, and the reason of it is this, the word, that in our Translation, is rendered by the Participle *searching*, is really not so in the Original, but a Verb of the present Tense (or, at least, that Tense which corresponds to the present in our Language) and should be *literally* translated *searches*. What led our worthy Translators of the Bible to insert the Verb Substantive *is*, and this learned Writer to go so far beyond them in inserting his Verb, and then to make this other Trespass upon the Original, I shall not pretend to determine; all that I shall say is, that the first Freedom seems almost

almost necessarily to have hurried them into the second, but what induced them to take the first. I cannot devise with any Art, that I may be possessed of, or at least, with regard to our Translators, who do not appear to have any particular end to serve by it.

If, then, upon making no Insertion of any defective Words at all, and giving a strictly literal, (as I call it) Rendering of each Word, that is, at present, in the Text, a good Sense should arise out of them, and this Sense should require the *Nusmetb Adam* to be translated the superior, and not the animal Soul of Man; this, I think, will be a strong Presumption and something more, that *Nur* has no peculiar or exclusive Right to be put for the superior Part of the human Soul in this Place.

In this view, it will run thus: *A Lamp of the Lord, the Soul of Man* (which, by the wise Providence of God, is ordained to be that very Lamp) *searches all the inward Parts* (or Chambers) *of the Belly*, i. e. the Heart and Reins, the Seats of the Passions, Appetites and Affections. Here, then, there is a fair, consistent and true sense of the Words without any Insertion at all, and which requires *Nusmeb* not only to be understood of the superior Part of the human Soul, but in one of its highest Offices too, seated, as it were, upon its Tribunal, and searching into, and giving Judgment upon all the Tribe of

Passions and Affections, which constitute the inferior Part of the human nature. But now do but translate the *Nusmeth Adam*, the animal or inferior Soul of Man, and this fair, this consistent, this true Sense will be immediately converted into a Chaos. In this Text, then, the *Nur Javob* and the *Nusmeth Adam* seem to point exactly at the same part of the intellectual System in Man; and, therefore, nothing from hence can be deducible to give *Nur* a preference to *Nusmeth* in this respect, they being nearly one and the same. i. e. what we stile *Conscience*.

The next Passage mentioned, is in the 24th Chapter of Prov. v. 20. By way of introducing it, He says,——That this Divine Part (the *Nur*) contrarywise in the wicked, we are told, shall fail, or be quenched, or put out; so that it shall not abide with him, to perform the above-mentioned Acts, to enlighten, inform, animate, support his *Nusmeth* or animal Soul.——For (here comes the Text) there shall be no *אחרית* (*Acherith*) Remainder of that other higher or divine Part to the evil Man, but the *Nur*,—Lamp of the wicked shall be *put out*. It is true, that *Acherith*, in its first sense, signifies a Remainder or what is behind, but so does it likewise, very naturally from thence, signify a Reward, as what is behind, or comes last after a Person's Deserts have been tried and proved; and, therefore, it may very justly stand for, and be translated

stated Reward, in this particular Place, and the *Lamp* of the Wicked may here very fitly signify the *Life* of the Wicked, and will then come under the notion of temporal Success or Prosperity, as Life is one (and that the most necessary too) of the component Ideas of earthly Happiness, and the Sense of the whole Passage together with the preceding verse will be this:—*Be not filled with vexatious Envy at the present Enjoyments of the Wicked, for they shall have no Reward in their latter End in the future World, their Hopes shall there be cut off, and even here too, by their Lamp of Life being prematurely extinguished.* Nothing, therefore, seems justly deducible from hence, for the pre-eminent Signification of the Term *Nur* in respect to the Human Mind.

After this, He refers to three Passages in the New Testament, as making for his purpose: And the first is taken from the 1st of Thess. Ch vi. v. 19. viz. *quench not the Spirit*; which caution, He says, has more immediate respect to this Divine Part that is in us, i. e. (if I understand him) to that Part of the human Soul, that is stiled *πνευμα* (Spirit) which, He says, is the Greek Word, that properly signifies that noble Part of the Soul of Man, derived and infused into him by God, just as *Nur* and *Or* are the Terms for the same in Hebrew. But I must beg leave to assert the *Spirit* in this Passage does not stand for that, but for the *πνευμα το θεου*, properly

properly speaking, or the *το πνευμα αγιον*, the holy Spirit, the Assistance and Co-operation of which is the *stipulated* Privilege of all sincere Christians; for if it had signified the *human Spirit*, then, I apprehend, a Pronoun Adjective (as *υμετερον*) *your* would have been added, or the Pronoun *υμων* itself, just as it is in the 1st Ep. Thes. Ch. v. v. 23. where *πνευμα* (Spirit) bears this very Sense : but when *το πνευμα* is put simply with the article of distinction only, it must signify *the Spirit* by way of eminence, or *the Holy Spirit*. Besides, if Spirit stood here for the human Spirit or Mind, the Verb would seem to determine the admonition to be against Drunkeness or Murder; which Sense of the words would be looked upon, I fancy, by most Readers, as a very uncommon and extraordinary Comment upon them, and such as would hardly have ever entered into their own imaginations to conceive. And as the form of Expression in the verse itself thus determines the Sense to this peculiar Spirit, so does the company that it is placed in likewise, for the clause immediately following it is, *despise not Prophecys*, which are, we know, one remarkable effect of that Spirit; and that only, at least, all such Prophecies are so, which an inspired Apostle admonishes his Thessalonians not to despise.

But here you must permit me to pause a little, and go back, before I proceed any farther; I have

have not long ago observed, that this Writer remarks, that πνευμα in the Greek Language (frequently) stands for the noblest Part of the Human Soul; and I will add, that in the sacred Writings of the New Testament its Dignity is infinitely advanced in being assumed by God himself to express his own Nature. But, yet, the Term or Terms in Hebrew, correspondent to it, are by no means *Nur* and *Or*, as this Author, in effect, seems to intimate, at least, according to the Laws of Etymology, they cannot be so, for, in this view, λυχνος answers to (נֹר) *Nur*, and Φως to (אֹר) *Or*; and, I fancy, upon Enquiry, it will be found, that, in their metaphorical application in the Scriptures, they likewise bear an Analogy to them; what then is the Term in Hebrew that corresponds to πνευμα? the Etymologists being from πνεειν, *spirare*, *to breathe or blow*, and I heartily wish our Author had kept to his method here, in respect to the word *Nusmeb*, i. e. of resolving it into its primary Root or Roots; for then we might have immediately seen, whether it did not, in his opinion, correspond to πνευμα. He has, indeed, given a paraphrastic rendering of it, that looks as if He (notwithstanding his respect for *Nur* and *Or*) favoured the notion of such a correspondence; but as He has not, unfortunately for me! persisted in his usual Practice here, I hope, it will not be looked upon as presumption, if I should

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endeavour to pursue it according to the agreeable instructions his Book has given me, altho' I had put the former in practice in some Instances before I had seen the latter.

Sanctes Pagninus in his Thesaurus Linguae Sanctae, extracted from R. David Kimchi's Book of Roots, says, Multi dixerunt *Nusmeb* sic appellari quod sit à cœlis; those many, therefore, thought it came from Shimem the Heavens, but, still, there remains a *Nun* to be accounted for, and, which cannot well be a *Nun* of the Passive voice here, since Shimem is a Noun, and, therefore, it must be the Part of another word. Now there is a Verb (which does not appear, indeed, to be used in Kal, but only in Hiphil) I mean the Verb נשם, and to which the Lexicographers give as the first sense,—to *break*, and they make it likewise signify *irritum facere & annihilare*, &c. if then we were to say, that *Nusmeb* comes from this Verb נשם and נשם, could this learned Writer have any objection to it, after what he has said upon תבא (Tebah) the Noetic Ark, (at p. 161. V. 1. of the Originals) provided this Etymology should appear to be agreeable to Fact, and can be made in a tolerable degree to comport with it?

Let us, then try a little, in respect to the first sense of the word *to break*, and there the two words together taken will express *to break the Heavens or the Air*; which all Animals may, with

with propriety enough, be said to do by the Act of breathing; since, by the Inspirations and Expirations which they make of it from their Nostrils in that act, They break and alter its consistence in whatever Light we view it, whether according to the lately revived notion of a Plenum, or the more prevalent one of a thin fluid Body abounding with innumerable small Vacuities. In either case, I say, its Consistence, or the relative Position of its Parts, will be altered or broken by the Act of breathing, and, consequently, Experience comes in upon this Sense of the word *Act* to support the Derivation.

Let us now consider it in the other Sense, which I have observed, that the Lexicons give unto it, of making void or annihilating: it must, then, in the first place, be very plain to any one, the least conversant in these matters, that *making void* or *annihilating* (if this latter is to be understood as explanatory of the former, or the same with it) cannot be taken in the utmost rigid Sense of the Word, in the common and ordinary Use of it, since, according to an exact strictness, nothing can annihilate but what can create; and, therefore, it would be solely applicable to the Deity; but annihilate may be frequently employed more laxly in a manner correspondent to *consume*, i. e. when the sensible Qualities of any Body are so altered, as that it loses its former appearance and is unfit for the same uses: thus

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Fire annihilates or consumes fuel, and thus we annihilate or consume our food, and if the Air should, by the act of breathing, be found to undergo any changes analogous to these, it may likewise with sufficient Propriety be said to be annihilated or consumed. The word appearance, indeed, that I have so lately made use of, cannot very justly be applied to the Air, because it is a Term belonging to the Faculty of Vision, and the Air is not the Object of that Faculty; but, if any of its sensible Qualities are changed, and it becomes unfit for being employed to the purpose of breathing, after it has been used a certain time in it, the Thing will come to the same; and when it does so, I hope that you and I know each other better than to quarrel about mere Words.

Now, that this is the Fact, that the Air does suffer a change in the Act of Respiration, and is from that change rendered unfit for the same purpose, 'till replenished with a fresh quantity of unrespired Air, is demonstrated beyond all reasonable ground of doubt, by the most ingenious and accurate Writer of the Vegetable Statics, (Exper. 108. P. 234.) and that too, even to the Eye by means of the Bladder that He made use of, as any one may see, that will be pleased to consult the Experiment referred to. He shews plainly there, that a considerable Degree of the Air's Elasticity is destroyed by Respiration,

spiration, so much as to render it absolutely unfit for that purpose, 'till it is recruited again; and if his conjecture, at P. 243 and 244, should be found true, that some Quantity of the Air is, moreover, attracted thro' the small thin Vesicles of the Lungs into the Blood, it would tend still more to serve the point, for which I have advanced the observation, for then the Analogy between the Application of Food and of the Air to our use, would be stronger, and, consequently, the Propriety of saying we *annihilated* or *consumed* some of the latter in respiration would be so too, since then we should receive part of this breathed Air into our composition, as it were, and throw off the remainder of it in an unelastic recrementitious State, just as we do with our Food.

But, here, it behoveth me to be honest, and not to serve my Cause at the expence of what I think the Truth, by passing over in the way of admitting the Fact, whilst I am rather of a different opinion, and think there are no Avenues for the Entrance of the Air into the Blood from these parts. To insert my reasons for this Notion into the Text would be making too great a breach in it, and carry us too far from the matter at present under Agitation. I, therefore, must refer you for it to the Note (L) and go on, by observing, that it is sufficient for my purpose if the Air's Elasticity is destroyed by the Act of breathing,

breathing, and it becomes incapacitated to serve the same use 'till it is reformed by being replenished again with that Quality, since that I apprehend sufficient for the Application of the Term נֹא (Noa) to it in the Sense of *irritum facere* or *annihilare*, as a consequence of the Act of Respiration, and, therefore, for the Justness of its being a component Part of the Term נֶשֶׁמָה (Nusmeh) Breath or Spirit.

But here, perhaps, it will be said, that when נֹא (Noa) is employed in (Hiphil) to signify *irritum facere* or *annihilare*, it is chiefly used in an intellectual Sense, for bringing to naught or frustrating the intentions or counsels of the Heart; and, therefore, to give it application (in that Light) to things *material* may not be quite so proper, unless the Authority of S. S. is, at the same time, produced for such a Use of it. That it is commonly so employed, I believe, may be true, yet I must, at the same time, observe, that the Sense here given to it by a material application of it, is rather the primary and more proper Sense of the two, since it is observable, I believe, in all Languages, that almost all words stand for material Ideas in their first application, and that the Use of them, in an intellectual or spiritual Sense, is secondary, *tralatitious*, or *metaphorical*, and by analogy; and as it is probably thus more or less in all Languages, so it is remarkably thus in the sacred; and,

and, therefore, this observation is, I think, sufficient to vindicate our thus employing of it here, altho' no express Authorities should be found for doing so.

But, however, to give this point up for the present, (not as compelled by the force of Truth and Reason, but only just for argument's sake) yet, still, if it is ever allowed to be used in the former Sense of *altering or breaking materially*, and, I think, the 141 Ps. v, 5. will not permit it to be disputed; this, I apprehend, is abundantly enough for our purpose; and, therefore, upon the whole of what hath been said upon this point, I hope, it may be concluded, and that pretty strongly too, that the component Parts of נשמה *Nusmeb* are נא (in Hiphil to break or alter the consistence of) and ש the singular of שמים (*Shimem*) the Heavens or Air, and the ה feminine, together taken נשמה *Nusmeb*.

But in this view נשמה (*Nusmeb*) and πνευμα will appear to be very nearly related in their Origin and literal Meaning, (the former only expressing with greater exactness and *precision*, the Manner or Effect of the material action) and, therefore, it is but reasonable to look for the same correspondence in their metaphorical application likewise. If then the Spirit that dictated the new Testament has employed the Term πνευμα, which, in its primary and literal Sense, signifies *breathing*, to express the noblest Part,

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the ſupreme Faculty of the human Soul, certainly it is but fitting to think and expect that Nuſmeh, which, in its primary and literal Senſe, ſignifies the ſame, ſhould be employ'd by the ſame Spirit to ſerve the ſame purpoſe in the Old Teſtament; i. e. to expreſs the ſupreme Part of the human Mind; hence, therefore, have I not, as it were, accidentally and by the way gained another, what I think, ſtrong presumptive Argument in favour of that Interpretation of the Nuſmeth Chijm, which I adhere to? but—left I ſhould prematurely preſs too far into the general Concluſion, I will ſtop ſhort here, and bethink myſelf of the next Paſſage of Scripture alledged by this learned Writer in favour of his Opinion.

And this is taken from the Parable of the ten Virgins (in the 25th Chapter of St. Matthew's Goſpel) which He ſays is an Exemplification of the very point that He is treating of; but I heartily wiſh, that He had been ſo good as to ſhew how it is ſo, becauſe, after a tolerable attention to it, I am not able to make the Diſcovery. There is, indeed, mention of Lamps there, and of their being trimmed by one Part of the Virgins, and permitted to go out or be extinguished by the other; but yet to answer his purpoſe theſe Lamps ſhould be repreſentative of Mind, and the ſuperior Part of it too, whereas the Senſe and the whole Tenour of the Parable ſeems

seems to require that they should stand for neither the one nor the other, but for the material Actions, the Expressions (if I may so say) of prudential Virtue flowing from the Dispositions of it, which Dispositions are, in this Allegory, signified by the Words *ai φρονιμοι* and *ai μωροι*, the *Wise* and the *Foolish*, and not at all by the word *Lamps*. If our blessed Saviour had been pleased to assign the Causes of this Wisdom and this Folly, and to have ascribed the former to *Nur Javob*, and the latter to the want of it; and if he had interpreted this *Nur Javob* to be in strict Propriety and exclusively the superior Part of the human soul, then, indeed, this Parable would have been directly to the present Subject, and an incontestable Proof upon the Affirmative Side of it; but as He has thought fit barely to advance it, as a matter of fact, that five of these Virgins were wise and five foolish, without entering the least into the efficient Cause of this Wisdom or this Folly; nothing in the world can, I think, be drawn from this Parable to support that Doctrine of which this Writer would have it to be an Exemplification.

But will it be thought here, that I seem to go counter to the popular Language of Divinity (in what I have just said upon this point,) since in it, Lamp and Light are frequently used as Terms to express the superior Part of the Soul of Man? and, moreover, that St. Luke appears to give
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into this notion, (Ch. xii. v. 35.) when He records our Saviour as admonishing his Disciples, to have their Loins girded and their *Lamps burning*; which last expression should seem to be similar to that of the Lamps in this Parable, and as it is here joined with the *girding of the Loins*, it may, perhaps, be from hence argued that both the one Expression and the other must in their metaphorical Application be employed to point out what is properly a Part of the intellectual Man, and, therefore, that *Lamps* in the present Parable are engaged for the same purpose.

That Lamp and Light are frequently made use of in the popular Language of Divinity to express the superior Part of the Soul of Man, I believe, may be true, and that they may be so with very great Propriety, I am so far from denying, that I assert it, and have already a little above, in the course of this very Enquiry, shewn, that there is beautiful Scripture Authority for one of them; the former I mean. (Vid. P. 135.) But if any Writers of that Class should happen to make use of the Lamps in this Parable in particular for that purpose, and by their method of weaving them into, or accommodating them to their Subject, should plainly shew that they do so; then, I fancy, from the reason just given, the Propriety of such a Proceeding will not be quite so clear, altho', notwithstanding, it might *possibly* be rendered some way defensible

from that Laxity and certain Latitude of expression, which is not only allowable, but even, in some degree, necessary in Discourses of this Nature. Since each such Discourse is but one, whilst the Understandings, to which they are addressed, are frequently many and various; and, therefore, this method and manner of Style may seem the most probably calculated to gain an easy and useful reception for them amongst the generality of Hearers.

But—yet—will you bear with me, whilst I set this Topic in one more point of View, wherein the Use of this Term for the Mind, even when taken from this very Passage, may appear not only pardonable or allowable, but even proper? this, perhaps, you will say, looks like giving myself a wound; but as by taking a pen seriously into my hand, I have in effect professed myself a Votary to Truth; so, provided that Cause should be promoted by what I say, I am not very anxious about any other consequence that may follow from it; and yet, at the same time, that I go thus far seemingly against myself, I must add a moreover,——a moreover, I say, that even this View may be made perfectly reconcileable with the interpretation that I have espoused; by this last Clause, I question not but that I have thrown you into some suspense, and, therefore, the Indication of good Manners is

immediately to proceed to an Eclaircissement, and explain myself.

In this Passage, then, I have said, that the Lamps and the trimming of them must stand for the performance of the external Actions of prudential Virtue and Beneficence, rather than the moral Disposition from which they proceed ; but it is a common and well acknowledged observation in Morality, that altho' the external acts of Virtue do not properly, nay ! cannot produce those Dispositions of Mind from which they flow, but must pre-suppose them, yet they reverberate, as it were, upon the Soul, and strengthen that turn in it for the future, to which they themselves owed their Original: thus, if a Person can be any how disposed to perform one act of Virtue, He will from that very performance be the better inclined towards another, either from the Self-Complacency He feels in gratifying a just and worthy Principle of action, or from the Sense of having done his Duty, or even from a sort of natural, (it is almost dangerous to write it for fear of Misapprehension) but—a kind of natural Impulse, I say. But to draw up what hath been just said more concisely towards a Point, and lay it before you, it is no more nor less than this, that the Exercise of Virtue tends to form a confirm'd Habit of it.

If then the Lamps and the trimming of them stands for the external virtuous Practice, and
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this Practice tends to produce and strengthen the Habit of it, as far as it does this latter, it may be considered as an efficient Cause of the virtuous Disposition itself in the mind, and, therefore, proper for the purpose of our Author, as making the Lamps here correspondent to his *Nur* in the Hebrew. But will it be said, that this Solution is, *in some sort*, liable to the same Charge with the foolish Virgins in this very Parable, that is, its Efficiency like their Oeconomy does not take place 'till it is too late, 'till the Bridegroom is entered and the Door is shut, i. e. plainly not until the Scene of the Allegory is closed, whereas the Persons in it have their characters of wise and foolish from the very Commencement of it; and, therefore, there is no way of getting clear of this Difficulty, but by a vague supposition, which, doubtless, was never in the Mind of the Divine Author, nor would ever enter that of any other so as to persuade, unless there was a pre-conceived Prejudice in it, and a violent Inclination to serve a present purpose; the Supposition that I mean is, that the Cause just assign'd operated before the Commencement of the Allegory, and conduced to form that Character of Wisdom given to one half of the Personages in it? This, doubtless, guards against the Absurdity just above-mentioned, but if the Supposition itself is charged with being vague and highly improbable to be

in the Intention of the great Propounder, these are Charges that I cannot pretend to remove.

But will you say, that, supposing thus far all was well, yet still there is a kind of remote Refinement, a Sort of Turn or Chicane in this account, that seems rather not wholly worthy of, nor conformable to the general Intention of the Sacred Writings? They are grand and sublime like their great Author, but like him too (when considered as his Workmanship) they are full of Goodness and Benevolence; their sole Aim is to bring us unto God, the Origin of our Being and the Completion of its Happiness, and, therefore, they will not defeat themselves by perplexing the way to him. Whatever Difficulties there may be in them, they arise from their Age, their Language, and their Subject Matter, but never (all things rightly considered,) from their manner of treating of it; and, therefore, whatever gives a remoteness, an undue refinement or turn to this last, will always, upon that very account, be suspicious. If these should be your Sentiments upon the point, I shall join issue with you, and infer, and that pretty strongly too, that if this Gloss, which looks like the only plausible one to give a Propriety to that Part of the Parable, which seems relative to the purpose of this Writer, appears thus in a good degree indefensible; I say it may be pretty strongly inferred, that it really is so, at least, it shews that
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the Difficulty of the Application of it merited more regard than a bare reference to it.

I come now to the Passage of St. Luke, where this word *Lights* or *Lamps* (λυχναι) is joined with the Expression, — *Let your Loins be girded about*; and as this seems plainly referable in its metaphorical application to what is properly a Part of the intellectual Man, and I will add is positively so applied by St. Peter (in Ch. i. 1 Ep. v. 13.) where He says, *gird up the Loins of your Minds* (or being girded up as to the Loins of your Minds, but this, at present is not material) and as the Expression is so closely connected with *the Lamps burning* in this Passage, it may be thought, perhaps, (as I have before observ'd) that this last is, in its metaphorical application, to be properly referred to the same likewise, and, therefore, that the Lamps, in the present Allegory, are applied to the same purpose. But here you must permit me to observe that the consequence is by no means a good one, because, altho' some of the parabolic Images in both places have an Affinity with each other, and, likewise, the spiritual intention of both the Discourses too, yet many of the circumstances in them are so plainly different, that no good Inference can be any way directly drawn from the Use of a Term in one of them for an exactly same Use of it in the other, and consequently, that the *Lamps* in this place may signify what
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this Writer would have them, and, yet, not do so in the Parable of the ten Virgins ; but, however, I shall so far give that point up as to allow that they are in both places employed for the same purpose, but then it is a purpose, I apprehend, that will not serve the Sense of our Author, but my own.

Let me then apply myself a little more closely to the Passage, and I shall directly give you what I take to be the true Sense of the words, and, then, that you may not think it arbitrary, my reasons for it likewise.

The Sense, then, of the Passage, I take to be this : *Let your Loins be girded about*, i. e. have all your Passions and Affections ready prepared and fitly disposed, and (that they may convincingly appear both to yourselves and others to be so) (let) your Lamps (be) burning, i. e. let them shew forth themselves in the external acts of Goodness (such as in the peculiar circumstances of the Disciples was to sell what they had, and to give Alms.) This, then, I take to be the real Purport and intended Sense of the Expressions ; my reasons for it are these :

In the 1st place, the Words are plainly metaphorical, and it is certainly the Dictate of good Criticism in such cases, that that metaphorical Sense is, *cæteris paribus*, best, which keeps up the Analogy to the *literal*, best ; now this, I apprehend to be the case before us : the Loins
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are a Part of the Body, and to gird their flowing Garments about them was a usual Practice of the eastern People, when they were about to do any thing that required Activity and Expedition; but the Lamps are not a Part of the Body, but something distinct from it; here, then, is an established Difference between the two prime Ideas in the literal Sense of the expressions, that, therefore, in the metaphorical, which maintains the same, is certainly so far preferable; but the interpreting the *Loins* of the Passions and Affections of the Mind, and *the Lamps burning* of the positive Exercise of the external Acts of Goodness, the good works that are to shine before Men, seems in the best way to do this very thing, whereas if these two expressions are in a lax manner considered as synonymous, this Propriety will be lost, and there will be a sort of Dimness and Suffusion thrown over the Passage which is otherwise avoided. But,

2dly. Another reason for this Interpretation is this, That the Sentence, immediately succeeding that now insisted upon, begins with—*and you*, (yourselves) this last is not in the Original, it is there only—*and you*—here, then, the allegoric method of proceeding seems for a moment dropt and re-assumed again in the word (*ομοιωσις*) *like unto*, &c. so that *you* must not have an allegoric and a literal Sense, as the other Terms appear to have, but only a literal, immediately refer-

referable to the Disciples. Thus far, I apprehend, all is clear, but I fancy the copulative—*and*—puzzles the Commentators a little, and must necessarily do so; if *the Loins girt, and the Lamps burning* are thrown together in a loose way and made to stand for the Soul,—for then the copulative—*and*—which seems to promise something new, that has not been just before mentioned, will really not give it,—for you (yourselves) and your Souls are near tantamount if not exactly so. But if the *Loins girt about* stands for the Passions and Affections rightly turned and disposed towards Virtue, and *the Lamps burning* for the positive Exercise of the external Acts of it, then there will be a fair Opportunity for the Copulative *and* to come in, and keep its Place with very great Propriety; for, then, the word *you* (yourselves) immediately joined to it, may signify what it usually does, when it is put absolutely and addressed to any Persons, —i. e. the *rational conscious self, the Man*, that which properly constitutes him so, and without which the mere external Acts of Goodness would be but as a lifeless Carcass: and tho' accompanied with the Affections and Passions would be but a kind of instinctive Virtue, but when joined to this third particular, then become the reasonable Service, such as will entitle the sincere Practisers of it to—*a well done, thou good and faithful Servant, enter thou into the*

the Joy of thy Master; or that still higher Honour allegorically represented in this very Passage. This, then, I give as a second Reason for my interpreting the *Lamps burning* in this Place of the Exercise of the external Acts of Virtue, and not properly of the superior Part of the Soul of Man, or indeed of any Part of it.

I come now to the conclusion I intend to draw from this Text: you doubtless are ready to say, that when I have, as it were, brought over this Expression of the *Lamps burning* to serve my purpose, I have, in a good measure, from what has been before said at P. 153, precluded myself from applying it to that end by Analogy at least. I readily allow it, but I do not intend to apply it by Analogy, but by an Argument, that in the Language of the Schools (a little of which I hope you will excuse here) is called *a fortiori*: if, then, the Expression of *Lamps burning* in this Passage, where it is so closely connected with another metaphorical one confessedly descriptive of a Part of the Mind, seems, notwithstanding, according to the Rules of good Sense and Criticism, to be put for the external and material Exercise of the virtuous Actions, rather than for any thing internal and intellectual, certainly, in this other Scripture of the 25th Chapter of St. Matthew, where the word *Lamps*, is not at all connected with another metaphorical—kindred Expression (if I may so call it) allowedly expres-

expressive of a Part of the Mind, and where there are other words not properly metaphorical, but literal used for that purpose, such as Wisdom and Folly; certainly, I say, it may, from hence, be *more strongly* concluded, that this must likewise be the Sense of *the Lamps* in this Parable of the Virgins. Here, then, I think, that I have gained another corroborating proof on my Side of the Question, at least that I have shewn, that the (*λυχναι*) *Lamps* here cannot be an Exemplification to prove, that their correspondent Term *Nur* in Hebrew signifies the Divine or Superior Part of the Soul of Man. Yet, after all, it must be confessed, that, through the whole of what hath been said upon this Passage, I have been, in some measure, treading in the Dark, and this because of the learned Writer's only making a bare reference to it. Yet, I think, I may be pretty confident, that I have struck upon the point, from whence He means to draw his Exemplification.

I come now to the last Text, that He brings from the New Testament in favour of his Argument, that *Nur* in Hebrew is the proper Term for the superior Part of the Soul of Man, and that is taken from the 1st Cor. Ch. ii. v. 11.—I shall first give the Text with this learned Author's insertions adapting it to his Purpose, and then betake myself to the Original, and make some observations upon it.

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He says, that, according to the Distinctions of an *Animal Soul* in Man, and the Divine-super-addition,—the Apostle says,—*What Man knoweth the things of a Man, save the Spirit of a Man* (the Animal-human Soul) *which is in him?* even so the Things of God knoweth or perceiveth no (mere natural) Man but the Spirit of God (only that Divine Part supported by continual Influx of the Holy Ghost) which is in him. The Words of the Text without any addition are these:—For, *what Man* (or who of Men) *knoweth* (or hath known) *the things of a Man, save the Spirit of a Man which is in him?* even so the things of God knoweth no Man, or no one knoweth) but the Spirit of God. Now it appears, in my humble opinion, that this Writer has thrown some little confusion upon, instead of clearing St. Paul's reasoning in this Place, by his insertions and additions, nay! so far as to render it to me unintelligible.

The Apostle is, in effect, saying the Doctrines peculiar to the Christian Religion were not to be known by the mere Light of Nature or unassisted Reason; and, then, at the 10th verse says,—*But God hath revealed them to us* (or me) *by his Spirit*; and, then, to shew how fully qualified the Spirit was for this Office, He adds,—*for the Spirit searcheth all things, yea! the deep things of God.* And, then, to illustrate this Truth, and, at the same time, to shew how necessary

cessary such an Assistant was, He goes on; *For what Man knoweth the things of a Man, save the Spirit of a Man which is in him? even so the things of God knoweth no Man but the Spirit of God*; here this Author adds,—which is in him. Now this addition is taken from the latter part of the former clause of the verse, and one would think (if there were nothing more) was intended to be applied to God just in the same way as it is there applied to Man, which might be tolerable, altho' not quite so proper, since to say the Spirit of God which is in him, is rather somewhat harsh; because it seems to suppose that it may go out of him, or from him, just as the Spirit of a Man, which altho' He now enjoys at present, may yet this night be required of him: but this tolerable interpretation He, by an unfortunate assertion at the same time, will not allow us to make use of; for, by that, He explains the *Spirit of God* (that Divine Part supported by a continual Influx of the Holy-Ghost) which necessarily determines the just mentioned additional clause to Man and not to God, since it can only, in regard to the former, be said with any Truth and Propriety, that Divine Part supported by continual Influx of the Holy-Ghost; but such an application quite confounds the whole Sentence, and at the same time anticipates what the Apostle is just going to say in the next verse.

For

For after He has illustrated the Inscrutability of the Counsels of God, by the Secrecy of what passes in the mind of one of even our fellow-Creatures; — He goes on, — *Now we have received, not the Spirit of the World, but the Spirit which is of God; that we might know the things that are freely given us of God.* So that although the Difficulty of arriving to the knowledge of the deep things of God be in itself insurmountable, yet, when He is pleased to reveal them by so completely qualified an Agent as his Spirit, the Difficulty immediately vanishes to all those who are the Subjects of this assistance, just (it might be added) as the Counsels of the human Heart, whilst they remain lock'd up there, are inscrutable to the keenest human sagacity, but as soon as they are declared, they then become as plain to all, as they were before abstruse. As this, then, seems to be the intended Sense of this last verse, I think, it is clear, that the just-mentioned Insertion only takes something by way of anticipation from it, without doing any Service to, but rather injuring the place to which it is carried. But, still, the most material observation for my purpose remains behind, and that is, that Spirit here which is to correspond to the Hebrew *Nir*, seems to stand for the Co-operation of the Holy-Ghost, or rather the more extraordinary Operation of it, which as contradicting from the other, is stiled the

Inspiration of the Holy-Spirit, such as constituted the Possessors of it, what we call inspired Persons, and comported to the Penmen of the Holy Scriptures, or the first Propagators of our Religion, rather than to the common Herd of Christians.

I come now to consider a little the Texts alleged in favour of the second Term (*Or*.)

The first, that is brought in support of his interpretation of this Word, is the same with the first that He brings in favour of the Term (*Nur*) only what is there rendered *Lamp* or *Candle* He here translates *Light*; but that is not material, since the part of the Sentence that is summoned for the present Purpose is not that word but the Verb here translated *illuminate*, as I infer both from the Original Word and its being included in a Hyphen by this Writer; however, the same Answer almost will do here, that was made use of before, viz. that as the Noun *Nur* stands for the temporal Condition of Man, so when it is lighted it corresponds to the prosperous State of it, and the Verb *Or*, (in Hiphil,) here only expresses the Modus or Manner by which that prosperous State is conferred, i. e. in this place by the immediate Hand of God himself—Thou (says the Psalmist addressing himself to God) *illuminatest my Lamp*.

The next Passage is taken from the 97th Ps. v. 11. and is—*Light is sown for the righteous*. But
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any one may upon the slightest view of the Context see, that in the common obvious Sense of the Passage, Light will very properly, nay! must, I apprehend, in order to preserve Propriety, stand for Prosperity, for then the next or the other following Clause (as there is but another) in the verse, may be considered in a beautiful view as a consequence of the former in both parts of it; (I don't mean consequence here in the strictly scholastic Sense of the expression, but only in the way of common experience;) for then the Sentence will run thus—*Prosperity is sown for the righteous* (or the Just) *and Gladness for the Upright* (or the right in Heart) i. e. Prosperity, and, in consequence of that Gladness is sown for the Just, or him that is just; and, in consequence of that, right in Heart, which disposition itself is a Fund of Joy to him, as well as his external Prosperity. The Word, indeed, that stands for the Just is singular, and that of the Upright or right in Heart appears to be plural (although our Translations seem inclined to make them both plural) yet, I fancy, that is not sufficient to break up the view, that I have placed the Sentence in, since, I apprehend, such a Liberty is not uncommon in the Moral and Divine kind of Compositions, especially when they are of the poetic sort too. However, be that as it may, the word *Light* seems here tied down to the Idea of Prosperity

as well by the preceding Context, as the view that I have put the immediately succeeding Clause into; and, therefore, I think there can be no room left to doubt, but that it is the true and obvious Sense of it in this Passage.

Immediately after quoting this Clause of the 11 v. of the 97 Ps. *Light is sown for the righteous*;—He adds, but *this* (meaning the *Or*, in his sense of the word) in the wicked again has no Place. And then He adds,—But while the righteous walk before God in this Light of *Life*, which is sown *in* them, as above; All they that do kindle in themselves another Fire, &c. quoting and adapting the whole 11th v. of the 50th ch. of Isaiah to his purpose. There are several things remarkable here; He seemingly repeats again his Quotation from the 97th Psalm, but yet varies it in two respects; He changes *for* into *in* the righteous, which, when attended to, makes a considerable difference, the latter Prefix adapting the word *Light* in his purpose, whilst the former leaves it to the Possession of another; but in the Original it is *Lamed* not *Beth*; and, therefore, in accuracy, such a Liberty ought not to have been taken, unless it be taken for granted the *Light* must here necessarily signify what this Writer is pleased to pitch upon for its signification. But farther,—He adds to *Light*, —of *Life*—*This Light of Life*, and refers us to Ps. lvi. v. 13. where, indeed, the Expression

sion of the *Light of Life*, or rather of *the living* occurs, for it seems to be the adjective plural; but whether adjective or substantive singular or plural, it seems not in the least applicable to his purpose. For the royal Psalmist, whether he is speaking in his own Person, or by his prophetic Character, in that of Christ, it is plain that He is speaking of a Deliverance from Death, so as that the Person delivered shall walk before God in the Light of the living, or *that all which live walk in*, which is all the mystery that I can see or apprehend to be in this particular Passage; and, therefore, I should be glad, if those that can find the *divine superior Soul* of Man in it, would lend me their acuteness.

But the most remarkable particular is yet behind, and that is, the 11th verse of the 50th Chapter of Isaiah, which he accommodates to his purpose, by opposing the *Fire* in it to the Light or *Light of Life* just before mentioned, and by calling it *another* (as much as to say false) *Fire*, &c. but, yet, by what He says at the close of this Quotation, it would seem that He intends something more by it, than barely a mere accommodation, nay! as a positive proof of a *false Light* of our own kindling in our *Nusneeb* or *Animal Soul*, which is directly opposite to the true Light, or this *Light of Life*, the *Or*, and, therefore, a *Proof of its Existence doubtless*; yet, by his vague and loose manner of introdu-

cing this Passage, an accommodation is certainly all that, in strictness, according to the Laws of reasoning, He has any just claim to.

But, however, let us hear the Prophet speak for himself, and that He may really do so, and not be made to speak for any other but by fair consequence, it seems proper to go back to the beginning of the 10th Verse. The whole Chapter appears to be a prophetic Speech in the Person of Christ, wherein He upbraids the Jews for their Obstinacy and Impenitence, sets forth his Power, his Submission to the Will of God, and God's favour to him upon that account, which short Detail brings me to the 10th Verse, wherein he seems to address himself to his sincere Followers in these words: *Who is among you, that feareth the Lord, that obeyeth the Voice of his Servant, that walketh in Darknes and hath no Light?* Here, then, it seems plain, that Darknes and Light cannot be put for spiritual Light and Darknes upon our Author's own Principles, because the Person, that is said here to walk in Darknes and to have no Light, is, by the Character of him, (which just preceded) of fearing the Lord and obeying the Voice of his Servant, (i. e. either the Apostles, or as it is in the singular number our Saviour himself, who, we know, took upon him the form of a Servant) I say, from this Character of him, it is plain He could not be said to be in spiritual
Dark,

Darkness, or to want the spiritual Light; hence, then, it would seem that these expressions here must stand for temporal afflictions, and in that view they are a true representation of the State of the first Christians. And as, from this consideration, we infer, that temporal Afflictions are here meant, so likewise is the Advice given at the close of the Verse extremely apposite to the same, for it is,——*Let him trust in the name of the Lord, and stay upon his God*, which the sincere Christian in Affliction might do with comfort and confidence; but the Person that wanted the spiritual Light, the *Or*, could not possibly do so according to this Author, since it was this same Light that must inspire him with the Fear of the Lord, and Obedience to the Voice of his Servant, which is the Ground of this very Trust and Confidence; hence, then, I infer again, that temporal Affliction is here meant *by the walking in Darkness, and the having no Light.*

I come now to the Text that is made use of by this Author, and, at first view, it appears to carry an opposition in it to the Passage, that I have just considered, in two particulars; for immediately, upon concluding the former verse, the Prophet begins with an exclamation,—*Behold!—All ye that kindle a Fire, that compass (yourselves) about with Sparks*, which appears plainly referable in opposition to those just men-

tioned, *that walk in Darknefs, and have no Light;* and, therefore, must, in this place, represent temporal Prosperity, and, it is, moreover, observable, that this Sentence is introduced with an—*All ye*—whereas the former begins with a—*Who among you?*—which two manners of expression seem strongly to intimate, that those who kindle the Fire, and compass themselves with Sparks, were of the Majority, the Multitude, and such as feared not the Lord, neither obeyed the voice of his Servant, as the few expressed by the *Who among you?* did; and that this is the real intention of the Passage seems confirmed from the next Clause,—walk in the Light of *your* Fire, and in the Sparks that *you* have kindled; thus intimating, that their Prosperity was by them looked upon as *entirely* and properly their own, or at least enjoyed as thoughtlessly in respect of any superior Power as if it was so; but if this reasoning is admitted for good, we have gained a third circumstance of opposition between these two verses, (for the second just above referred to is yet to come) and thus far this verse will be a sufficiently just representation of the unbelieving Jews of our Saviour's Time and a little after, for they might be *fairly* enough said to enjoy temporal Prosperity at that Juncture, I think, altho' they were under the Roman Government, and from our Saviour's severe reprehensions of their Hypocrisy, &c. and their

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virulent behaviour in turn towards him. They might be said not properly to *fear the Lord*, nor at all to *obey the voice of his Servant*. But as the Prophet, in the Person of Christ, has been exhorting his faithful followers in *Affliction* to put their trust in God, what is to be expected that He must say to the unfaithful basking in their Prosperity? certainly, something opposite is to be looked for, and this brings me to the last Clause of the verse and the second Circumstance above hinted at, which is, — *This shall ye have of mine Hand, — Ye shall lie down in Sorrow*. There is no ground for your Trust in and Stay upon God, and, therefore, I do not exhort you to it, but tell you positively, that (if ye do not repent) ye shall lie down in Sorrow. And, doubtless, it cannot be denied but this last circumstance is as just a representation of the sad Catastrophe that happened to the Jewish Nation, as the former are of the Demerits that brought them to it. Thus, then, I have considered this Passage of the Prophet Isaiah, and upon the whole cannot help thinking that temporal Prosperity has as good a claim to the Term *Or here*, as any *false intellectual Light of the Mind* whatever, and much more so.

Upon quoting this Text, and supposing it to convey to us the *Doctrine of a false Light of our own kindling in our Nosoph or Animal Soul* (as He styles it) He says, that the wise Man tells us,
 what

what and whence it is under the former word *Nur*— (Prov. xxi. v. 4.) *the Lamp or Light of the Wicked is Sin*, That is (as He goes on) Sin sows this false Light in them, making them by a Diabolic Insinuation, to become a *Seed* or *Sowing* of the *Wicked* one, and the Children of their Father the Devil. To pass by the little Confusion that seems to be introduced here, by bringing a Part of a Text wherein the principal Term is *Nur*, whilst the Subject in Question is the proper signification of the word *Or*, I say, passing this by, I shall beg leave to observe, that thus to dart, as it were, at a particular point of Scripture, a half Sentence! and not to give some of the Context with it, or, at least, the whole Sentence, and then to found direct Proof upon it, appears to be a method of Proceeding extremely liable to Error; for, by these means, there is hardly any notion almost, but what may have Scripture Authority assigned for it; and this Danger will increase in proportion to the Difficulty of the whole Passage, a Limb of which is thus employed, or mis-employed, shall I say? Now, I apprehend, this very Passage, at present before us, is not one of the least difficult in the Bible, and, therefore, it seems to have merited a more distinct consideration, before it was made use of by our Author to serve his Cause; and this especially when by his present method

method of quoting it, He has by no means brought it to bear.

Will you permit me, then, just to offer you a Reflection or two upon the Passage as this learned Writer has here given it to us, and then to go to the original Text, and offer you one or two more from thence?

He says,——the Wise Man tells us, what and whence this false Light in our Nufmeh or Animal Soul is, and, then, quotes this Part of a Text,——*the Lamp (or Light) of the Wicked is Sin.* And He explains it with a *that is*,——*Sin sows this false Light in them*; thus, by introducing the former allusion in Ps. xcvi. v. 11. of *sowing* and putting *in* here too, He endeavours to fix, as it were, the more direct opposition between them, and gives *Sin*, or rather, by what He adds of——*a diabolical Insinuation, a Seed or sowing of the Wicked one, and the Children of their Father the Devil*, referring us, at the same time, to three Texts in the New Testament, from whence these several expressions are taken; I say, from hence, He rather gives an Efficiency to the Wicked one here (just as he did in the former place to the Deity) in producing this *Effect* upon the *Man*, which, doubtless, is all perfectly just and proper, when rightly understood; but, yet, almost *all* too much to be deduced from this Passage as our Author has given it to us; (and when we come to consider the original Text, I
fancy,

fancy, it will appear entirely so, but of this presently;) for, surely, to give Satan an Efficiency from hence, to make him *insinuate, sow, and implant* his *false* Light in the Minds of the Wicked, is, certainly, going a great deal too far in a *Philological Treatise* on set purpose to ascertain the precise Signification of Words, and the Truth of things from thence, when the Text, even according to his quotation of it, contains only a bare simple affirmation, *that the Lamp* (or Light) *of the Wicked is Sin*. This, indeed, is far from being a precise determinate expression, yet, I think, it is obvious, that it is highly incapable of being determined to that particular Sense, which this Writer would have it carry here.

And to enforce this, let us now come to the Original Text, in which the quotation is part of a Sentence, and as it is in the Proverbs, there is no occasion to have recourse to any more of the Context than the whole Sentence, (in order to come at what, I apprehend, to be the Truth of it) which almost every one knows is frequently the case in this Book of Scripture.—But here I must have recourse to an observation that I have made once before in this very Letter, and that is, that, *cæteris paribus*, that Sense of a Passage of sacred Scripture is best, where the fewest insertions are necessary; that some are so, in numerous Places of the Bible, when it is translated

translated into a modern Language, is well known to all those who are conversant in the sacred; since, if it was always rendered exactly verbum verbo, it would frequently appear——

I cannot give a better Idea of it, than by saying, like a private memorandum Book, rather than one endowed with a full and smooth flow of Style;

——but it is superfluous to mention this to you;

and I only did it the better to introduce the Remark, that the present Passage is a plain Instance of the necessity for such a Proceeding,

since it consists entirely of Nouns, and nothing else except one copulative (*and*); but, yet, I apprehend, our worthy Translators have made an Insertion here more than was requisite, and have likewise inserted the Verb Substantive in the wrong place; there is no (*and*) before —

the Light of the Wicked, which, indeed, is only the Marginal Reading in our English Bible, whilst the Text is enjoyed by *the Plowing of the Wicked*, (however, as I am so happy as to agree with this learned Writer in inclining to the Expression *the Light of the Wicked*, there can be no occasion to stop upon that account) and as there is an (*and*) here, more than in the Original, so the Verb Substantive ought, I apprehend, to be inserted before the *Light of the Wicked*, and not immediately before Sin, and then the Light may metaphorically express one chief Property of the latter in respect of Wicked Men. Having pre-

missed

mis'd thus much, I will now give as literal a rendering of the words as our Language will possibly bear, and then a paraphrastic one founded upon it, after which we will try the Issue.

The first may run thus,—*The Elevation of the Eyes and the Enlargement of the Heart is the Light of the Wicked, viz. Sin:* or to invert it, *Sin, the Light of the Wicked, is an Elevation of the Eyes and an Enlargement of the Heart* (i. e. to them. Now, these Words (as thus rendered) are capable of affording a very beautiful and just Sense to an attentive Considerer. But lest the little uncouthness arising from the strictly verbal Translation should prejudice you or any one else from paying the attention proper to discover it; I will here subjoin a paraphrastic Translation founded upon this Construction, which may be some how to this effect: Sin,—the Light, the Glory, the Boast, the Guide, and, in their own opinion, Excellence of the Wicked; (i. e. those that are so completely thus as to merit the appellation of the *Resign*, which the Royal Psalmist applies seemingly in the strongest Sense to a *Convict* after Judgment, Ps. cxix. v. 7.) I say, Sin is to these an Elevation of the eyes, it creates them no Shame, no down-cast Looks, but they are full of Life, Gaiety and Sprightliness during the Pursuit and Commission of it; and as their Joy thus shews itself in their Countenance, so neither is it hypocritical
or

or a Stranger within, there is an *Enlargement* of the Heart too, the inmost Soul rejoices and glories in its Shame.

This, then, I look upon as a just and fine Picture of a through-paced Debauchè: the rising Sun is not more apt to give a joyous pleasing Air to the Countenance, or to dilate and fill the exulting Heart of the *natural Man* in perfect health, when He first beholds its bright, but moderate beams, and feels its genial warmth, than Sin is apt to do to this *immoral One*, as long as it can be enjoyed consistent with health, and, frequently, for some time after that Period. It is true, this Joy is, in reality, false and deceitful, since it leads to the chambers of the grave, and to something much worse beyond it; yet, still, He, for his time, enters thoroughly into it, and enjoys as much as his inferior Nature is capable of enjoying. Here, then, I apprehend, is a just, beautiful, and easy Sense arising from the words, without the insertion of any defective ones at all, except the Verb Substantive, which must be inserted upon the footing of any Interpretation whatever. And in this view it is, moreover, a bare assertion of Matter of fact, without entering into the causes or reasons of it at all, and, therefore, comports better with the nature of proverbial Sentences, which are usually of that kind, as being too concise to comprehend any thing more: and if it should be thought,
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by way of objection, that the division of the verse into two Hemistichs is not preserved by it; I answer neither is it preserved by our present Translation, and that the exceptions to this Rule are so numerous, that it is to be looked upon rather as a Punctilio than a Rule, and, therefore, a Trifle, especially if it is to be put up in competition with the Sense of the Passage.

—But if this interpretation is admitted for good, then there is one consequence will follow from it, and i. e. that the part of the verse assumed in proof by this learned Writer will be of no use to him or any one else in the condition that this interpretation leaves it, since it is now without a *Verb*, incapable of affirming or denying any thing; and, therefore, a mere Non-entity in the reasoning World.

I come now to the last Text of Scripture brought by this Author in support of the present point, and that is taken from the 18th Chapter of Job, v. 5 and 6.

This is not a place (if I was qualified for it) to enter into a Criticism upon this famous Book, it will be sufficient for my purpose just to observe, that the great business of Job's three Friends seems to have been to convince him of Sin and Impiety, in opposition to his maintaining his Integrity, judging it morally impossible, that so much Innocence and so much Misery could be united in the same Person.

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In so long a conversation it is natural to expect, that various Topics of discourse must arise upon this subject. Amongst other things, Bildad the Shuhite, in this 18 Chapter, ventures to reprove Job for his impatience, and, upon that, takes occasion to set forth the calamities of the Wicked. *He* (meaning Job, and seeming, in this Sentence, to address himself not to him, but the By-standers) *teareth himself in his Anger*; then turning short upon the poor afflicted Patriarch, He adds,—*Shall the Earth be forsaken for thee?* Shall the common Father of the World collect the wide extended rays of his providence, and throw them all upon thee, leaving the rest of his creation un-aided with the beneficial influence of his Wisdom and Goodness?—*and shall the rock be removed out of his place?* and shall this Providence, which is as firm and stable as a rock, because its schemes are so deep and so completely laid, be unhing'd and diverted from its course for thee? Nay! expect it not, but remember it is one of the established Laws of it, that the Light of the Wicked (in which number, notwithstanding all thy declarations, I cannot help comprehending thee) *shall be put out, and the Spark of their fire shall not shine.* His Prosperity shall fail, (just as thine has done) and there shall none of the circumstances concomitant to that State remain with them. The light shall be dark in his Tabernacle, and his lamp shall be put out with (or rather

over) him. There shall nothing of Mirth or Gaiety go forward in his Dwelling, and the Lamp that is hung up and shineth over his Head upon such occasions, shall be extinguished. Here, by putting Light (according to the sense now given of the Passage) for Prosperity, a fair and consistent account may be rendered of the whole, as both suitable to the case of Job and the Character of his pretended Friend that spoke. But if these words *Or*, *Shebib Ash*, and *Nur* are to stand for the Divine intellectual Part of Man in this place, then there will an unsurmountable objection lie against it from this Author's own Principles and Assertions.

For at the entrance upon his Disquisitions or his citing the Texts of Scripture that are to support his notion concerning the Term *Or*, *This*, He says, *in the Wicked has no place*. But here the Verbs are all in the future Tense, and it is not said the *Or* in the Wicked, or rather *of* the Wicked *is* put out, but shall *be* put out; whereas, according to this Author's reasoning the Extinction of this *Or*, this Divine Light is that which constitutes the *Resbignim*, i.e. the Wicked, it has no place in them, as He had just said; but how is this reconcileable with the future Tense here; with its being to be extinguished afterwards; can that be extinguished hereafter which is already so? whereas, if temporal prosperity be here signified, it is by no means so rigidly and closely link'd in this World with

moral merit, as continually to accompany it, or immediately leave the man when his Virtue does so.

One would almost suspect a little, that our Author himself was some way sensible of this absurdity, for in one of these Sentences where the Verb substantive is to be supplied, as the Light shall be dark, &c. He has converted it into the present Tense, — *The Light is dark*, altho' the Verbs immediately preceding and following are future: this, I say, looks a little, as if He was conscious of the absurdity that I have mentioned, and would have been glad, if they had all been of the present Tense, for the sake of avoiding it.

I come now to my Conclusion from this Detail. As then, I have, at length, gone through every Text alledged by this learned Writer in favour of the Terms *Nur*, a Lamp, and *Or*, Light, as properly signifying that noble Part of the Human Soul derived and infused into it by God; so, I think, that I have no reason, in the least, from this examination, to retract any thing from what I said at the entrance upon it, viz. That these Terms may be considered as expressive of temporal Success, or Success or even Excellence in general, or as signifying the very same with the (*Nusmetb Chijm*) or some Action of it; or rather as determining this Expression to that Sense, which, we apprehend, Truth requires it to bear

in the Passage now under consideration ; or lastly, as signifying something infinitely superior to it, either the Word of God given for a Rule of its Conduct or the Co-operation of the Holy-Spirit assisting and enabling it to perform the Prescriptions of that Rule ; and as this is the case, I think there is no bar from these Texts with the Terms *Nur* and *Or* in them ; (when spoken of Man or as descriptive of something in or belonging to him) no bar, I say, to my inferring, that the *Nufmeth Chijm* (the Breath of Lives) in the 7th verse of the 2d Chapter Genesis signifies properly (in one, that is, a common Sense of the Expression) the superior or rational Part of the Soul of Man ; and this exclusively of his *Animal Soul*.

Here, then, it were natural to conclude this long Epistle, but I am in a little danger of doing something to you like unto what I did in my former Letter ; the Mention of the superior or rational Part of the Soul of Man, and the Animal Part thus so closely together, is, as it were, the springing of a fresh Mine : it suggests numerous reflections, as referable to this Author's method of considering them, and likewise a consequence arising from it. I hope, therefore, if I should offer some of these reflections to you, that you will not think it tedious, especially as, I apprehend, they may be made some way, if not

not immediately, conducive to the Point now before us.

He seems, then, to me, at least, so lax and vague in the remaining Part of this Section, (or, however, as far as what I, at present, intend, is concerned in it) that it is difficult to come at his Sentiments, to know whether by *Animal-Soul*, He means to express the whole immaterial Part of the human Nature, or only the inferior or irrational, or whether He comprehends *all of the Man* that is above an Animal or brute Creature in what He calls the Divine Part infused by God himself; the best way, that I can think of, to extricate myself out of this Labyrinth, will be to consider all that He says for each of these particulars in one view, and altho' it is very possible this may do it, yet, to know whether it will or not, the only way is to make the Experiment; however, if it should not do it, yet, I hope, your good nature will excuse that Loss of Time, which may arise to you from the Perusal of my fruitless endeavours. I must be obliged to repeat, in this place, some of the Expressions that have partly been considered at the beginning of this Letter, yet as the View and Intention of doing so here is somewhat different, I know that you will readily pardon it.

At P. 350, Vol. 2d of this Treatise, He adds and joins by a Dash *Human to Animal Soul*,

the *Animal-human Soul*, as considered in Union with the *Divine Part*. Here, then, by the additional word *human*, one would imagine, that He should signify something more by *Animal-Soul*, when it subsists in Man, than when it is considered as existing in the *Brute-Creation*; for if by *human* He only intends to characterize his Body, it seems but an useless Addition, since that is sufficiently determined by the Passage itself (or at least the preceding Context) to which the remark (in which this expression is contained) is an Appendage; and, besides, it seems not greatly material if the *Soul* is *exactly* the same, whether it exists in an Ox, or an Ass, or a Man.

Again at P. 356, He says, that the Heathens, who would not know or acknowledge any Heaven beyond this material Firmament, could not talk or think of any other than *Animal Souls*. For, altho' they added to *human Souls* a Power of Ratiocination, yet as they had nothing beyond the Elements, or Atoms, and first Matter, to suppose them constituted of; so their said human rational Souls were still but *Physical Substances*, and, therefore, had nothing in them essentially different from these of Brutes, &c.— Here, then, He intimates that *Animal Souls* are equivalent to *material Souls*, and that *Animal-human Souls* had a Power of Ratiocination added to them, and, therefore, *Animal-human Souls* must

must here imply reason ; but, then, all is material.

Again, He says, at P. 362, That Man was created an Animal, constituted of an *Animal Soul* and a fleshy Body. That his said *animal Soul* consists of an *Animal Halitus* of material Light and Spirit, form'd with reciprocating Powers and Acts, and breathed into his said *fleshy Body by God*, and so Man was made a *Physical Animal*.——That this said *Animal Soul* fills, distends, and by its said Reciprocations does immediately animate, inform, and move his Body.

This is all that I can collect upon the *Animal Soul*, for what is said more is either a repetition of this, or so far of the Chaotic kind, that it is beyond my Power to reduce it into form. And, from hence, it may be observed, in short, that, by *Animal Souls*, He means such as subsist in all Animals in general, and that He looks upon or allows them to be strictly material ; and by the Addition of *Human*, He would seem to intimate that the Soul in Man is somewhat different from those in Brutes, that is, as far as it is endowed with reason ; but, still, there is nothing yet of what one would expect He should mean by the *Divine Part* in all this, because He asserts at P. 350, that the *Animal-human Soul* may be considered as in Union with the *Divine Part* ; but if the Soul here, *as human*, is exactly the same with what He means by the *Divine Part infused by God*, then it could, with no Propriety, be

said, that one is in Union with the other; because such an Expression implies two distinct and different Subsistences, and not one and the same. A Thing cannot be said to be in Union with itself, because that is making it one and two at the same time, and in the same respect; hence, I infer, that his *Animal-human Soul* is, or ought to be something distinct from what He means by the Divine Part, &c. infused by God into the Man.

I am now to consider a little what I can collect concerning the Properties of this Divine Part infused by God, &c. but previous to this, I shall just beg leave to give you another short observation upon what hath been already said; and that is, that admitting or taking for granted the Materiality of the Souls of Brutes, as this Author seems to do here, is certainly not so exact as one could have wished in so learned a Writer; for voluntary Motion, and the Animal Sensations in the inferior Animals, analogous in all appearance to the same in ourselves, are as much above all the known Properties of Matter, as Man himself is beyond the *Brute-Animals*; the Presumption, thus far, therefore, certainly is, that their Souls are immaterial too, and it ought to be kept up in its full strength, since, to suppose the contrary, is to weaken some of the natural Arguments for the immateriality of the *human Soul*, consequently such a supposition should

should not be made without some appearance in the material World sufficient to support, or some Passage of *Sacred Wit* expressly revealing it. One or other of these should have been alledged then to ascertain an, otherwise so dubious, Opinion, or rather an Opinion where the Presumption is so strongly on the other side. But enough of this, I proceed now to consider what may be collected from this Writer concerning the *Divine Part of the Soul infused into it by God*.

At P. 362, He says, That into the *Animal Soul* God infused the other Divine Part, and endued it, in like manner, with its reciprocating Powers and Acts. I own this last Clause puzzles me a little, and I cannot know well what to make of it, but as to the first, it is observable, that in it the *Divine Part infused by God* must stand strictly for what others call the *rational Soul*; for otherwise, as He has here put the *Animal Soul* singly, without the addition of *human*, if, by the Divine Part infused by God, the Rationality of Man is not signified, that will be in this Place wanting in the moral Microcosm, or rather there will be the Microcosm *Man* plan'd out and formed without any moral Part in him, and, therefore, with an utter incapacity for any Morality at all, properly speaking, since He will, as thus drawn, be only upon a level with the inferior Animals, and when considered in a further view, in respect of the *Divine Part*,

Part, He will be a mere Instrument, most strictly speaking, in the Hands of the Deity, without any such thing as we call Morality in his Composition; from hence, therefore, I conclude, that the *Divine Part infused by God* must here stand in Propriety for Reason, or the rational Part of Man and that only. And this Sense of the Phrase gives a very plain and consistent one likewise to the next Sentence but one following, for there He says—That this Divine Part or Soul has the Sovereignty over the Animal Soul, moving it ad libitum (which was strictly true of the *Rational Part* of Man at his original Formation)—and by it the Body also.

Then He goes on (very agreeable likewise to what has been just said) to assert, that this *Divine Part*, while preserved in its Integrity, kindles good Affections, and by its Reciprocations (this last word I do not very well understand here, but, I suppose, it means no more than something *tantamount* to Operations)—performs the Office of what we (or rather He) calls a *good Conscience*.

But here, in the next Sentence, He seems to go off a little, and to advance some expressions not quite so consistent with the Sense that we have hitherto supposed to be affixed to the *Phrase*,—*the Divine Part infused by God*. For He proceeds,—Whereas, on the other hand, if Men, by their carnal Mindings, are carried
away

away to Evil, they do by degrees quench and put out that *good Spirit*, and receive into themselves another *evil and diabolic Spirit* in lieu of it. Here, then, it is observable, that, by changing the Phrase, The Divine Part infused by God into the Expression—*good Spirit*, and opposing to it not only *evil* but *diabolic Spirit*, He must, in order to preserve the justness of the opposition, comprehend both the rational Soul, and the superior Agency of the Deity upon it in the former, since it is in this last particular only that it can be properly opposed to the Spirit *Diabolic*; as this is, I think, allowed on all hands to be something distinct from the Soul of Man, and an Operation upon it *ab extra*. But if this way of arguing is allowed for proper and good, and I almost dare venture to say, that you will not think otherwise, then what must become of a Sentence a little lower, where he says, That the one or the other of these *Spirits*; either the *Divine* or *Diabolic*, as it is respectively predominant, *constitutes in the main every Man's rational or reasoning Power; and is the Fund and Source of all his actual Reasonings*, whether for Truth or Falshood, &c. but, certainly, the diabolic Spirit can never be said to constitute the rational or reasoning Power of Man, but must, in reality, remain as distinct from it, as any two things in nature can be from each other, and so must the Divine too considered as opposed to this; altho' both the one and the other

other may in a very just Sense be said to be the Fund and Source of his actual Reasonings, as they give *occasion to and suggest notions* for his Reason to work upon. These two particulars, therefore, should most assuredly not have been run together with a copulative *and*, but have been set at some greater distance, since the one may undoubtedly be admitted to be in a very proper sense true, whilst the other can, by no means, be so in any.

Immediately after this, He says, that the said *Divine Part* is accordingly derived to us from Jehovah, thro' the Humanity of Christ by the Holy Ghost. By all which Characters, as well as its being introduced with a——the *said Divine Part*, the Sense of this Expression seems plainly determined to be the same in this Sentence with what it must bear in that immediately preceding, i. e. the *Co-operation, Assistance, or Inspiration of the Holy-Spirit*.

But then, the next succeeding Paragraph begins with asserting, *That this*, if cherished and supported with the continual Influx of fresh Oil (Grace) sanctifies the whole Man, and so forth. Here, then, *this Divine Part* seems to stand again for the rational Soul of Man, since that only can be properly said to be cherished and supported by Grace; hence the expression of the *Divine Part* in the middle Sentence seems to be in a somewhat piteous case, being engaged to signify the *Divine Agency* upon the human Mind,

or

or what is commonly called the Inspiration of the Holy-Spirit by the first Sentence; and the superior or rational Part of Mind itself by the third or last that I have made an extract from; but, certainly, this lax, and as it were momentaneous Transition from one signification of this Expression to another, without any the least notice taken, or Apology made by this Writer for doing so, is, undoubtedly, in the mildest view, not a little incorrect, and, yet, to be ingenuous, it is a Fault that the Author himself, from the Tenour of his Discourse, does not seem to be the least sensible of; since the introducing the two latter Paragraphs with a—*The said*, and—*that this*—plainly implies that he means that *this Divine Part* should carry one and the same Sense through all the three Sentences or Paragraphs; but, yet, how the whole contents of them will permit it to do so, after what has been said, I must leave you to judge.

This, then, is all that I can conveniently, or think necessary to be extracted from this Writer, in respect of what He calls *the Divine Part infused* (into Man) *by God*; since, as from the former Extracts concerning the *Animal-human Soul*, I think, it might appear tolerably plain, that He comprehended both the inferior Part of the Soul of Man, and, likewise, the superior or rational in that Expression; so, I think, it is as plain, from these particulars that I have taken from him

him concerning the *Divine Part*, &c. that under that Phrase, He, in effect, comprehends the rational Soul of Man, and, likewise, the superior *Divine Agency* upon it, and, accordingly, He appears to use it promiscuously for either the one or the other, which, doubtless, must cause no little Embarras upon so (abstruse, as I think, He himself calls it) a Subject as this is.

And this Embarrassment, I apprehend, will be considerably increased when what, He here says, comes to be applied to that particular Point, which is properly in Question between this learned Writer and your humble Servant :— I mean the true Sense of the Nufmeth Chijm in the 7th verse of the second Chapter of Genesis. Here, then, you have got to the bottom and true ground of these my observations upon this part of the learned Author's Performance, which were not made for the mere Pleasure of finding fault ; that, I can assure you, is not my turn, but only, as I thought, that they might conduce to illustrate and confirm the present Subject ; (as I before hinted at the entrance upon these Disquisitions, P. 181.) and now the particular method by which they are to do so, I have laid before you.

But, yet, still it remains to shew that my Apprehension is not groundless, in this respect, that this Embarrassment is really increased, when, what He says in this part of his Work, comes

to be applied to this 7th verse of the second Chapter of Genesis; and this, I fancy, may appear with no weak evidence from a distinction that ought to be made upon treating of this Subject, and which our Author does not seem to have made, altho' He was upon the very Confines of it, when He speaks of (what He calls) the Deteration of the Soul of Adam; the Distinction, I mean, is between the *Divine Part infused into Man by God* before the Fall, from that which was infused into him after it.

For as God originally formed Man in his own Image, by infusing a rational Soul into him, so when he had probably given him some instructions, as Data, for the Exercise of this Faculty, and a positive Law strictly so called, as the Test of his Obedience, it seems to have been proper, and likewise from the Event of his actual Fall, to have been the real Intention of the Deity, to leave him after this, in the moral view, to walk (if I may so say) entirely by himself. For otherwise a continual Influx of the Divine Spirit upon this Divine Image in Man, the *rational Soul*, (whilst it remained pure and unalloyed) seems to render his Fall not only *in a moral*, but even, as it were, *in a natural Sense* impossible; and, therefore, as He did actually fall, the Presumption certainly is, and that very strongly too for the case as I have stated it, viz. that after his original Formation, and what was
then

then transacted upon it, He was left entirely to himself as a complete and perfect moral Agent ought to be.

But as soon as the fatal Event took place, and the Divine Image in Man was sullied and defac'd from the true adjustment of his moral Oeconomy being broken and destroyed by his transgression, and this, (as I have conjectured before, and only conjectured) from some natural efficiency in the forbidden Fruit giving an undue Strength and Impetus to the inferior and animal Nature, by which it encroach'd upon the superior and divine, and, by this, rendered Moral Conduct for the future more difficult; I say, as soon as this happened, the state of things was changed, and then the Assistance and Co-operation of the Holy-Spirit seems to have become in itself highly expedient, and, in some degree, in mercy necessary to aid the Man in performing his reasonable Service; and, therefore, it is but fit to suppose, that it was, in some proper degree at least, conferred immediately now, when the Expediency of, and the necessity for it commenced, altho' I do not think any express Promise or Stipulation upon that Subject can be collected from the written Records of Moses in this Place, or, indeed, in any other Part of them.

If some should alledge here the Cherubim mentioned by Moses, and the Interpretation of their

their Nature given by some learned Writers, as founded upon what the Prophet Ezekiel (Ch. i. v. 10. Ch. x. v. 14.) and St. John (Rev. Ch. iv. v. 7.) hath said concerning them, and likewise from the frequent Occurrence of *the Spirit of God* (M); or some such equivalent expression in the Writings of the Old Testament, as grounded in all probability upon the Doctrine and Exhibition of these very Cherubim; I say, that I may still, notwithstanding, adhere to my assertion, that nothing of that kind is to be found in the *written* Records of the Jewish Legislator, since the Cherubim were properly a Hieroglyphic Method of instruction; and, therefore, if only their bare name, or even a material Description of them was there mentioned, I might still safely affirm, that this Doctrine of the Spirit does not properly make a Part of the *written* Records of the *Mosaic Law*, altho' the traditionary account of them might make this very Doctrine prevalent in the Jewish nation, and, with some adulterations, even in other Places.

But to enter thoroughly into the Truth and Merits of this Point, would be a Subject of too large Extent, and, besides, is not now properly before me, since, I fancy, it will be allowed, from what has been already said, that the Expediency of or Necessity for the Assistance and Co-operation of the Holy Spirit did not commence,

'till Man had weakened, and, in some measure, effac'd the Image of God in him, *his rational Soul*, by Transgression; this is all that I, at present, want, since, I imagine, that I shall, from hence, gain a corroborating Proof in favour of my own Interpretation of this Passage, and, consequentially, weaken that of those who happen to be of a contrary opinion.

Let us now attend a little (if you please) to the consequence that I intend to draw from what hath been said; if, then, this learned Writer, in his interpretation of the *Nusmetk Chijm* in the second Chapter of Genesis, comprehends three leading Ideas of the human Composition (N) in it, or rather let us say three leading Ideas referable to the human frame, viz. the human or rational Soul, (which is most assuredly what is meant by the Image of God or the Divine Image) and, likewise, the inferior and irrational, i. e. the *Animal Soul*, together and in Union with the Divine Part infused by God, which must here mean the Assistance and Co-operation of the Holy-Spirit, since there is nothing else left for it to signify; and if, from the Distinction just above insisted upon, it may appear highly probable that this Assistance and Co-operation had no existence in nature, until after the Time referred to in this Passage, i. e. 'till it was become in some sort necessary by the transgression of Man; then, certainly, according

ing to the Strength of that Probability, this will be a corroborating proof, that the interpretation of the expression *Nusmeth Cbijm*, which includes this Idea, is not the true one, since it confounds the state of the Adam after his fall with that which preceded it; and, therefore, this consideration tends to support the interpretation which I have espoused, and when joined to what has been suggested in my former Letter, together with what has been advanced in the Entrance of this, I think, determines the thing beyond all reasonable doubt, that the last Clause in the seventh verse of this second Chapter of Genesis is not a consequence of the two former, but the carrying on of an historic and descriptive Narration of the Nature of Man, and is intended to express the *Animal Soul* adapted to an *organical Frame*, whilst the first Clause describes the gross Body as formed of the Admah or Earth, and the second, the superior and rational, i. e. properly the Divine Part of the Man infused by God into him, and considered as capable of a double Existence here and hereafter to all Eternity; and this exclusive of any other considerations or Ideas whatever.

Thus, Sir, I have done.——But, yet, methinks, I perceive you with a smile, asking, what could induce me to dispute, and, as it were, combat against the opinions of two such learned Writers as Dr. Middleton and the Au-

thor of the Originals Physical and Theological upon this Subject? As to the former, I believe, that I might partly give you my reasons in my last Letter, but yet there is, I think, a general Answer that will do both for the one and the other of these learned Gentlemen, and, indeed, for all such cases. I fancy, it has often been hinted at, or implied in the course of this Enquiry; but, now, I shall give it you in the form of something like a Latin Adage; and it is this,—*Sit amicus Plato, sit amicus Socrates, sed magis sit amica Veritas.*

So that if these two learned Writers stood as high in my literary Esteem (and, I can assure you, they are far from being low in it) as high, I say, as a Plato, or a Socrates in the Heathen World, yet, still, this Sentence instructs me, that Truth is to have the preferable regard in our enquiries. If, therefore, upon a perusal of the Mosaic Pentateuch, some thoughts offered themselves to me, tending, as I fancied, to set the 7, 8, and 9 Verses of the second Chapter of Genesis in a clearer view, than I had as yet met with them placed in; and if I found the learned Librarian, with a good share of warmth and acrimony, maintaining an opinion contrary to that which I subscribed to, certainly it was but natural to give it an examination to the best of my Power, in order to retract or persist in my own conceptions upon the point, just as I found

found it necessary. And if a little time after this another learned Writer arose, an Orientalist! and advanced something different, altho' not extremely so from that part of my interpretation which happened to fall under his Cognizance, there is no Question can be made, I think, but that I was called upon to pay him likewise the regard of some degree of attention; and if, upon doing so, I found, or thought that I found, Truth on my Side, it was but natural, I suppose, to avow it. And altho' I must not pretend to either the natural Abilities or acquired Learning of these two Gentlemen, yet Truth and Reason are not so infallibly attached to Learning as to be always and constantly with those who have the greatest share of it: sometimes their very Knowledge is an Obstacle to them in this respect, filling their Heads with such great designs and such crowds of Ideas, as now and then to lay plain and simple Truth so far beneath them, as it were, that they shall overlook it, whilst a more humble Pretender comes after them and takes it up, or, however, some way finds it, when they could not do so.

If this or any other cause has been so fortunate as to give it to me in this particular case, I should be extremely glad to perceive that you think so, as then believing, that I have the concurrent sentiments of many worthy and com-

petent Judges thus summed up in yours. What shall I say more? — I fancy the best thing that I can, in Decency, say, is to promise, that I shall not in haste trouble you with two other such long Epistles, and after wishing you all the Happiness that—you deserve, (I need wish no more) I shall conclude this, by declaring myself to be, with the very greatest respect,

Your most obedient

and most sincere

humble Servant,

PHILALETHES.

NOTES to ESSAY I.

P. 4, (A.) **I**T may be proper to add a few remarks here by way of note, in order to be a little more explicit in respect to the preference that I have just given, and to prevent some mistakes that may possibly arise from the neglect of doing so. In respect, then, of any versions that are made of the sacred writings, (or, indeed, of all others) I say, that each Version of this kind may be considered as a more accurate sort of Lexicon to that particular Author from whence it is made, whilst Lexicons and Dictionaries may be looked upon as more compendious Versions of all Authors in that particular language to which they belong; and both the one and the other may, doubtless, be extremely useful to facilitate the acquiring of a language, or the reading any Author in that language before we have gained a facility in it, i. e. 'till use and custom hath sufficiently linked together the Ideas and the Words by which they are expressed; linked them together, I say, in our minds. But, upon reflection, it must appear, that, in all this process, we generally presume upon the skill and veracity of the Translator or Lexicographer, and take, in a great measure, upon trust, what they thus give us, as the scholar does from his Master; whereas, when a Person ventures in any point to commence a sort of Critic in a dead language, or upon any composition written in it, the proper method of proceeding, certainly, seems to be somewhat different.

For He must contract a kind of Ingratitude towards his Benefactors, and assume a superiority by sitting in Judgement

upon them, i. e. in plain Terms, He must not only consider the Versions whether they make sense in themselves, but, likewise, whether they give the real sense of their Originals; nor will He listen with an implicit and undistinguishing ear to the best Lexicographers, but proceed to the examination of the Context, Usage, and Etymology, and then give his sentence in favour of his old Friends and Assistants, or his reasons why He withholds it. In short, He will pursue the very same method that these Translators or Lexicon-writers themselves took, if they proceeded rightly and did not begin to exercise their office, 'till the language, which was the subject of it, was absolutely expired from off the tongues of Men, and lived no where but in their Writings. For, in this case, there does not seem to be any other possible or feasible manner of proceeding. People engaged in affairs of this Nature must set themselves to work in some way, I apprehend, after the same manner that a Person does, who undertakes to unfold a piece of modern Cypher-writing; He must compare one part with another, &c. 'till He finds out a Key that gives good and pertinent sense to the whole, from which last circumstance He is led most strongly to conclude, that He has made the true discovery; and just thus in a dead language, the first Investigator of the sense of writings in it must attend to the Context, Usage and Etymology, 'till He gains good, or at least proper, and consistent sense from them, and, by doing so, He may, with just grounds, determine, that He has got their *true* sense; for if we reflect how few passages, in comparison, there are in any Authors, that are capable of above one good common obvious meaning, if that, therefore, is at any time discovered, it, certainly must give the strongest presumption, that the real interpretation is fallen upon.

But will it be said, that this method seems to be extremely difficult and tedious? I cannot help it, but in the case supposed, there does not appear to be any other possible; and as to the difficulty and tediousness of it, I shall only observe, that one Author of tolerable bulk, (Virgil suppose, in the Latin tongue) thus well decyphered, will greatly facilitate the

the future pursuits in that way ; whilst these latter, if successful, will sufficiently confirm, and only not demonstrate the certainty of all former labours, till, by successive future additions, the Exposition shall be brought to such a degree of copiousness and accuracy, as to render all doubting about the general truth of it justly entitled to the appellation of Scepticism, since it will have such a degree of Evidence as no one can reasonably refuse his assent to.

This, then, seems to be the only rational method of enquiry, that Persons, who first engaged in a business of this nature could pursue ; but, then, it must be remembered, that what is now said, proceeds upon the supposition, that the language was every where totally extinct (except in Writings) before they undertook their employment, because, if it expired by a gentle decay, or if its Ghost hovered, as it were, for some time around its tomb after its departure, or it left a son that bore some, altho' but a distant resemblance to his Father ; but to lay aside our Allusions, if, in plain terms, the Language did not entirely cease to be used all at once, and it is reasonable to think that it would not, unless a conquest, extremely rapid in its motion and violent in degree, should make it so ; (and even this must almost of necessity wait for the rising generation with patience ;) or if some oral tradition should remain of it, after it had failed from common use ; or lastly, if the Conqueror's language should come to a compromise with that of the inhabitants, should intermix or make, as it were, a marriage with it, and from thence produce a third, bearing a resemblance to both its Parents, without having the exact features of either of them ; in all these cases, those that should endeavour to transfuse the writings of a dying or dead Language, or the Spirit of them into another Tongue, or would make a Lexicon of it, might, doubtless, receive considerable help from such Auxiliaries, but still, even here, these Aids could be but of a secondary Nature, whilst the primary and chief Materials seem requisite to be drawn from such an examination as I have just insisted upon ; and the necessity for it will encrease in proportion as these particulars shall be deficient, and their Deficiency will, for the most

most part, in all probability, be enhanced according to the distance between the first decay or death of the language, and the time that the Translators and Lexicographers shall begin to exert themselves; however, this method of proceeding seems to be at all times, of itself, in some degree, necessary, and those other ways, that we have mentioned, can, at the best, but be considered as inferior appendages to it.

And as such must be the conduct of all those, who worthily labour in endeavouring to rescue the sense of any dead language from oblivion, and especially of them who have led the Van in it; so, likewise, if any will aim to judge for themselves, and commence, in some measure, Critics upon any Author or particular passage of one that is conveyed to us in a dead Tongue, the sensible method of process is certainly the same, and He cannot, by any other means, properly exercise his own Judgment, or deliver himself from the Authority of that of others.

Thus, then, I have given you more explicitly my reasons for preferring the former method of enquiry to this last, and, I hope, that I shall be so happy as to gain your approbation in it. — But, yet, there has just now an illustration of this point rose up to my view, and it appears to it, at present, so strong and pertinent an one, that I cannot resist the temptation, and, therefore, I must beg your indulgence a little longer, and that likewise, of those (to whom the most useful and entertaining branch of Science, from whence I intend to take it, more peculiarly belongs) for this sort of slight intrusion, as it were, into their province. I imagine, it is universally allowed, that, in the study and contemplation of the corporeal part of the human Frame, altho' draughts of the several portions of it are reckoned extremely useful, yet, still, in order to arrive at a tolerably accurate and satisfactory Knowledge in this way, the actual Inspection of Dissections is esteemed highly necessary, and, moreover, is the only regular means of detecting any received errors, or of making further and entirely new discoveries upon the point: now the case seems to be almost exactly the same in respect of the enquiry into the true and accurate sense of the sacred Writings;

tings : the several Versions may be allowed their due merit ; but, still, the actual inspection of the Original Text itself and the several Sentences of which each Passage is made up, their relative situation, and likewise the internal and radical structure (if I may so speak) of the Parts of which these very sentences themselves are composed, seems the more immediately useful and necessary for this end.—But permit me just to carry the illustration to one particular further, and, then, I shall have done with it : altho' a Knowledge of the nice internal structure of the human Frame may be highly requisite for those who are the regular and established Guardians of its health, and are, by their skill, with the permission of providence, to restore that blessing when impaired or lost ; yet the common uses of the Body may be sufficiently learned and enjoyed by the Herd of Mankind without any such Enquiry or Information : the case seems to be quite analogous in respect of sacred Knowledge, altho', in a critical Light, and in regard to defending the Scriptures from the injuries of Misrepresentation and Infidelity, such a view and examination of them as has here been insisted upon, may appear extremely fitting and requisite ; yet all the common and important purposes of Morality and Religion may be served to the Bulk of Christians from the Versions themselves, without any such laborious, and to them impracticable search, as this before us must necessarily be.

You will, here, perhaps, ask, as I have just been recounting some general Canons of Criticism or Enquiry in respect of the Sacred Writings, what was the reason that I omitted, or at least have not expressly mentioned one (so much applauded by some learned Men) of appealing to the several Oriental Dialects for their assistance in the explanation of some, if not many, difficult Texts in holy Writ, and especially to the Arabic, which is reckoned a very copious, and, at this day, a living language. To be ingenuous with you, I considered, that altho' this method of proceeding was much commended by some, and, notwithstanding, I heard of, and have read some plausible instances of the use of it ; yet, as it was a point strenuously disputed against by several others, I thought that—*non nostrum erat tantas*

componere lites; and supposing the thing had been entirely uncontroverted, yet, as I am, at present, disqualified for employing these Dialects by not understanding them, and as the particular occasion, for which I enumerated those general Rules, I thought, did not want their assistance, I, for these reasons, chose to omit the mention of them any otherwise than in this way, which the quick sense of your piercing sagacity hath thus extorted from me.

P. 6, (B) Here, perhaps, it may be objected to what I say, that the Epithet *living* is given to God, whose name, doubtless, implies *Life*; and, therefore, the charge of *Tautology* seems to lie here too: but God is styled the living God, in opposition, properly speaking, to the Gods of the Heathens, who were only senseless Idols without *Life*.

P. 9. (C) Perhaps it may be said, that the sacred Writer was obliged to give the Title of *Lives* to the *Nusnech* that was inspired by God into Adam, because the word rarely, or rather is never used in the singular number. — Be it so; — but was He obliged to give it to him at all, in this case, more than to the other Animals; and if nothing more is intended by it, than to describe the Animal Nature of Man, it is entirely superfluous, since that would have been done, if He had said no more, than that God formed the Adam, a (*Nepesh chi*) *living Creature*, out of the *Adameh*. This consideration, therefore, when joined with the Reflexions that will follow upon the Context, may, likewise, serve to corroborate that Interpretation of the *Nusnech chijm* that I espouse in the present passage. Here you must just permit me to add an observation of Fagius, which altho' it does not strictly belong to this Place, yet, if it be allowed to be just in itself, it may be easily applicable to it; and as, I think, it may be shewn that it is otherwise, from the concluding and immediately following clause of the present verse, I hope, such a little irregularity may be excusable, if not rigidly defended. Fagius says, *Arbor Vitæ (vel Vitarum) sic dicitur, quoniam in Linguâ Hebræâ denominata non inveniuntur, sed*
corum

eorum loco denominationibus utuntur ; but do not we find in this very seventh verse, *Anima vitalis*? I, therefore, either do not understand him right, or if I do, I must beg leave to withhold my Assent to the Justness of his Remark ; and, therefore, 'till it is made more apparent, it cannot any way be employed to invalidate what is here said upon the *Nusmetb cbijm*, which, perhaps, it might otherwise be.

P. 16. (D) Here it may be observed, that I apprehend Adam to stand for the *gross Body*, as it appears externally to the Eye, and consider'd as form'd of Earth or Flesh, just as a marble Statue does, considered as a composition of Marble, and nothing more or further ; whilst *Napefb* strictly respects the *interiour and organical structure*, by which the Creature is capable of *Growth, Life, and Sensation*.

A Consequence of this is, that every *Napefb* necessarily supposes an Adam, or material Substance from whence it is to be form'd, but it does not hold *vice versa*, because all Matter is not organical. The manifest Use of this observation will appear when we come to take notice of a Passage in the famous 15th Chapter of St. Paul's first Ep. to the Corinthians.

P. 23. (E) The Lexicographers as making (*Napefb*) in its primary Idea include Life or Breath seem to make a Root of it in itself, or (it may be imagined) may bring it from the verb (*Napech*) to blow gently, but the former, I fancy, is somewhat uncommon, as Verbs are the general Roots of all words, and the latter seems to be a quite different Term from (*Napefb*) since the *Nun*, in this last, seems to come from a passive signification, and as *Shin* and *Cbetb* are quite different Letters, there will but *Pe* remain in common to them. Wou'd there be any harm then, if we were to suppose (*Napefb*) to come from the verb (*posb*) augere, passive (*Napefb*) augeri, and then dropping the *Vau* (*Napefb*) ? And this will be a Root exactly correspondent to the primary sense that we have given it of *Organical Frame*. Since to grow, or to be made to grow, from less to greater, is an universal Property of all Organiz'd Bodies. And accordingly we find some
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Linguists that say, that *Napish* est generale nomen omnium, quæ Ignis, Aqua, Terra, & Homo gignit; and in confirmation of this, Isaiah Ch. 19. v. 10. with some other places, may shew its universal extent thro' the whole Animal Kingdom: it must be confess'd, indeed, that the Derivation above, as well as the Remark, will admit the whole vegetable Race, as in some degree entitled to this Appellation, since they are organiz'd, and grow from less to greater; and if Usage cou'd be pleaded here as well as in the case of the Animal Tribes, it wou'd, I think, put the Etymology beyond any the least Shadow of reasonable doubt concerning the Truth of it: And yet what I have said in the Letter itself upon (*Napish*) may give a very probable Reason why this Stream from the Fountain of Derivation might be entirely block'd up, without calling the certainty of it in question.

P. 30. (F) I have been at the pains to make some little Enquiry into the Term *ψυχή*, since I wrote my Letter, and I will now give you the result of it, and without the least straining to make it serve a cause; but as Frailty and Prepossession are frequently so apt to adhere to our Enquiries, I will not go so far, but only say, without the least *designedly* straining to make it serve a cause, and whether I have really and in fact done so or not, shall be left to the determination of your better and, perhaps, more unprejudiced Judgment.

The word is of very common, extensive, and various Use, and, therefore, without some caution, I may be drawn in to write a very long note upon it, and perhaps at the conclusion find myself in a Labyrinth, and by consequence leave you in one too, which wou'd not be quite complaisant, after you had been at the trouble of so much perusal; I shall therefore endeavour to be a little methodical, and as succinct as possible in what I say.

In the first place then I observe, in respect of its Etymology, that Plato and likewise Plutarch seem to derive it from *ψυχω frigefacio* or *refrigero*, because when the little Captive, the Foetus is released from its warm prison, and draws the cool Air into its Lungs, it then begins properly to live, or I should

should rather imagine when its whole Body is exposed to the cold Air, it immediately begins that way of Life, in which it is to continue during its Existence here, and hence I apprehend the word $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ was taken to signify that Life: but as the Life of *Man as such* is chiefly seated in that part of him which we call, in our Language, the Soul, hence it is not improbable that Translators have been led by this consideration (as well as by the Context, and sometimes, I fancy, even in opposition to it) have been led, I say, to render the Term $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ by soul, generally speaking, notwithstanding its material origin. But you will perhaps ask what have I gain'd by this observation? it is true you will say, that it appears from hence to be of terrestrial extract, but so does *ανιμα* of the Greeks, *Spiritus* of the Latins, and *Spirit* of the English, which Term, notwithstanding, in all the three Languages, is used to express the highest rank of pure Intellect, and therefore so might $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ too maugre my invidious and, as it were, calumniating insinuation against it. All that I have or pretend to have gained by the present observation, is this, that if other circumstances concur to set the Term $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ somewhat lower than it often bears in the Translations, there will no Bar arise from the want of a material Idea or Root, to which it may in its primary and most genuine signification be referred.—I come now,

2dly, To offer you a few considerations arising from the Terms used in what is called the Platonic Trinity, tending to this very end, i. e. to set it somewhat lower than perhaps our word Soul will permit it to go. I say, commonly call'd the Platonic Trinity, because, I suppose, He is the first Person whose written records of it remain to us, since the Learned, I think, do not allow him to be the first Advancer of it, even amongst the Heathens, but say that Parmenides insisted upon it before him, and that Pythagoras likewise taught it, being instructed by one Aglaophemus, skilled in the Orphic Orgia. Thus this short Detail brings us up to Orpheus: but don't look aghast and be afraid for yourself and me too, lest upon the naming of these ancient Sages, I shou'd be tempted to exert my industry not a little upon them, in setting forth
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their Characters and Opinions, all that I cou'd, I fancy, say with any tolerable degree of certainty, after my best endeavours, wou'd not be much, except it were of Plato, as we have but very slight remains of any accounts of the others, unless, perhaps, the fabulous parts of one of the Characters shou'd be admitted as an exception, and supposing it otherwise, yet still it wou'd be in a good measure impertinence to you; however, it wou'd most assuredly be so to my present purpose, as all the reason that I had for mentioning this Platonic Trinity was only just to offer an observation or two upon the Terms made use of in it, and which, I hope, may be effectually done without, at the best, an imperfect ransacking into the chain of Names, that I just recounted.

The Terms then are these, the τὸ εἶ or ἀγαθόν, the νῦς and the ψυχή, which the Heathens are said almost universally to have called their first, second, and third God, and likewise frequently to have considered them in the way of subordination, the τὸ εἶ as supreme, and so on; however, whether Plato himself considered it exactly in that light, is not, perhaps, quite so clear, nor is it heré very material; it is sufficient for my purpose that the two latter Terms are taken from the animated Part of this inferior World, and as the Term ψυχή (Physche) is put last, or for the third Hypostasis, it is certainly a *strong presumption* at least, that in its usual, and (what I may call) its proper sense, i. e. when applied to the things of this World, it was considered in an inferior light to νῦς (Nous); and that it *really* was so, permit me just to offer you two, what I think, no weak Arguments in the way of confirmation. And,

1st, It is observed, that many of the Platonists and Pythagoreans adulterated the ancient Cabala of the Trinity by considering the ποιεῖμα or δημιουργούμενον, the Work or Thing made, or else the ψυχὴν ἰσχυρίον, the *informing Soul* of the World, as a third Hypostasis of it, or a third God. Whether Plato (and I might here safely add Pythagoras) was really of this opinion, I have just above observed, is not, perhaps quite so clear, but yet it is not improbable, since it appears from his Timæus, &c. that the Soul of the mundane

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Animal is there affirmed to be a *γενήτος θεός*, a generated God, and if so, this, I fancy, will bring the Matter to a short issue, and shew plainly that the Term *ψυχή* must even, in Plato's opinion, and when He is upon this very subject, bear a much inferior signification to the Term *θεός*, unless it can be shewn, that he considers this last any where in the same light as a *γενήτος θεός*, a generated God, and in the same manner too, which I imagine, may not be so easily done.

But however, let us for the present acquit Plato himself of a charge of this kind, and suppose that the depravation was entirely introduced by some of his Followers; and I will then beg leave to ask how came they to introduce such an innovation in Opinion? will it be said that the Platonists or Academicks had a sort of Tendency toward Scepticism, and might, therefore, from thence, be easily led to innovate upon or change whatever Doctrines they met with in the world, preceding their own Times? That the Platonists were rather more favourable to Scepticism than some other Sects, I believe, will be readily allowed; but yet take the *veriest* Pyrrhonist that ever was, and, I fancy, that amidst all his profound Labour in doubting, it will be found, that he always retained a veneration for the Dogma's of his Leader, and I will add, that a close and constant adherence to one of them, the *εὐμαλλος*, was perhaps the best and the only reason that he cou'd give to support himself in his otherwise universal and unaccountable suspense. How happy wou'd it be, if some that live amidst the light of the Gospel, and outwardly profess Christianity, cou'd acquire a little of this weakness of their ancient Brethren, in paying that Deference to the infallible Oracle, of Truth, which they pay'd to the Tenets of an unreasonable Man like themselves! what was *really* weakness in these latter, wou'd be the Excellence of Wisdom in the former, and go near to give the final stroke at the root of their Infidelity.

But to proceed—as one remarkable part of the conduct in every ancient Sect of Philosophy was a kind of awful regard for their Leaders Tenets, certainly to suppose any Innovation is owing to a wilful repugnancy to them in any of his Followers is not the most easy way of accounting for it: if then,

In this particular case, we shou'd, for the present, only suppose that the Terms $\psi\chi\eta$ and $\psi\chi\eta$ stood wide of each other in common language, and that the latter was of much inferior Signification to the former; and that this Captain of the Academics in applying these Terms to his Trinity did not some way sufficiently explain the peculiar sense He would have them to carry in this particular case, then I imagine his Followers might very easily in a little time adulterate his notion from the terms themselves, without designing it, and thus be found to keep up their well known regard for their Master, even at the very time that they were making a breach in his Doctrines. This then is certainly a more easy and plain account of the Fact, and I must add, that the Fact, in this light is, in its turn, a strong corroborating Proof of the point before us, viz. the difference between the Terms $\psi\chi\eta$ and $\psi\chi\eta$, and of the inferiority of this latter to the former. I shall now close up this paragraph with only just observing to you, that whether the Innovation made in the ancient Cabala of the Trinity is supposed to be from Plato himself or only his Followers, yet, either way, it is a Proof of the reality of what was above advanced only in the way of Presumption.

I come now to my second Argument in favour of the Point before me, and that shall be an appeal to common experience, or the general Practice of Writers in that Language, who use the easy and popular style, and whose use of these Terms will appear sufficiently to vindicate that difference which I am for establishing, or rather endeavouring to shew is already established between them. You will readily imagine what I am here going to say, arises not from my having made the almost innumerable and often voluminous Authors in that Language undergo a critical examination in regard to this particular; but I fancy that I may venture to assert, without any great Danger of being refuted, but rather with a strong confidence of being seconded by your larger experience and knowledge in the Language, that $\psi\chi\eta$ is a term applicable to all Animals, that the least, the most contemptible Insect, is with very good Propriety entitled to its ($\psi\chi\eta$) Physche, but that Man alone can with any tolerable share of the same quali-

qualification lay claim to the (Nous) and if ever we find it to have got amongst the inferiour Animals, we must look upon it as a *Stray*, which of right belongs to Man, that Lord of the Creation, i. e. in plain terms, it is only applicable with any decent Propriety in common Writing to Man alone. If indeed at any time such a wild, lawless, and ungovernable, but yet happy Author as was the fam'd Theban Poet, shou'd snatch it up and carry it to the savage Creatures in the forests, or to the lowing Herds and bleating Flocks in the lawns or upon the mountains, we must then with patience submit, it is his Privilege to say whate'er He pleases, and in saying it to please: He seems to be above all common Law, and is only a Law unto himself, and such exalted Geniuses as himself, and therefore if this last circumstance is but duly retain'd in memory, there is no great danger that his example will be converted into a Nuisance, by becoming too prevalent; in the mean time we may observe, that if a force of Genius and Energy of Soul, equal to that possessed by this renowned Lyric, seems requisite to give any degree of currency to such a *Transfer* of these Terms, as we have just hinted at, this must certainly tend to shew how well grounded and established that difference between them is which we at present are maintaining.

Thus then you have my reasons why I look upon the Terms $\nu\epsilon\varsigma$ and $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ to be so greatly different, and the latter so much inferior to the former in strict propriety of Language; but if this is the case then, I fancy, the Term $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ may be admitted as sufficiently correspondent to the word (Napesth) even according to the sense that, for the reasons given, we look upon to be the true sense of it in this Passage; for altho' their radical Ideas or Etymologies are somewhat different, yet they both appear to be material, and neither of them primarily to include the Idea of Life, and they seem to carry the same relative signification in both Languages, i. e. $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ takes up a middle station between the $\nu\epsilon\varsigma$ and $\sigma\upsilon\mu\alpha$, just as Napesth does between Nufmeth Chijm, and Adam. Here then, perhaps, you will be ready to say, that by this account I seem to have made a great step towards vindicating

the septuagint Translation in this Passage, and to throw what fault there is in the Translations chiefly upon our own ; but will it immediately suggest itself to you, that it is very possible the Seventy might, notwithstanding, neither view *Napeſb* nor *Phyſche* in the Light that I have here endeavour'd to ſet them, but look upon them both in not a little higher Rank than I am pleas'd to place them, and in ſupport of this intimation, you ſhou'd alledge, that if their ſenſe of (*Napeſb*) had been the ſame with that which I take to be the true one here, there are other words in the Greek Tongue, which ſeem rather better adapted to it than the Term $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$, ſuch as are $\phi\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ and $\kappa\lambda\iota\sigma\iota\varsigma$; and therefore, whilſt I offer ſomewhat in vindication of the Translation, I may, notwithstanding, at the ſame time leave the Translators themſelves without the Benefit of it.

The 'Translators of the S. S. into the Greek Tongue were I think, never look'd upon as inspir'd, (unleſs it were by ſome few, who had Underſtandings weak and wide enough to ſwallow the Ariſtean Legendary Story of the Cells) and therefore no one is bound to defend them in all the errors that they may be charged with, either as to Language or Opinion ; however, I can offer you, I think, a Reaſon why they might prefer the Term $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ in this place to either $\phi\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ or $\kappa\lambda\iota\sigma\iota\varsigma$, even ſuppoſing that they had the very ſame notion of the *Napeſb* that I have given, and that is, becauſe theſe two laſt Terms are of rather too general Import, and equally comprehend all the three parts of the human Nature, that we have juſt mention'd, $\nu\acute{\epsilon}\varsigma$, $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$, and $\sigma\omega\mu\acute{\alpha}$, ſince each of them may be ſaid, with propriety enough, to be a $\phi\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ or a $\kappa\lambda\iota\sigma\iota\varsigma$; and therefore, when three particular large Branches of the human Compoſition, taking in the whole of Man, are enumerated, neither of theſe Terms ſeem to be ſo proper, as not in a ſufficient degree diſtinctively deſcriptive of any one of them. I have indeed wiſh'd that our Translators had in the ſecond occurrence of the Terms (*Napeſb chi*) employ'd *living Creature*, as they did in the firſt, and Creature, you know, is the literal rendering of $\kappa\lambda\iota\sigma\iota\varsigma$ vel $\kappa\lambda\iota\sigma\mu\alpha$, but then I only did it, becauſe a variation would by that means have been pre-

prevented in the Translation, which did not subsist in the Original, and which the Context did not seem to require; yet I have there intimated that Creature is by no means an adequate Term, and that I wou'd only make use of it because a better single one did not occur to me, nor does it now, indeed, unless you shou'd approve of *Machina* or *Instrumentum* in Latin, and *Machine* or *Instrument* in English; and yet this does not fully convey the Idea of the Original, and besides wants authority and custom to take off from a little uncouthness that it wou'd probably appear with in this place.—But be these as they may—I hope from what hath been here said, the Perspicuity of the inspired Writer's reasoning, in this famous Chapter of his 1st Epistle to the Corinthians, will be somewhat assisted, and his use of the Terms $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ ζῶσα sufficiently vindicated. The Point,—that I was chiefly concern'd with in this, I am afraid, rather too long Note. And yet, long as it is, I must beg your Patience, whilst I increase the fault of it, by adding one Paragraph more.—For—

I begin to be afraid that you may intimate it possible, some one might object, that I have given but a partial sort of an Account, when I spake above of the $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ ἐγκοσμίος, and said it was not improbable that Plato himself might lend a helping hand in corrupting the ancient Cabala of the Trinity, since he called this $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ ἐγκοσμίος, a θείος, or a γεννῆτος θεός; whereas Plotinus and others of his Followers suppose, with good reason, that he held a double Pysche, one ἐγκοσμίος, the other ὑπερκοσμίος, which last was that which properly made a Part of his Trinity, and therefore the Inference may be (supposing this last remark true) that he might hold the $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ ἐγκοσμίος to be a γεννῆτος θεός, without corrupting the ancient Cabala of it.

I must leave the complete Discussion of the Platonic Doctrine upon this Point to those that are more conversant in it than I can pretend to be; all that I shall observe is this, that the Learned seem agreed that Plato held some sort of subordination in his Trinity, a first, second, and third, in order, and that $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ was not only the last in Position, but likewise a Term of really an inferior Nature, appears con-

firm'd from this very Notion of the double *Psyche*; for why was this last word assumed to express this Soul of the World, as well as the last Hypostasis of the Trinity, assumed, I say, rather than *νς*, but only because it was a Term of truly inferior Import, and therefore, upon that account, fitter for both these purposes? This perfectly determines for the Propriety of such application of it, whilst perhaps nothing else will; and therefore the Point taken in this view likewise brings me to conclude again for the real inferiority of the word *ψυχη* to that of *νς*. But I now begin to have another Fear upon me, and that is, lest you shou'd think that I seem to be labouring a plain case, which no one will contend with me: if this shou'd happen to be your Sentiments, all that I can alledge in the way of Apology is, that the thing seemed to myself to be of importance, as the Propriety of an inspired Writer's reasoning depended upon it, and the Translation does not seem to have paid all that Regard to it which it required.

The learned Bishop of Cloyne, in his *Siris* (P. 171) remarks, that Plotinus observes in his fifth *Ennead*, that this Doctrine of a Trinity, Father, Mind, and Spirit or Soul, was no late Invention, but an ancient Tenet.

P. 36. (G) The learned and diligent Noldius has indeed given (in his concordance) two or three Examples where *mem* prefix'd signifies towards, but *from* its most usual signification by much, whilst *He* final is most properly put for towards.

P. 80. (H) It may perhaps be thought that the consequence here is far from being a necessary one, since the Mind is look'd upon as passive in its simple Perceptions; and as these are the Ground-work and Foundation of all its intellectual Operations, it may be argued, that we can have a very sufficient Idea of Intelligence without including that of Freedom, or even without supposing it to be a necessary or any consequence of it at all. That Freedom is not so necessarily connected with Intelligence, as the Idea of Equality is between two and two, and four, or as between the Principles and
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Conclusion in any Mathematical Proposition, I fancy, must be readily allow'd, and likewise that we can abstract and consider Intelligence without Freedom; but still, when it is reflected that Freedom is universally *in fact*, connected with Intelligence, and moreover that all the Dignity and Usefulness of this latter arises from its conjunction with the former Quality, whilst Freedom in its turn cannot possibly subsist without Intelligence, I say, if these Reflections are duly attended to, it may lead us perhaps to think that the Mind is not quite so passive, even in its simple perceptions, as it is generally asserted and acquiesc'd in, and that the connection between Intelligence and Freedom is much closer than is usually attended to; and therefore, altho' the consequence from one to the other may not be strictly necessary in the order of our Ideas, yet it is in truth and fact sufficiently close to justify a consequential connection of one with the other in common, if not even in philosophic Language. But you may possibly observe, that the course of my Subject does not require me to mention Intelligence at all in this place, since it may go on smoothly enough without doing so, as Freedom alone is the Point that is in strictness immediately before me; or if I shou'd mention both, you may ask why I did not put it thus, Freedom and consequently Intelligence, which wou'd have been unexceptionable from the consideration just above hinted, that Freedom cannot possibly subsist without Intelligence?

As I had a little before mentioned the highest order of free Agents, and as it is usual to class the several Ranks of Beings endow'd with this Quality, not so much according to their degrees of free Agency as Intelligence, this gave me an opportunity, and in some measure called upon me to take in both the one and the other, as tending better to enlarge and keep up our Idea of the divine Creation to its due pitch, than if only the former had been alone insisted upon; and as Intelligence is at least a negative Cause (or in the Language of the Schools a *Causa sine quâ non*) of freedom, and as Causes are in the order of things prior to their Effects, I therefore thought that in this view it wou'd be preserving

the greater propriety to give the first place to Intelligence, and the second to Freedom.

And here I can't help taking notice of an appearance, which, if properly regarded, must, I apprehend, confirm what has been just above advanced : I shall call it a studious Absence, because Persons of a literary complexion seem the most remarkably liable to it, altho' there are few, if any, that can plead a total exemption from it ; but, however, it is the Fact itself, and not those who are subject to it, that we are at present concerned with. And we may observe, with regard to this disposition of Mind, that Persons can by no means of it withdraw themselves, as it were, from the Objects around them, without once moving their Station, and be able for a time neither to see, hear, nor feel, altho' all the Avenues of these Sensations shall in the mean while remain open, and their objects be in some degree playing upon them, which certainly is a plain argument of the Freedom of our simple Perceptions to a certain Point, and our Power of admitting or excluding them by Attention or the contrary.—If it shou'd be thought that the mind in this case is really involuntary, and therefore, if thus view'd, the Instance may go near to change sides, so as to favour the opposite opinion : all that I shall further say is, that Habit may, in this respect, as well as many others, conduce to abridge its freedom, but this state of the Soul can never be said strictly to be involuntary, until it appears to be absolutely incorrigible, which is a Height it seldom, I fancy, if ever, arrives at.

P. 89. (G) I say, that I think it was generally agreed that the sacred was Adam's Language, but yet it does not seem to be so compleatly an established Point amongst the Learned, as to be passed over without any further notice being taken of it. The Presumptions for it are various ; I shall beg leave just to mention some of them, two or three, that I look upon as good ones.

The Simplicity and expressive Conciseness of the sacred Language seems to be a Presumption of that kind, and likewise these very names of the Creatures, and especially of the Personages, in this first part of the Mosaic History. For
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only to take the names of our first Parents, if the Hebrew was not the Original Language, then the Names of the two first of the human Race were not really Adam and Eve, but somewhat else: It may indeed be said, that this somewhat else was exactly correspondent to the present names, and bore the same relation to *Earth* and *Life* that Adam and Eve do, and therefore whilst that is preserv'd, so is the Propriety too; and likewise no end, that cou'd be intended in imposing the names, can be frustrated. But yet it is reasonable to think, that in this case the real original appellations wou'd have been given: yet as that, it may be thought, cou'd not have been done, and the reason for conferring them, at the same time, mention'd without perhaps that little impropriety, which subsists in our present Translation, when it is said that Adam called his Wife's name Eve, because she was the Mother of all living (Gen. iii. 20) whereas, in strictness, it ought to have been, He called her *Life* (or the living one) because she was the Mother of all *living*. Upon this state of the case, I must observe, that this Difficulty might have been avoided by only giving the real names, and then saying, which is by interpretation Adam or Eve, &c. (as is sometimes done in the sacred Writings upon similar occasions) and it is reasonable to think that this or some such method wou'd have been follow'd, if the real state of things had been as this case supposes, since then a Propriety and Exactness wou'd have been maintained, which is now lost, and will be always wanted in almost all the proper Names of Men, and the generical names of Animals.

There is an Author indeed, whose name is great in the learned World (Schultens in his Preface to the Book of Proverbs) who seems to look upon the first Language as lost, and yet to be a sort of unknown substratum or support to four, what he calls, Sister-Dialects, viz. the present Hebrew, the Arabic, Syriac, and Chaldee, just in the same manner as the four Græcian Dialects are founded by the Learned upon the old Pelasgic Language.

But here it may be proper to observe, that the Cases are not exactly similar, for Herodotus tells us that *Ιωνες* — *παρὰ* —

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λαβόντες διδασχὴν παρὰ τῶν Φοινίκων τὰ γραμμάτια, μεταρρυθμισαντες σφέων ὀλίγα, ἐχρέωτο· χρεωμένοι δὲ ἰφατίσαι, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ δικαῖον ἔφερε, ἐσαγαγόντων Φοινίκων εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα, Φοινικῆα κεκλήσθαι.—
i. e. as I understand it, *the Ionians being instructed in the nature of Letters by the Phœnicians, after changing them a little, made use of them, and own'd, (as it was but equitable, since the Phœnicians introduc'd them into Greece) that they shou'd be call'd Phœnician.* But the Phœnicians not only taught them the use of Letters, but likewise further conduc'd to civilize them by introducing Commerce and Navigation, and planting Colonies amongst them (which last was their Practice not only here, but in multitudes of other places, as Bochart shews from the ancient Historians) but as they introduced the Arts of civil Life, and took up their Habitation amongst them, and moreover taught them the use of Letters; it may be presum'd, that they went a great way in making their Language prevalent amongst them likewise, since the Transition to this latter from the former seems in some degree easy and natural, if not necessary; when the consideration is added, that the Ionians must want absolutely new Terms to express the improvements that their Teachers gave them, and from whence is it probable they shou'd draw them, but from these Teachers themselves? Certainly this is the most obvious Process, in the introduction of arts, amongst a rude unciviliz'd People, and therefore it is fit to look for and expect some footsteps of the old Pelasgic Language in the Remains of the Phœnician, upon this view of things.—But the old Phœnician Tongue was that of the Canaanites, since the Phœnicians, I think, it is universally agreed, were the Canaanites; but the Language of the Canaanites and the Children of Israel (at the time of their Exit from Egypt) appear by the sacred History to have been nearly one and the same, and therefore the Phœnician Tongue is to be found in what remains of the Hebrew in the Bible. But as to this primæval Adamic Language that is to correspond to this other, and to be the foundation or support of the four Oriental Dialects before enumerated, there does not appear to be the least Shadow of Authority or Proof for its subsistence, nor is it so much as pretended, (unless the learned Writers own Hypothesis can

can be look'd upon as such) and therefore, in this view, there is a manifest difference between the two cases, as much, almost, as between Existence and Non-existence.

If to this consideration it shou'd be added, that Noah most probably spoke the Language of Adam, since there were but few generations betwixt them, and we do not hear of any Language but one during that Period; and if Noah spoke it, then Shem. But Shem was the Progenitor of, and likewise Co-temporary with the great Father of the faithful, and therefore it is reasonable to think that they both spake the same Language. When God was pleased to single out Abraham, to make him the grand Promise, that in him *all the Families of the Earth shou'd be blessed* (Gen. 12. v. 3) and commanded him to depart from his native Country of Chaldea, it is certainly but proper to think He should carry the true Adamic language along with him; and when we consider, that in his line was to arise the great inspired Recorder of the History of the Creation, and of God's dealings with Mankind, down to his own time; the presumption is strongly that it was continued to his Age, especially when there are no grounds, or the least Historical Evidence to presume the contrary.

But if Moses possess'd this Tongue, then we have it in the Pentateuch, and therefore whatever variations may appear in the present Chaldee from the Language we have there, the most natural account of them certainly is, that they grew up in time after Abraham's Departure, and therefore that it is a Dialect of the Hebrew. But if the Chaldee is to be look'd upon as a Dialect to the Language of Abraham, much more must the Arabie be so, since the Arabians were for the most part Ismaelites, and Descendants from the loins of Abraham, and therefore had their original language from him, and the future Additions or Alterations in it, i.e. the Dialectic part, from themselves. As to the Syriac Language, the Learned seem to affix different notions to it, the most ancient Syriac they make to be exactly the same with, or only another expression for the Chaldee, whilst that which is Syriac, properly so called, and as contra-distinguish'd from the Chaldaic
Tongue,

Tongue, commenc'd after the Captivity, and was a mixture of some of the old Hebrew words which the Jews used before that Period with the Language they had acquired from their new Masters, together with some additions from the Greek and Roman Languages, &c. if therefore reason can be found, why the Chaldee should be consider'd as a Dialect of the language of Moses, much stronger may in this view of things appear for making the Syriac so, and consequently they all three, Chaldee, Arabic, Syriac, may justly be considered as Dialects of the Hebrew, which we have in the Pentateuch. And this doubtless much more naturally, and with much better foundation, than to suppose them all four equally Dialects of a Language, whose very Being may upon as good grounds be deny'd as affirm'd, since there is not the least signs or traces of it any where but what appears in these four supposed Dialects themselves.

The learned Buxtorff says, that the specimen we have of Chaldee in the Books of Daniel, &c. is to be look'd upon as the standard of the genuine Purity of it, and why the Pentateuch of Moses shou'd not in the same way be consider'd as a genuine standard of the true ancient Language, that of Abraham, Noah, and Adam, I must confess, I can't at present, see any plausible objection. The Presumptions appear to me at least strongly for it, and I hope even from this short and imperfect Sketch of some of them, they may appear so to you likewise.

But here from my suggesting it to be high'y probable that the Language of Moses was that of Adam, pray do not think that I am any way inclin'd to the wild Rabinical notion of the absolute Sacredness of the Hebrew Language, as such, and consequently its, as it were, indefeasable Right to all God's Revelations being convey'd in it. If I have but the Jewel, it is not material in what sort of a Casket I receive it; and if the Author of our Religion, or his inspired Apostles had thought fit to translate the old Testament into the *Greek* Tongue, I shou'd have then thoroughly rested in that, and thought any further enquiry absolutely superfluous,

I have not done yet. This Subject of the Oriental Dialects seems to be a very nice and copious one, yet if I had Skill, Leisure, and Patience sufficient (which I am far from pretending to, especially the first) to beat so ample a Field compleatly, the Occasion of a Note, and likewise my present Enquiry wou'd not be quite so proper for it; however, I cannot help here giving you a short observation or two, which, I hope, will not cloud, but rather throw a little Light upon this Topic, that may not be entirely disagreeable to you.

Permit me then to observe to you, that one of the best arguments (where positive historical evidence of the point is wanting) that a Language is not an Original one, seems to be the Anomalies in it, or its variations from the regular Analogy of Grammar; if therefore the Hebrew, properly so called (for clearness sake, let us say the Mosaic Pentateuch) contains any of these (and that it does, I fancy, is a Point that will hardly be disputed) this may be a presumption that it is so far dialectical to another more ancient primæval Language that wants them.

But yet even this argument, upon a closer survey, will be found to be inconclusive; for it is more than probable, that no One ever actually spoke in an *unanomolous* Language, that is, one which is entirely so, which was perhaps,

A faultless Monster that the world ne'er saw.

For whence do Anomalies arise? I imagine that they owe their origin either to absolute Necessity, or to the Climate, or to what is called by the Grammarians *Euphoniæ gratiâ*, i. e. a Regard to Harmony, or lastly sometimes to Whim or Humour, i. e. a Cause unaccountable. For it may be observed, that there neither is, nor perhaps ever was, any Language, that had all its Words of such a kind, as could be well pronounc'd thro' all their regular inflexions; whenever, therefore, a difficulty of this sort occur'd, the method to avoid it wou'd be by introducing an Anomaly in that place. But, supposing all was right thus far, yet the Climate may sometimes have a kind of Mechanical effect upon the pronunciation, and conduce by that means to introduce Anomalies into a Language; I shou'd chuse for an instance of this kind, that

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Passage of sacred Writ (Judges 12. v. 6.) where the word Shibboleth was put as a Test to the unhappy Ephraimites, who, by their ill success, in pronouncing it with a *Samech*, betray'd their Country, and in consequence their lives into the hands of the Enemy; this, I say, I wou'd chuse as an Instance for this particular, because, I take it, that the Climate will do more towards accounting for it than any thing else. — Yet further, if both the regular inflexions and the Climate shou'd plead their innocence, and stand clear of a charge of this nature, yet a Regard to Harmony will sometimes make way for these Anomalies: for it frequently happens that regular words, which in themselves are smooth and easy to the organs of pronunciation, yet are of an unsociable Temper, or at least bear a sort of Antipathy to some particular Brethren, and will not join kindly with them; in this case Anomalies wou'd at first be apt to offer themselves, as the easiest means of an accommodation. From hence it is, I apprehend, that we meet with so frequent and promiscuous Use of all the Græcian Dialects in the great King of Harmony and Poets—Homer: but not to go to Greece and Poetry for an Instance, let us take a more humble, and less distant one for our present purpose.

Pray may I ask you, did you not find some difficulty in articulating a sentence just above? I am sure that I did myself, and altho' I cou'd perhaps have varied it, yet I chose to put it down with a set design, that you might find the same. This is a piece of rudeness and inconsideration that nothing can justify but the ultimate intention for which it was done and it will be well if that can do it; however I was willing to run the Hazard. Is it necessary to point out the sentence? when you have so lately read the assertion, 'That it is more than probable that never any one actually spoke in an *unanimous* Language. This then I look upon as a good instance of the want of Harmony, and therefore by some reflections upon it, it may serve our purpose as well as a positive example on the opposite side. Now its inharmoniousness arises not from the syllables themselves (absolutely consider'd) but their *collocation*; for each syllable, in the part where the exception lies,

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is neither overloaded with vowels or consonants so as to make it difficult to the organs of speech, and in consequence devoid of Harmony, but each consists of a vowel and a consonant only, and the Fault arises entirely from their situation, for the consonant is one and the same thro' all the four syllables, without a pause between them; and this at once conduces to render the Tongue of the speaker almost paralytic, and creates at the same time a sort of Lassitude and Pain upon the Organ of hearing. Here therefore is a fair invitation (if the Genius of our Language wou'd permit it in this case) to introduce some Anomaly, and so likewise in similar instances. Anomalies may also in the last place sometimes arise from, what I call, Whim and Humour, i. e. the Cause is not with any degree of probability resolvable into those before mentioned, nor is it otherwise to be accounted for, yet, I fancy, this but seldom happens, and therefore upon both these reasons, I shall drop it without any further animadversions upon it.

To bring this point to a conclusion.—If then these general Causes of Anomalies are justly assigned, it will follow, that the Language of Adam might in all probability have them as well as that of his Descendants, and therefore, notwithstanding any Anomalies that may subsist in the present Hebrew of Moses, it might still be the very Original Language of Adam, and therefore not a Dialect of it, but itself the Parent and support of all the other eastern Dialects.

If that which is styled the primæval Language were supposed to be one entirely compleat, without any the least Anomaly, an Ideal Language, like the general models in Painting and Sculpture, which never had any architypical real existence altogether, but in the Minds of the Artists themselves, then indeed it might be true and proper to say the Hebrew (strictly so called) is dialectical, as well as the other Eastern Dialects; but it wou'd be trifling, because by the same way, we might make all the Languages that ever were actually in Being dialectical: besides, this is not what is commonly meant, when it is said, this or that is a Dialect of this or that Language, for here the Parent Language is supposed to have, or to have had as real actual an Existence as
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its Off spring, and to have been worn in the Mouths of Men equally with it ; but, as we have shewn it highly probable, that all such Languages must, almost of necessity, have always had some Anomalies,—a Step or two further wou'd bring us to the conclusion that I have already just drawn, and therefore I shall desist here without repeating it.

P. 93. (I) Gnolam vau Gnad. Might not this with propriety enough be render'd,—the *Commencement and Procession of Eternity*? It may indeed be said, *that there is no Procession of Eternity*. And in respect of the supreme infinite Being, who at once grasps and comprehends all things, it is true ; but as we can at no time conceive it possible for a finite Being to have any Idea of duration, but from succession, hence such a Phraseology as—the *Procession of Eternity*, will always be justly applicable to Natures of that kind.

P. 107. (K) Take what a very remarkable and learned Author says upon this particular, which fell in my way since I wrote this to you, altho' I will not be bound to subscribe to all his notions,—Transporter, says He, dans des Siècles reculés toutes les Idees du Siècle où l'on vit, c'est des Sources de l'erreur celle qui est la plus féconde. A ces gens qui veulent rendre modernes tous les Siècles anciens je dirai ce que les Pretres d'Egypte dirent a Solon, O Atheniens, vous n'etes que des Enfans.—Esprit des Loix. L. 30. C. 14. P. 437. Vol. 2. Quart. Ed. i. e. To carry all the Ideas of the Age in which we live into remote Ages, is one of the most fruitful Sources of error. To all those People that wou'd make all the ancient Ages put on a modern Air or Appearance, I will say what the Priests of Egypt said to Solon, O Athenians, you (as yet) are but Children or Infants. It is plain the learned Writer, by *modern*, here means the *civilized World* ; and therefore his Observation can be no bar to the propriety of that Illustration of the case of our first Parents, which I before drew from the *savage* and *uncivilized* Inhabitants of the present Earth.

NOTES in ESSAY II.

P. 143. (L) **M**Y Reasons for it are these. In the first place such a supply of Air to the *blood* from the *lungs* seems to be superfluous, since all the air that is found by Analysis to be in it, and by being there, I suppose necessary to it, may be sufficiently accounted for, as derived from other channels, I mean by the nourishment convey'd by the *laeals*, through the *chyliferous duct* into the blood, and therefore there seems to be no occasion for any of it to be received by this way. But adly, some, I believe, have been led into this notion from the fine florid colour that the *arterial blood* enjoys, and which they have supposed it to acquire in its passage through the lungs; for it is observable, that some time after the operation of bleeding, the *venal blood*, upon being exposed to the air, or the under part of the *crassamentum*, after a little time being turn'd up, is frequently apt to gain a degree of floridity, which it had not before; from hence they have inferr'd, that the stronger and fuller redness of the arterial contents is owing to such a kind of communication of the air by means of the lungs. But if this fast appearance will admit of an easier and more feasible solution, I apprehend this fact of a communication may and ought to be disputed till some better argument is offered for it than this appearance.

From whence the blood had its rubicundity at all, I fancy, has been a point not a little enigmatical to the learned Naturalist, but some microscopic observations made not a great while

while ago (the account of the experiment I have not read myself, but had it from one well conversant in these matters, who had) upon the circulation of the blood in the tails of fishes, it seems in a good measure to be tolerably accounted for : for there it was observed, that in the slow motion of the fluid at the extremities, and in its passage thro' the narrow canals from the arteries to the veins, that several of the red globules were triturated and broke into five or six pieces, and upon that became serous, i. e. more pellucid, and lost their former hue; hence it was inferr'd, and I think with the strongest appearance of reason, that the redness of the blood is owing to the density and compactness of it as one chief, if not sole cause) since, when that is destroy'd or weaken'd, as in the just mention'd process, we see it lost its red colour. And this remark receives, moreover, no small confirmation from two other very common ones, *viz.* that the Quantity of Serum in the venal, is much greater in proportion than in the arterial blood, and that the Crassamentum is of greater specific gravity than the Serum.

But if this is the case, it may shew us that one office of the *lungs* in sanguification is not to give its florid rubicundity to the blood, by admitting some of the breathed air through its small vesicles into it, since that effect can be produced by their only conquassating, intimately mixing and compacting the as yet uncompleted mass of venal blood and chyle sent into them from the right ventricle of the Heart.

But enough of this; you now have the reasons why I do not think that there is an immediate intercourse between the blood and the air from the lungs; and you see that I have frankly given you them, altho', in the present case, they make in some degree against myself; yet, I hope, your good sense will likewise readily shew you, that they by no means so far do so, as to render the use of the word (*noa*) in the Etymon of the Term *Nusmeh*, ineffectual: if these reasons had been on the side of this able and learned writer's conjecture, I should have been better pleased, since then the word would have been more elegantly adapted to my purpose, but yet, still, as it now stands, according to what was last said of it
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in my Letter, I think it bids fairest for the preference, from the rules of Etymology, put in practice by the learned Author of the Originals, and likewise from the Truth of things.

You, I fancy, will be ready to smile, and think, that in all this Note I have been stepping not a little out of my Province: well, to be plain with you, it would be great vanity in me to pretend to any depth of knowledge, in that part of Science, of which the Topick just insisted upon is a branch, yet, if any one, (as it were by accident) gleans up something of that kind, and can apply it any how to serve the cause of truth, it is putting it to one of its noblest uses: and yet, after all, I do not imagine, that so illustrious a piece of the *Divine Mechanism*, as is the material Part of Man, can be thought entirely foreign to the business of those, who have professed to make the study of Nature in some degree their employment.

P. 193. (M) The Prevalence of Prophecy under the old dispensation, and the Cause assigned of it, 2. Pet. i. v. 21. and likewise what is said in Acts Ch. xxxviii. v. 25. Heb. vi. v. 7, &c. seem to shew, that to the Agency of this Spirit were to be ascribed the Inspirations of the Holy Pen-Men, and that it was the *commonly allowed* Cause likewise.

P. 194. (N) Here, perhaps, it may be thought, that, by saying, *three leading Ideas of the human composition*, I shall go so far as to make *the Assistance and Co-operation of the Holy Spirit* a Part of the human Frame, which would not be quite so proper, after what has been a little before said, in respect to this Particular; all that I shall just observe upon it is this, that by dividing the intellectual System of the human nature, into three Parts, I plainly distinguish between the animal and rational Soul in Man, and the divine operation upon them, which, let me add, is all that here seems necessary: but farther, this last in a qualify'd Sense, and a remote view of it

is capable of being beheld, even as a Part of the composition of man, i. e. as this Assistance is to be the fruit of his own endeavours; by a proper application to the Throne of Grace for it, and as, whatever good is done in consequence of it will be entirely imputed to him: but, however, as he has no claim to call it *his*, but in this very remote and qualified view, I have added a saving clause, which, I hope, keeps the point clear from any suspicions of impropriety, that might arise from the former expression.

F I N I S.

4 OCT 58

ERRATA.

Page 40. l. 17. read (*sob*) P. 48. l. 26. read *Nusneib*
Chijm. P. 139. l. 18. read *bring it from*. P. 140. l. 10.
 read *but*. P. 150. l. 2. read *myself*. P. 154. l. 20. put a :
 pro . At line 22. put . pro : — P. 159. l. 14. one part of
 the Hyphen wanting (. P. 160. l. 18. read *insert*.
 P. 173. l. 24. insert at the end of the Parenthesis — ; —
 P. 179. l. 1. read *continually*. P. 181. l. 16. insert *not* be-
 tween may—and—do. P. 186. l. 21. read *tantamount*.
 P. 214. l. 24. insert between from and its—*is*.

RE R A T A

P. 170. A. 1. read (left) P. 178. A. 2. read Venerabilis
Capit. P. 179. A. 1. read data in stem. P. 180. A. 1. 10.
read but P. 180. A. 2. read wylde. P. 184. A. 20. but a 1.
pro. At que 22. pro: — P. 180. A. 14. one part of
the fiftien wylde. P. 181. A. 18. read inent.
P. 173. X. 24. inent. the fawntels —
P. 179. A. 1. read continually. P. 181. A. 18. inent not de.
ween may — and — do. P. 180. A. 21. read inent.
P. 214. A. 24. inent between from and is — in.

